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SUMMARY STATEMENT 
This report summarizes deliberations over the Access to Human Genetic Resources held 
during a stakeholder dialogue process launched by the World Business Council for 
Sustainable Development (WBCSD) in 2001/2002. The dialogue process was 
designed to explore options of companies to address contested issues of intellec-
tual property in their business strategies. To that end, companies were exposed to 
the concerns of stakeholders and urged to define responses to these concerns. The 
project involved major companies and transnational non-governmental organiza-
tions as well as renowned experts in the field of intellectual property rights.  
This paper briefly sketches the project and the process of the dialogue. The 
products of the process are the opinions, both concurring and dissenting, that the 
participants reached on the access to human genetic resources, subsumed in the 
final report to the WBCSD that emerged from the project. This paper also reviews 
documents (Circulars) from the proceedings, which further illustrate the dynamics 
of the deliberations, and the range and direction of arguments exchanged by the 
participants. 
 
ZUSAMMENFASSUNG 
Das Diskussionspapier stellt die Ergebnisse dar, die im Rahmen eines vom World 
Business Council on Sustainable Development (WBCSD) initiierten Stakeholder 
Dialogs zum Thema Zugang zur humangenetischen Ressourcen erreicht worden 
sind. Ziel des Dialogs war es zu untersuchen, welche Optionen Unternehmen 
haben, öffentlichen Kritiken am geltenden Regime des geistigen Eigentums durch 
Anpassung ihrer Strategien Rechnung zu tragen. Beteiligt waren an dem Dialog 
Vertreter von großen pharmazeutischen Firmen und von transnational operieren-
den Nichtregierungsorganisationen, sowie Experten des Rechts des geistigen 
Eigentums. 
Das Diskussionspapier skizziert Charakter und Verlauf des Dialogverfahrens. 
Im Zentrum stehen die Ergebnisse zum Thema Zugang zur humangenetischen 
Ressourcen, wie sie in den vom World Business Council herausgegebenen End-
berichts des Stakeholder Dialogs eingegangen sind — mit der Kennzeichnung der 
jeweils übereinstimmenden oder abweichenden Positionen der Teilnehmer. Es 
folgt eine kurze Diskussion dieser Ergebnisse. Im Anhang werden zentrale 
Dokumente des Verfahrens (Circulars) abgedruckt, die Einblick geben in die 
Dynamik der Verhandlungen und die Reichweite und Richtung der von den Teil-
nehmern ausgetauschten Argumente. 
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1. The Project: In Search of New IPR Policy Options for 
Pharmaceutical Companies 
In 2001 the World Business Council for Sustainable Development (WBCSD) 
launched a project to engage transnational pharmaceutical companies and non-
governmental organizations in a dialogue over the proper role and limits of intel-
lectual property rights (IPRs) in the development of medical biotechnology. Pro-
ject Working Groups dealt with three issues areas that raise broad public concerns 
and confront companies with the need to reconsider their IPR policies: Access to 
Human Genetic Resources, Protection of Traditional Knowledge, and Access to 
Essential Medicines. 
The WBCSD is a coalition of 160 international companies sharing a commit-
ment to sustainable development. Council members considered the dialogue pro-
ject as part of their broader efforts to find options for business strategies that meet 
the requirements of social, political, and ethical “sustainability”. Accordingly, the 
focus of the project was on what the companies themselves might contribute in 
order to resolve contested IPR issues, given the economic criteria under which 
they operate. Participants, of course, had to be aware of existing legal regimes of 
IPR (in particular, the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Prop-
erty Rights, “TRIPS”), but they were expected to explore options for societal self-
regulation within and beyond those regimes. 
Some of the rationales and premises underlying the project are described in 
the following excerpts from the document that outlined the project and called for 
the participation of the stakeholders1:  
 
Conflicts over IPRs 
Existing regimes of IPRs are contested. Companies would defend them as a 
suitable and, in fact, necessary strategy to secure a return on the investments 
necessary to produce useful knowledge. … Companies hold that these regimes 
serve a social and not merely a private function: By providing incentives for 
innovation and mobilizing resources for research IPRs will accelerate and 
multiply technological development that benefits the whole society. In con-
trast, critics argue that IPRs, particularly patent protection, in fact create unfair 
monopolistic advantage and concentrated market control; they defend exces-
sive prices and profits, and deprive societies of the benefits of rapid dissemi-
nation and use of new knowledge. … Strong IPRs are suspected of concen-
trating strategic knowledge in the hands of some exclusive global business 
players, making it even more difficult for developing countries to gain access 
to and derive benefits from new technologies. This further exacerbates already 
existing imbalances in the world economy. 
                                                                    
1 Framework for a Stakeholder Dialogue Proposed by the World Business Council for Sustainable 
Development (WBCSD), downloadable from the internet at: <http://www.wz-berlin.de/ipr-dialogue>. 
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Emerging Patterns of Global Governance 
While the contested issues may ultimately require national or international 
regulation, regulatory policies may be slow. … Strategies that involve non-
state actors (including the business sector) in processes of negotiated policy 
making and private-public partnerships are likely to coexist with legal interna-
tional regimes in the emerging processes of global governance. Such strategies 
give political mandate (and corresponding duties) to global players from the 
private sector of business and from the civil society sector of non-governmen-
tal organizations. This implies that business enterprises are able and willing to 
address criteria beyond short-term profit making and shareholder value in their 
corporate policies, and that non-governmental organizations are able and will-
ing to engage in limited taskforce like cooperation in addition to and beyond 
strategies of protest designed to raise public awareness or encourage public 
resistance. 
The Notion of “Embedded” Economy 
The WBCSD project assumes as given the premise that companies operate on 
markets that are … to a certain extent at least, also communities where people 
act as citizens and as stakeholders pursuing social, political, or cultural con-
cerns beyond purely economic interests. … The WBCSD is aware of the social 
and political embeddedness of the market economy. In fact, such awareness 
was the very reason for establishing the Council in the first place. The question 
is, of course, how such awareness can be translated into operational rules for 
corporate management in a competitive, transnational environment. To expose 
companies as visibly as possible to the concerns of stakeholders will be a nec-
essary condition. In the IPR case, the challenge is to devise business strategies 
and use legal rights in such a way that they strike a fair balance between the 
need to protect intellectual property and maximize return on investment, on the 
one hand, and the need to provide access to new knowledge and distribute the 
benefits of innovation to the society—especially the developing countries—on 
the other. 
 
2. The Process: Deliberations with Stakeholders 
IPR issues are discussed in numerous formal and informal arenas. The WBCSD 
project was specific, in that it convened conflicting parties in a sustained effort to 
sort out views, positions, and options through dialogue. While “dialogue” is the 
accepted norm in dealing with embattled political questions, it is seldom the social 
reality. In most settings the parties lack the time or capacity, or mandate to engage 
in extended deliberations over the arguments put forward. The WCBSD project 
intended to break that pattern, in keeping with models provided by previous pro-
jects such as the Keystone Dialogue or the Crucible Group.2 
The IPR Dialogue Process involved some 50 participants: representatives 
from companies and civil society organizations, experts on IPR, and a number of 
                                                                    
2 See, for example, The Crucible Group: People, Plants, and Patents—The Impact of Intellectual Prop-
erty on Trade, Plant Biodiversity, and Rural Society, IDRC, Ottawa 1994; or, The Crucible II Group: 
Seeding Solutions, Vol. 1: Policy Options for Genetic Resources, IDRC, Ottawa 2000, and Vol. 2: 
Options for National Laws Governing Control Over Genetic Resources and Biological Innovations, 
IDRC, Ottawa, 2001. 
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observers from international organizations or governmental bodies. It included 
two face-to-face meetings, one conference in the beginning to decide the agenda 
and the rules of the Dialogue (Montreux, May 2001), and one conference towards 
the end (London, February 2002) to discuss the contents and procedure for draft-
ing the final report of the project. Communication before, during, and after the 
conferences proceeded via internet exchange. 
Communication through the internet was vital for the project. Without it, effi-
cient cooperation of participants from 15 countries around the world would not 
have been possible. The Montreux conference gave the mandate to organize and 
moderate the internet exchanges and conferences to a team of scientists from the 
Social Science Research Center Berlin (Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin fuer Sozial-
forschung) (WZB).3 The WZB team was expected to provide surveys of arguments 
on the topics that the participants put on the project agenda. Moreover, the mem-
bers of the team screened the transactions of the Working Groups that dealt with 
these topics at the first conference, and analyzed related documents and literature 
proposed by the participants. The surveys of arguments were circulated back to 
the participants for response, further questions, and criticism. The responses, in 
turn, were synthesized and presented to the participants to be discussed at the 
London conference. 
This procedure gave the WZB team a major role in preparing and supporting 
the deliberations throughout the project. Such a role was indispensable in view of 
the complex issues and interactions that had to be managed within the time sched-
uled for the Dialogue. It was understood that the WZB team would guarantee 
transparency of all transactions, and act according to the rule that full control over 
the Dialogue process rest with the participants. This rule implied, in particular, that 
the participants decide what to include in a report from the project, or what to add 
to such a report as commentary or dissenting opinion. 
Formal supervision of the Dialogue process was exercised by a Steering 
Committee established by the participants at the first project conference in 
Montreux. The Steering Committee was in charge of organizing, compiling, and 
editing the final project report.4 
                                                                    
3 The WZB team included: Wolfgang van den Daele, Rainer Döbert, Achim Seiler and Jost Wagner. At 
the London conference Michael Lesnick and Heather Lair (Meridian Institute, Washington) acted as a 
facilitators. 
4 Project Steering Committee: Carlos Correa, University of Buenos Aires; Thomas Cueni, Roche Pharma-
ceuticals; Wolfgang van den Daele, Social Science Research Center Berlin; Johnson A. Ekpere, Univer-
sity of Ibadan, Nigeria; Maurice Iwu, Bioresources Development and Conservation Programme, 
Burkina Faso; Achim Seiler, Social Science Research Center Berlin; Patricia Solaro, Aventis; Ross 
Stevens, World Business Council for Sustainable Development. 
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STEPS IN THE IPR STAKEHOLDER DIALOGUE PROCESS* 
 
3. The Product: Conclusions on the Access to Human Genetic 
Resources from the Final Report to the WBCSD5 
The following pages contain an excerpt from the Final Report (July 2002) of the 
IPR Stakeholder Dialogue (part 1, “Access to Human Genetic Resources”). The 
footnote numbers in this excerpt correspond to the numbers in the original text. 
                                                                    
5 World Business Council for Sustainable Development (ed.), Intellectual Property Rights in Biotechnol-
ogy and Health Care—Results of a Stakeholder Dialogue, July 2002. This document is available from 
the WZB and the WBCSD (4 chemin de Conches, CH-1231 Conches-Geneva, Switzerland). It can also 
be downloaded from the respective websites: see <http://www.wz-berlin.de/ipr-dialogue/> or 
<http://www.wbcsd.org/> (under the rubric “Publications and Reports”). 
March 2001 Framework for a Stakeholder Dialogue Proposed by the 
WBCSD 
May 2001 First Conference (in Montreux, Switzerland) 
Up to February 2002 Circulars to the participants (surveys of arguments from 
the First Conference and related documents) 
Responses to the circulars 
Synthesis of responses to the circulars and points to 
consider for conclusions 
Steps towards conclusions (proposals to be considered for 
the final report at the Second Conference) 
February 2002 Second Conference (in London, United Kingdom) 
Up to July 2002 Proposals for the Final Report based on the proceedings of 
the London conference 
Responses to the proposals, revisions, additions, dissenting 
opinions 
July 2002 Final Report of the Dialogue Process to the WBCSD 
*Documents indicated in bold are included in this report insofar as they relate to HRG. 
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Access to Human Genetic Resources  
Human genetic research is becoming a key resource for the development of effective 
new medicines. Accordingly, pharmaceutical companies have a vital interest in 
knowing under what conditions such research, if pursued in a business context, would 
be regarded as legitimate and accepted in the society. What rules should companies 
apply in collecting and storing data and samples from a large number of individuals? 
To what extent should pharmaceutical companies claim exclusive rights to use the 
data and sample collections? What is the proper scope for intellectual property rights 
on research results, on the road to development of the commercial product? 
The participants of the Stakeholder Dialogue Process addressed these questions in 
their deliberations. Main conclusions are summarized under three headings:  
− protecting the autonomy and the rights and interests of research subjects 
(informed consent, benefit sharing) 
− balancing private and public uses of data and samples collected by compa-
nies (research consortia, access to databases)  
− calibrating intellectual property rights (gene patents)  
A. Protecting the Autonomy, Rights, and Interests of Research 
Subjects: Informed Consent and Benefit Sharing 
(1) Background and Contexts 
The principle of informed consent (IC) is unchallenged. Views differ, however, with 
respect to the regulations this principle implies. Industry tends to take a formal rule-
of-law view that emphasizes the autonomy of the research subjects. Accordingly, it 
should be the choice of the subjects to say “yes” or “no” to the conditions of the 
research relationship: for instance, whether or not to demand benefit sharing, allow 
data and samples to be stored after a research project ends, or give broad consent to 
future projects. Stakeholders, in contrast, tend to take a substantive political view, 
emphasizing the contexts of power relations and inequality within which research 
subjects take decisions. From their perspective, IC is not just the acknowledgment of 
autonomy, but foremost a mechanism that empowers the weak to resist the strong. 
Accordingly, no decisions should be accepted by which research subjects give away 
control or do not use the options for control extensively. 
In part, this difference may be more one of degree than of principle. After all, exist-
ing regulations do both: they acknowledge and strengthen subjective choice, and they 
impose some “objective” normative order that restrains choice. However, the differ-
ence is more profound. It makes it difficult to provide guidance for companies 
through a set of accepted rules that demarcate legitimate corporate behavior. Stake-
holders tend to emphasize the need to take the social contexts into account, within 
which such rules should operate. Thus compliance with accepted rules will be essen-
tial; it will provide legitimacy only to the extent that the rules are perceived as con-
stituting proper safeguards against the risks of genetic research and against the 
asymmetry of power and the hegemony of culture that prevails in the society. 
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1. Building a Trust Relationship. Companies should take special care to demon-
strate that the relationship they seek with the research subjects will be equal 
and fair and based on mutual respect. Companies need to demonstrate that 
the presumptions of mistrust are unwarranted, which are widely held in soci-
ety because of the inequalities in terms of power and information between 
companies and research subjects. 
2. The Ethical Order of the Research Relationship. Respect for autonomy is the 
most important principle for the protection of research subjects, but it is not 
the only yardstick of a legitimate research relationship. For example, the 
Helsinki Declaration determines that subjects cannot give consent to research 
that involves them in unreasonable risks. There are rules beyond informed 
consent that constitute the ethical order of the research relationship, and 
these must not be violated—even if the subject agrees. Companies should be 
particularly committed to these rules and possibly amend them with a view 
to giving additional legitimacy to research in the business context.  
3. Protection against Social Risks of Genetic Research. The future uses of the 
results of human genetic research in the society cannot be determined and 
monitored within the research relationship. However, the research will only 
be accepted if people can reasonably expect that misuse of the results and 
social risks from genetics will effectively be controlled in the society. Com-
panies should support legal regulations that control such risks: data protec-
tion, anti-discrimination legislation, etc. 
4. Value of Genetic Research. The Dialogue Process proceeded from the 
assumption that human genetic population research, if properly designed and 
controlled, may be valuable and in fact desirable, not only for the companies, 
but also for the society. While this premise was generally accepted, stake-
holders pointed out that some communities could decide to opt out of such 
research as a matter of principle. It was acknowledged that communities 
have a right to do so, according to community rules, whenever the decision 
to participate in the research is a group-level decision. It was also accepted 
that (notwithstanding the requirement of individual consent) the basic deci-
sion of whether or not access to human genes should be granted for research 
belongs to the society at large.3 
(2) Informed Consent (IC) 
5. Genuine Consent—the Right to Say “No”. All parties in the Dialogue Pro-
cess agreed that genuine consent by the research subjects is a precondition 
for including their data and samples in the research. The modalities of “con-
sent” must be determined from the cultural perspectives of the subjects, i.e., 
on the basis of their perceptions and values, not from the professional 
framework of the researchers. Subjects must be completely free to say “no” 
to the research, and no attempt should be made to coerce, manipulate or 
“buy” them into participation. 
                                                                    
3 It was pointed out as a problem that ethical objections which are culture-specific could block access 
to human genes that might be beneficial for human health in general. The solution seems to be that in 
such a case the requisite research is shifted to countries that do not object to access to human genes 
for moral reasons. 
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6. Explicit Consent—the Need to Opt In. Public interest may justify exemptions 
from the requirements of IC. National legal regulation and professional tra-
dition allow researchers, in certain cases, to draw on personal (identifiable) 
data and samples of subjects without consent or with reference to presumed 
consent. Companies should not use any of these exemptions for research in 
the business context. Rather, they should commit themselves unequivocally 
to the principle of explicit consent. They should always ask participants to 
opt into the research and not be content with the provision that participants 
can opt out—even if national law permits such an approach.4 
7. IC and the Use of Databases. Companies should not use databases that col-
lect personal data and samples without explicit IC. Exemptions from IC, 
which may be justifiable in the public interest, should not be exploited for 
private research. 
8. Withdrawal of Data and Samples. The Helsinki Declaration rules that sub-
jects in medical research can withdraw their participation at any time. The 
right to withdraw is an element of the ethical order of research with human 
subjects, and it cannot be renounced in IC. Companies emphasize that the 
rule fully applies when subjects contribute their personal data and biological 
samples. Subjects should, however, be free to authorize the anonymization of 
the data, or the uses of samples that make withdrawal unfeasible in terms 
such as their incorporation into secondary products.  
9. Sharing Samples and Data. Anonymous data and samples incorporated in 
further products cannot be withdrawn. Data or samples shared (with consent) 
with research partners can, however, be withdrawn as long as they are identi-
fiable. 
10. IC for Commercial Uses. Companies shall disclose the commercial uses they 
envisage for the data and samples collected, and get IC for such use. Disclo-
sure shall include the intention to develop secondary products (e.g., cell 
lines) from samples and to claim IPRs (patents) for inventions derived from 
the research based on the collected data and samples.  
11. Unforeseen Purposes of Research—Re-Consent. If data and samples are to 
be used for other purposes than those agreed upon in the IC process, compa-
nies should always go back to the subjects and ask for new consent, unless 
data and samples were anonymized with the initial consent.5 But it is 
acknowledged that the administrative burden of obtaining re-consent could 
be minimized by allowing consent for circumscribed areas of disease. 
12. Collected Data—Storage and Use. Collections of (non-anonymized) data and 
samples constitute valuable resources for future research. Therefore compa-
nies should, with due consent, be allowed to store them over a longer per-
                                                                    
4 One participant from industry expressed the desire to have uniform IC requirements, i.e., irrespective 
of whether research would be undertaken by public or private organizations. Another participant from 
industry endorsed the above statement for the future but considered it inappropriate if industry uses 
data (or samples) it has legally obtained under a presumed consent rule in the past. In those cases 
industry should not be obliged to seek explicit consent from the subjects retroactively.  
5 The proposal made by a participant from industry, to confine the need for re-consent to a period of, 
say, ten years, was not widely accepted. 
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iod.6 However, the use of the stored data and samples may be blocked under 
the requirement of re-consent, if subjects can no longer be retrieved or if they 
are deceased.7  
13. Anonymous Data and Samples. Data and samples anonymized with consent 
may be stored and used without restrictions, within the rules of law and the 
provisions of the competent ethical review committee. 
14. Broad Consent—Purposes of Research. If the research projects for which 
data and samples are supposed to be used cannot be fully specified at the 
time when consent would be requested, the subjects cannot, strictly speaking, 
become fully informed. Participants concluded that subjects could neverthe-
less give consent in such cases, if they feel that they have sufficient trust. 
The crucial point is that consent must be genuine and emanate from the value 
system and assessment of the subjects, not of the researchers. Subjects may, 
for instance, decide whether or not to agree with the use of their data and 
samples in future research for circumscribed areas of disease. Such consent 
avoids blanket authorization for unlimited purposes, on the one hand, but 
reduces the administrative burden to obtaining re-consent, on the other. All 
future research projects have to be evaluated by appropriate ethical review 
bodies.  
15. Research in DCs. Companies from the North should be particularly careful 
in research projects not to take advantage of poor, uninformed local people 
from the South; they should not, however, as a matter of principle, abstain 
from doing research in the South. As one stakeholder from the South put it, 
exclusion is now at the center of inequity, not exploitation. It is therefore 
important that decent and transparent research relationships with local com-
munities be established.  
16. Community Consent. Whether individual IC is sufficient to legitimize the 
collection of personal data and samples depends on the culture of the com-
munity. Traditional or indigenous communities tend to require approval by 
the group. Modern communities tend to leave the decision with the individ-
ual, within the confines of legal regulations. When community consent is 
required, its refusal overrides the consent of the individual to participate; but 
community approval is not a substitute for the lack of individual consent. 
17. Groups Affected by the Research. It was discussed whether groups who 
could possibly be affected by the outcome of the research should have the 
right to authorize and, if they deem it necessary, to veto the research. In this 
case the need to negotiate IC would be extended to a large number of groups 
(patients, gene carriers, age groups, ethnic groups, persons seeking insurance 
or employment, etc.) who do not form a community proper and have no 
mandate to speak for, and act on behalf of, the research subject. The partici-
pants of the Dialogue Process felt that the legitimate concerns of such 
                                                                    
6 One stakeholder requested, instead, that all data and samples should, as a rule, be destroyed once the 
agreed upon research has been accomplished. 
7 One participant suggested that in this case the data and samples might still be used if they were 
removed from the exclusive realm of the company and placed under the rules and controls of public 
research. 
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groups should be addressed by legal regulation, but not by including them in 
the consent requirement.  
18. Community Consultation. It was considered appropriate, however, that 
companies consult with groups in the society that may possibly be affected 
by the consequences of the research and, eventually, support demands for 
regulations that protect these groups.8 
19. Ethical Review. Industry acknowledges that all research that draws on the 
collected data and samples should be reviewed by an ethics committee to 
make sure that the relationship with the subjects of research is balanced—
i.e., that the research design complies with the stipulations of the IC and with 
general rules that may apply. It is understood that such committees should be 
independent and include genuine third parties not associated with the com-
pany. Approval by an appropriate ethics committee may be taken as a kind of 
community consent.9  
20. Social Risks of Genetic Research. Social risks of genetic research and the 
question whether genetic research should be allowed must be dealt with 
through societal regulation. Beyond such regulation, individuals (and com-
munities) can refuse IC if the research, according to their own assessment, 
implies unacceptable social risks. It remained unresolved in the Dialogue 
Process whether or not social risks must be disclosed in the IC process, and 
whose standards researchers must apply in order to decide what they have to 
disclose.  
(3) Benefit Sharing (BS) 
Questions regarding BS with human subjects involved in genetic research can trigger 
responses in which, paradoxically, the parties change sides: Companies may appeal to 
altruism, and they may frame participation in research as cooperation for the produc-
tion of a public good (even if that good would eventually be achieved through com-
mercial development); stakeholders, in contrast, may emphasize the economic self-
interest of donors, and they may find acceptable the commodification of data and 
samples, as well as a business perspective on research participation. In the Dialogue 
Process there was some convergence (legal restraints such as those imposed by the 
Convention on Biological Diversity notwithstanding) on the idea that research sub-
jects should be able to decide whether they want BS or not. 
21. BS—Control of Data and Samples. Negotiations over BS must start from the 
principle that research subjects have control over their data and samples. 
Accordingly, the subjects must decide whether, and under what conditions, 
the data and samples can be used. 
                                                                    
8 One participant from industry argued that community consultation should not be a general policy 
with every single research project. Rather, the ethical review body should advise the company when 
to seek community consultation. 
9 One participant pointed out that ethics committees, if they cannot rely on existing regulations, might 
apply ethical standards that are highly controversial in modern societies. In such cases, companies 
may consider the review as not binding. They should, however, expose themselves to the discussion 
invoked by such review. 
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22. BS—Diversity in Culture Matters. It was a common understanding in the 
Dialogue Process that whether or not individuals or communities participat-
ing in research should demand BS is an issue that must be decided upon 
according to the cultural values and orientations of the individual or commu-
nity.10 
23. No One-Size-Fits-All Model. Except for regulations that make BS obligatory 
(such as the Convention on Biological Diversity in the case of non-human 
genetic resources), the question of BS is largely a matter of negotiations 
during the IC process. Companies may to appeal to altruism and ask for par-
ticipation in research as a gift, even though the goal is a commercial product. 
On the other side, subjects may regard such participation as a business rela-
tionship and pursue their own financial interests.  
24. Prevent the “Buying” of Subjects. Most participants, representatives from 
industry and stakeholders alike, warned that turning research participation 
into a commodity undermines IC and leads to “buying” the consent of sub-
jects. Especially under conditions of poverty, the offering of monetary 
incentives or other material benefits might amount to coercion.  
25. BS to Ensure Freedom to Operate. Since companies want to ensure freedom 
to operate they are reluctant to enter BS arrangements that grant financial 
reach through claims on future rights and profits derived from the research. 
In addition, it is virtually impossible to quantify the extent to which such 
rights and profits might be attributed to the contribution of single research 
subjects. There are, however, also cases in which companies want to offer 
financial rewards in exchange for specific contributions from subjects 
regarding their rights over data or samples. Either sort of arrangement should 
be considered as possible and negotiable, provided that there is genuine con-
sent and that the deal is not ethically objectionable—a matter, which, in any 
case, would have to be attested to by an ethical review committee. 
26. Indirect Benefits. It was admitted that new drugs, scientific progress, and 
economic growth flowing from the research provide individuals (and com-
munities) who participate in the research with some indirect benefits. It was 
also pointed out, however, that such benefits are less likely to accrue if the 
community from which the data and samples are retrieved is not the commu-
nity in which the commercial development and production takes place. Thus 
special issues of equity and BS arise when Northern companies pursue 
research with subject populations from the South or from indigenous com-
munities. 
27. Non-Monetary Benefits. Companies and research subjects can (and some-
times do) negotiate BS in terms of preferential access to the products (diag-
nostic or therapeutics) that will be derived from the research. In North-South 
relationships, especially with indigenous communities, such BS schemes are 
advised as good practice, because the subjects and their communities would 
                                                                    
10 One stakeholder held, however, that research participation without BS is unethical. 
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normally not be included in the flow of indirect (scientific and economic) 
benefits from the research activities in which they participate.11 
28. Gift Relationship and Pricing Policies. The gift culture of providing data and 
samples for research is based on the understanding of the subjects (echoed by 
the companies) that they will contribute to the public good of medical pro-
gress, even though the research is declared to be for the development of 
commercial products. This understanding will quickly erode if the products 
prove to be unaffordable for the subjects or their families or patient groups to 
which they belong. 
29. Negotiating Pricing and Licensing Policies. The participants in the Dialogue 
Process discussed some recent cases in which unreasonable prices where 
sought for genetic tests developed from research with human subjects. They 
proposed that subjects negotiate, and companies offer, arrangements that 
exclude such pricing policies. While, in general, it may seem difficult for 
companies to have their pricing policies discussed in negotiations with 
research subjects, such arrangements may only commit the companies to 
those policies which they advertise publicly anyway. 
B. Balancing Private and Public Uses of Data and Samples Collected 
by Companies: Research Consortia and Access to Databases 
(1) Research Consortia (RCs) 
The Working Group discussed RCs that are explicitly designed to release their results 
to the public domain. The prime example in the discussion was the SNP consortium. 
While the participants agreed that such RCs might be feasible and useful, they dif-
fered in the interpretation of their significance and preconditions. Stakeholders tend 
to welcome these RCs, because they enlarge the public domain and restore a balance 
between private and public knowledge, which, in their view, is increasingly being 
upset by a race among industry and universities for patents on basic genetic informa-
tion and research tools, far ahead of product-related inventions. Industry, in contrast, 
views such RCs as a pragmatic approach to distribute and reduce the costs and risks 
of research in areas that they consider pre-competitive. They may also be in favor of 
shifting certain knowledge to the public domain, because that preempts the patenting 
of the knowledge by competitors. However, industry sees no general need to rebal-
ance the private-public relationship. They trust that excessive patent applications will 
be turned down by the patent offices anyway, and that, despite patent protection, 
research tools will be available on reasonable licensing terms. 
30. Companies Should Explore their Flexibilities. The participants of the Dia-
logue Process agreed that RCs that release their results to the public domain 
or make them otherwise generally available might be a viable strategy to 
advance the knowledge in complex fields of genetics. The participants there-
fore encourage companies to explore the flexibilities they may have to 
engage in such RCs. 
                                                                    
11 Some stakeholders argued that such BS should be extended to all subjects and communities involved 
in the research of the company not just to those who happen to provide data and samples that lead to 
successful developments. 
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31. Viability of RCs. RCs that release results to the public domain are a viable 
option, only if such release is compatible with the proprietary interests and 
conditions of companies, especially with the need to justify and protect the 
investment in the research. 
32. Different Company Schemes. Admittedly, different companies may have 
different flexibilities. Small start-ups that use patents on research tools to 
raise money on the venture capital market will have fewer options to join 
RCs that release results to the public domain than will large companies that 
develop end-products for consumers.  
33. RCs Address Public Concerns. Whether the patent system functions well in 
the field of genetic research and development is a controversial issue. There 
are serious public concerns that basic knowledge at the frontiers of genetic 
science will be protected by patents and subsequently appropriated for exclu-
sive private use. RCs that release results to the public domain are a perfect 
means to address these concerns. RCs will undoubtedly contribute to the 
legitimacy of claiming exclusive rights to inventions further down the line 
towards products.  
34. Public-Private Partnership in RCs. Experience shows that companies also 
engage in RCs in the fields of structural and functional genomics, or pro-
teomics, provided the research is still at a distance from product develop-
ment. Governments (and charities) are encouraged to support joint public-
private RCs, in order to increase the options to retain basic knowledge from 
these fields in the public domain. Companies will have to assess whether, in 
their view, the advantages of public support warrant the price that companies 
would then not be able to claim exclusive rights to use the knowledge gener-
ated within the RCs. 
(2) Access to Databases (DBs) 
A leading question in the discussions of the Working Group was whether special 
rules should apply for DBs built by private companies with public support. The case 
of the Icelandic Health Sector Database provided the starting point for these discus-
sions. The participants acknowledged that the rules for access to such DBs must 
recognize investments made in order to have the DBs in the first place. On the other 
hand, they also acknowledged that access to DBs built with public support should be 
non-exclusive and cheap. 
35. DBs as Public Infrastructure. DBs (including sample collections) built with 
public support should be accessible as public infrastructure, irrespective of 
whether the DB operates under schemes of public or private law. Public sup-
port could either mean public spending or authorizing the inclusion of data 
collected in the public sector, or granting an exclusive license to build up the 
database. 
36. The Principle of Non-Exclusive Access. Access to such DBs should be 
granted, with due respect for privacy protection, on a non-discriminatory 
basis to anyone who has the competence to us it. Exclusive licenses to use 
the DBs should not be issued; they are hardly compatible with the function of 
the DBs as public infrastructure. 
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37. The Case of Clinical Trial Data. The principle of non-exclusive access to 
DBs built with public support was adopted by the participants for DBs to be 
used as research tools.12 DBs for product proof (clinical trial data) may war-
rant a different rule. 
38. Fees for Access. Fees for access can be appropriate to recover some of the 
costs for building and operating a DB. Such fees will, however, exclude 
users if they are too high. The first priority must be to ensure that the DB will 
be used as widely as possible to get maximum societal return from the 
investment in public infrastructure. Special allowances should be made for 
poor users from developing countries. 
39. Higher Fees for Companies. In many cases, companies charge higher fees 
for access to DBs than do academic researchers. The participants regard this 
practice as acceptable. However, care must be taken, that the use and the use-
fulness of a DB is not obstructed by the pricing scheme. 
40. DBs Within Companies. The participants encourage companies to ensure that 
their DBs are accessible for wide use in the society, wherever this is com-
patible with companies’ proprietary imperatives. Companies could also con-
sider the transfer of old collections, which otherwise would be lost or would 
never go into general use under public control.  
41. No Reach-Through Provisions. Participants concluded that, as a rule, holders 
of DBs should not require (and the user should not accept) that, in exchange 
for access, reach-throughs be granted on results or rights the user may obtain 
from the results achieved by using the DBs. 
C. Calibrating Intellectual Property Rights: Patents on Genes  
Patents on genes are contested. The participants of the Dialogue Process could not 
resolve the controversial issues. While in some cases they had a common under-
standing of the issues raised by patents on genes, their approaches to these issues 
were vastly different. Representatives of industry tended to start from the existing 
frameworks of patent law and considered how these frameworks may be applied 
and/or (if necessary) amended to cope with problems. Stakeholders, in contrast 
wanted to take a broader perspective. They urged that alternatives to the patent sys-
tem be discussed, and they challenged the notion that patents on genes are needed to 
reward invention and protect investment in the life sciences. No consensual conclu-
sions were achieved in the discussion on basic positions in this controversy; however, 
at various points the parties found some common ground. Representatives of industry 
considered the possibility to modify patenting strategies to address some of the stake-
holder concerns. Stakeholders, notwithstanding their rejection of gene patents in 
principle, acknowledged that there might be modifications which, in their view, are 
steps in the right direction. 
The following sections try to capture both the divergence of opinions and the com-
mon ground found in the discussions. For the sake of clarity it should be noted that 
                                                                    
12 A question discussed (but left open by the participants) is whether DBs that comprise results 
(publications) from publicly funded research should not also be accessible as public infrastructure. 
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the representation of industry in the Dialogue Process was biased towards large 
pharmaceutical corporations. 
(1) Alternatives to the Patent System 
The debate over whether patents should be granted is as old as the patent system 
itself. The discussion in the Dialogue Process on alternatives to patents echoed that 
debate. While representatives from industry emphasized that the patent system has 
emerged as the best solution to balance societal interests in the promotion and dis-
semination of useful information, stakeholders insisted that alternatives to the patent 
system are possible and necessary. No consensus was reached in this respect. How-
ever, the participants did converge in the opinion that patents do serve functions that 
would also have to be met, if alternative systems were in place: namely, to reward 
invention and provide incentives to invest in R & D.  
42. Criticisms of the Patent System. Stakeholders saw the public debate over pat-
ents on genes as indicating a deeper crisis in the patent system. They see pat-
ents as pursuing a winner-takes-all model, which is at odds with the incre-
mental and collaborative character of modern R & D processes. In the opin-
ion of stakeholders, patents serve more to protect investment than to reward 
invention; and stakeholders hold further that patents restrict the freedom of 
research and block innovation. Therefore, stakeholders call for alternatives to 
the patent system to be devised and implemented. 
43. Adaptive Capacity of the Patent System. Representatives of industry argued 
that the patent system has worked well in the past and that it is the most 
appropriate legal system to balance investment risks, rewards for creativity, 
and early disclosure, in order to advance progress toward inventions bene-
fiting the public.13 Without the patent system, private investment in R & D, 
for example, for new drugs, could not be mobilized. Questions that might 
arise in the context of patents on genes could be addressed through adapta-
tion within the patent system.  
44. The Need to Protect Investment. Stakeholders acknowledged that companies 
have to make a profit, but that, if alternatives to the patent system were 
sought, then alternative models of financing R & D would be required.14  
(2) The Moral Aspects of Patents on Genes (GPs) 
Among the objections raised specifically against patents on genes, moral arguments 
are the most basic. There are strong voices in the public debate claiming that patents 
on genes should not be granted as a matter of principle, because GPs violate the 
moral order. However, there is no consensus among the societies with respect to the 
                                                                    
13 One participant (industry) argued that there is no statistical evidence that the patent system has a 
negative impact on scientific dynamics of research and on the rate of innovation in industrialized 
countries. One possible comment to this argument is that aggregate data will not account for and 
accordingly miss single cases which may nevertheless be significant. Thus, there seems to be a need 
for detailed empirical studies, see also statement no. 57. 
14 One idea that came up in the discussion was that the whole R & D chain for new drugs be transferred 
to (and financed by) the public sector, while private companies be confined to the production of the 
drugs. The proposal was not discussed at length, but there was a common understanding that alterna-
tives to the patent system would imply major revisions of existing legal, institutional, and allocation 
arrangements. 
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moral standards that ought to apply. In the Dialogue Process, representatives of 
industry referred to existing patent laws and court rulings. They pointed out that 
claims for (human) genes are not comparable to claims for human reproductive 
cloning or producing human-animal chimeras—examples of inventions, the exploita-
tion of which is considered immoral under the European Directive (Art. 6-2). Further, 
representatives of industry held that patents on genes could not offend human dignity, 
because GPs do not confer any ownership on individual human beings. In contrast, 
some stakeholders applied a broader moral framework. For them, granting exclusive 
rights to components or structures of life would constitute a serious devaluation of 
life and an improper way for humans to relate to nature. Therefore, they consider 
patents on genes to be fundamentally wrong. The participants in the Dialogue Pro-
cess disagreed over these issues, but they agreed on some features and implications of 
their disagreement.  
45. Acknowledgement of Moral Diversity. The participants in the Dialogue Pro-
cess disagreed as to whether patents on genes contradict moral rules. They 
acknowledged, however, that this disagreement reflects the diversity of 
moral views in the society. People draw the lines differently: for some it is 
obvious that patents on genes constitute a breach of morality; for others this 
is clearly not the case. 
46. Moral Coercion Through Majority Rule. Participants also acknowledged that 
legal rules allowing genes to be patented offend the beliefs of those who 
object to such patents for moral reasons, and, further, that these individuals 
may find it coercive to have to live in a society that grants such patents. 
However, such coercion is common in modern societies; it follows from the 
principles of democratic majority government. For example, in many coun-
tries, people who object to abortion for fundamental moral reasons must 
nevertheless live with the fact that the practice of abortion is spreading in the 
society.  
47. Public Rules and Personal Moral Views. People should not be obliged to 
violate their own moral beliefs. However, this principle does not yield a right 
to dismiss public rules, even if such rules are seen to be in conflict with per-
sonal moral views. Normally, individuals can only choose, within their own 
private sphere, to dissociate themselves from practices that they consider 
immoral. Thus, they may decide, for instance, not use products based on 
gene patents. However, they cannot ignore the legality of such patents. A dif-
ferent conclusion would only be warranted if basic human rights or key ele-
ments of the rule of law were at stake.  
48. Evolving Moral Frameworks. While some stakeholders insisted that, for 
them, patents on genes raise fundamental moral issues of how humans 
should properly place themselves in nature and how they should deal with 
life, it was generally acknowledged that such moral tenets do not have the 
status of basic human rights. It was, however, also accepted that moral 
frameworks are dynamic in modern cultures. Discussions over patents on 
genes will continue. Should a predominant view evolve that such patents 
indeed violate morality, then the laws allowing such patents will certainly 
have to be reconsidered. 
  – 16 –
(3) Policy Aspects of Calibrating Patent on Genes  
Many of the arguments challenging patents on genes are not on the level of funda-
mental moral concerns: rather, they invoke policy considerations of how invention 
can be properly rewarded and innovation promoted, how a balance can be struck 
between exclusive rights and open access. Stakeholders in the Dialogue Process, 
while underlining their rejection of patents on genes in principle, involved themselves 
in discussions over the more pragmatic questions of whether companies do in fact 
need patents on genes to protect their proprietary interests, and how the scope of such 
patents should be calibrated—and possibly restricted. 
In view of the fact that patent legislation is still pending in many countries, and that 
few court rulings have been issued to clarify the scope of protection granted by pat-
ents on genes, the discussions focused mainly on rules (and interpretation of rules) 
that the companies could live with. While one representative of industry pointed out 
that companies (like everybody else) occasionally defend what they have and con-
sider the maximum protection they can get as a functional necessity, others empha-
sized that this is not the general attitude. Representatives of industry agreed with the 
need to acknowledge differences of opinion, have a dialogue, and find compromise. 
The discussions in the Dialogue Process revealed some flexibility, as is reflected in 
the following statements.  
49. Controversial: The Need for Patents on Genes. There was no consensus over 
whether patents on genes are necessary to provide the R & D investments 
needed for the invention of new medicines. Representatives of industry dis-
agreed with the position that patents on end products are sufficient; patents 
on intermediary results (research tools), such as drug targets, may well be 
essential. Also, in their view, other mechanisms that protect investment in 
research, such as exclusive rights on clinical trial data or orphan drug regula-
tions, cannot always substitute for patent protection on research tools. 
50. Scope of Patents on Genes. All participants acknowledged that patents 
should only be granted for inventions, not for discoveries. There was consen-
sus that this rule excludes patents on genes per se in their naturally occurring 
state. However, representatives of industry did not accept that genes isolated 
from their natural state and purified should also not be patentable as a rule. 
Instead they held that the European Directive struck an appropriate compro-
mise ruling that mere DNA sequence information without indication of a 
function is not patentable, but that patents can be filed if the gene function 
and a utility/industrial application (for example, as a drug target) is specified.  
51. Legal Perspectives. Participants from industry pointed out that one can only 
determine with certainty the scope of patents on genes after the appeals 
courts have clarified the meaning of the statutory requirements. Representa-
tives of industry envisaged the possibility that European law might require 
that the gene function be indicated in the patent claims, and that this 
requirement could potentially limit patent protection to the function dis-
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closed. Some representatives from industry conceded that they could live 
with such a rule.15 
52. Patents on Genes Must Not Restrict Freedom of Research. All participants 
proceeded from the premise that patents on genes must not be used to bar 
access to building blocks of science or to research tools. Industry, however, 
argued that, in fact, no problems exist in this respect, because research tools 
are often available at a reasonable price, or that research exemptions exist in 
many countries allowing the use of patented knowledge under specific con-
ditions. In addition they emphasized that it is the policy in many companies 
to license research rights generously and not to litigate against researchers in 
academic institutions.16 However, problems may arise nevertheless, since 
research exemptions only allow for experimenting on an invention, i.e., test-
ing, but not with an invention, i.e., the use of the subject matter for the pur-
pose for which it had been developed. Accordingly, such a “use” would 
necessarily conflict with the exclusive rights of title-holders. In this regard, 
the group acknowledged the need for the development of a “fair experimen-
tal use” — doctrine which addresses especially the issue of research tools. 
53. Safeguards to Protect Freedom of Research. An underlying expectation in 
this discussion was that companies should pledge to make the goodwill pol-
icy of granting access for research purposes a stable and sustainable pattern. 
It was understood that strong research exemptions are needed to underpin 
such commitment, and that options for compulsory licenses to guarantee 
freedom to do research should be available if companies are uncooperative.  
54. The Balance With the Legitimate Concerns of Inventors. On the other hand, 
the principle of freedom of research cannot authorize unlimited use of inven-
tions. There is still the need to balance the interest to facilitate access to 
research tools with the need to provide a fair amount of control/exclusivity to 
the inventor, because of the effort, time, and investment risk undertaken by 
the inventor. In general, patentees will find it easier to provide access to pro-
prietary technology, if the use is truly restricted to research or at least to a 
use within a developing country where there would be no export of products. 
55. Coping with the Patent Thicket: Licensing. Representatives of industry 
argued that there is no reason, nor any convincing evidence to assume that 
patents on genes will block innovation. While broad patent protection may 
mean that one has to get a license for any dependent innovation that uses the 
gene (even if the innovation is unrelated to the utility disclosed in the origi-
nal gene patent), licensing and cross-licensing are said to be normal and ade-
quate instruments to cope with the patent thicket. They also pointed out that 
patents on genes are unlikely to block the commercialization of downstream 
                                                                    
15 One participant from industry proposed that the following statement be made: “Representatives of 
industry envisaged that European law will require that the gene function be indicated in the patent 
claims, and that this requirement will limit patent protection to the function disclosed. They indicated 
that this interpretation is seen as appropriate.”  
16 One participant from industry proposed that the last three sentences be replaced with: “Representa-
tives of industry, however, argued that, as one of its seminal and intentional aspects, patenting forces 
the dissemination of knowledge that otherwise may not be disclosed, and that no patent restricts 
research. Thus, patents foster additional innovation and research rather than inhibiting it.”  
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innovation, because there is a trend among patent-granting authorities to nar-
row down claims so as to prevent undue restrictions of follow-up inventions. 
56. Unwanted Corporate Strategies. Industry acknowledged, however, that there 
are cases in which companies charge prices for patented technology, for 
example, for genetic tests, which may in fact mean that the technology can-
not be widely used. They also acknowledged that dependent patent holders 
could not expect that cooperation on reasonable terms could be achieved in 
every case. Some companies demand royalties that are clearly unaccept-
able.17 
57. Empirical Questions. Participants agreed that it was desirable to collect more 
empirical data on the practices of licensing and cooperation that evolve 
around gene patents, in order to determine whether or not problems of access 
to research tools and blocking innovations exist.  
58. The Option for a Compulsory License. Participants agreed that legal safe-
guards are needed to protect the freedom of innovation. Holders of depend-
ent patents should be able to seek a compulsory license for improvements if 
they cannot reach a deal with the holders of gene patents.18  
(4) Special Protection of the Interests of Developing Countries (DCs) 
The effects of patents on genes on DCs were a key concern of stakeholders in the 
Dialogue Process. Stakeholders argued that GPs exclude DCs from access to new 
technology. Representatives of industry pointed out that few gene-related patents are 
filed in DCs, and even fewer granted. In their view access to new technology is 
inhibited through lack of resources and infrastructure, rather than through exclusive 
intellectual property rights. The companies emphasized that they have no interest in 
blocking research in DCs, and that they are willing to collaborate through licensing or 
joint ventures. While patent protection by definition imposes restrictions on the 
access to protected technology, it remained an open question in the discussion 
whether, or to what extent, DCs are particularly at a disadvantage through such pro-
tection.  
Some representatives from industry pointed out that it is to the advantage of DCs to 
implement appropriate IPRs in order to promote a fair equilibrium between Industry 
and DCs and to guarantee the recognition of DCs’ innovations. India’s (starting) 
pharmaceutical industry, which is clearly pro patenting, provides a good example. 
Some stakeholders took the perspective of indigenous communities and argued that 
the extension of patent protection driven by the WTO/TRIPS framework constitutes 
injustice per se. They held that the extension of patent protection replaces traditional 
systems of intellectual property, for example collective ownership-of-knowledge 
schemes implied in customary law, and that it deprives indigenous communities of 
the right to operate under their own cultural, social and legal values. 
                                                                    
17 One participant from industry disagrees with the statement and proposes the following amendment: 
While it could be acknowledged that access to patented technologies “(as in all other walk of life) is 
limited by their affordability[,] providing such access and affordability is, however, a societal issue 
that, for the most part, is subject to the same free market framework as all other commercial activity.”  
18 One participant from industry withheld agreement with the last sentence. 
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There were few lines of convergence in this discussion, but it was acknowledged that 
special safeguards should be explored which respond to the concerns voiced by rep-
resentatives of DCs. 
59. Empirical Questions. There was an implied understanding that more empiri-
cal investigation is needed to determine whether, or in what respect, DCs are 
disadvantaged through the granting of patents on genes. In particular, one 
needs to find out whether (and why) mechanisms that mitigate the exclusive 
effects of patent protection in the North may not work well in the South.19 
60. Support for Challenging Patents. Experience proves that many patent claims 
fail if they are challenged in courts. However, high litigation costs and scar-
city of legal expertise are hurdles for DCs, hindering their ability to legally 
challenge patents they consider invalid. Many participants, also from indus-
try, acknowledged that some mechanisms should be introduced to help DCs 
challenge patents. An initial step might be compulsory public disclosure 
when a patent has been successfully challenged in any country, or a rule that 
allows abridged procedures in a DC in cases of the final invalidation of a 
patent in a Northern country. It is understood that such a rule would respect 
the defense rights of patent holders in appeal procedures. 
61. Discussion of New Ideas. Representatives of industry agreed that it might be 
worthwhile to discuss new ideas for special consideration of DCs needs. The 
model of the FAO International Seed Treaty was cited in this respect. The 
treaty guarantees free access to important agricultural genetic resources 
included in a multilateral system, and limits the possibility to get patent 
rights on these resources. It could be explored whether a similar model might 
be developed for other genetic resources as well, on a case-by-case basis and 
through international agreements. 
                                                                    
19 One participant from industry pointed out that it should also be investigated whether and to what 
extent cheap and rapid access of DCs to the patent system would counterbalance any disadvantage. 
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4. Discussion: Convergence and Divergence in the Deliberations of 
the Stakeholder Dialogue Process 
This section gives a brief analytical review of the results of the stakeholder dialogue 
by the WZB team. It discusses the achievements and limitations of the cooperation 
of the participants in their deliberations on contentious issues of Access to Human 
Genetic Resources. The participants will, of course, have to give their own assess-
ments of what they achieved or did not achieve. Our review also draws on the series 
of documents that have been created by the WZB team and distributed to the par-
ticipants during the dialogue procedure. Excerpts from these documents are 
included in the Appendix (below); they may be consulted by the reader to gather 
additional insight into how the deliberations proceeded. It must be noted, however, 
that the Final Report presented by the Steering Committee (see previous section) is 
the only authorized text on the results of the dialogue procedure. 
4.1. Premises for Compromise 
Human genetics is perceived with ambivalence. It raises hopes for new medicines 
and fears of genetic discrimination, as well as ethical concerns about the manipula-
tion of human life. This ambivalence was reflected by the parties in the dialogue. 
Companies and NGOs represented conflicting views, but they had sufficient com-
mon ground to cooperate in the deliberation over proper rules for human genetics 
research. The pharmaceutical companies accepted that they must build trust and 
address the public fears and concerns if they are to pursue the research legitimately 
in a business context and claim intellectual property rights on its results (1)6. The 
NGOs, on the other hand, accepted as a baseline for the discussion that the 
research could lead to new medicines and would therefore be of great benefit for 
patients (4). This baseline paved the way to compromise because it operated against 
any temptation to account for the fears and concerns by ever more restrictive rules, 
which, in effect, would amount to a complete ban on access to human genetic 
resources. 
4.2. Informed Consent 
Confirming the Standard Rules 
All parties agreed that informed consent is a conditio sine qua non, if samples or 
data from human subjects are to be used in research. Consent must be genuine and 
reflect the cultural perceptions of the subjects and not the professional needs of the 
researchers (5). Researchers must disclose all intended uses, including the intention 
to claim IPRs on inventions derived from the research (10). The subjects may with-
                                                                    
6 Numbers in parentheses following statements in this section refer to the numbered points (1-61) in the 
excerpt from the Final Report contained in the previous section, 3, of this paper. 
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draw their samples and data any time, except in cases where these have been anon-
ymized with the subjects’ consent (8-9). 
These principles were uncontested, but the participants differed about their 
political meaning. The companies considered informed consent as a means to obtain 
a legitimate “yes” to the collection and use of samples and data, whereas several 
NGOs looked at it primarily as a means to maximize the power of the subjects to 
say “no”. The NGOs concern was that research subjects are highly vulnerable and 
likely to be abused because of the asymmetry of power and the hegemony of pro-
fessional culture in research relationships. They nevertheless supported the standard 
rules. The NGOs admitted that respect for autonomy implies that subjects must 
have an option to say “yes”. On the other hand, they accepted the rules as necessary, 
but not as sufficient conditions, and thus withheld final word on the legitimacy of the 
research.  
Best Practice Rules 
The pharmaceutical companies pointed out that they are determined to “go an extra 
mile” beyond the standard rules. They agreed not to take advantage of samples and 
data collected without consent or with reference to presumed consent, even if such 
collections have been authorized by the law (7-8). They acknowledged that under 
this rule they could not use the Icelandic Health Sector Database, which triggered 
heated public controversy, because it is to include health data from all Icelanders 
without explicit consent—subject, however, to a right to opt out.  
The companies also acknowledged that they would seek re-consent whenever 
they intended to use the samples and data for purposes other than those specified in 
the original consent form (11-12). This implies that the companies would not use 
exemptions from the need for re-consent, even if such exemptions were legal and 
otherwise used. Apparently, the companies would rather forego some opportunities 
for research than put their own legitimacy at risk.  
This commitment to a strict application of the informed consent principle can 
be read as a trust building policy. The costs of the re-consent rule were reduced in 
the dialogue by admitting that research subjects can give broad consent to future 
research, which is not yet fully specified (e.g., for certain classes of diseases) (14). 
The crucial condition is, as the NGOs pointed out, that research subjects have 
enough trust to grant such consent. The fact that all participants accepted this 
exception indicates a shared understanding that a balance must be found between 
optimal use of genetic resources in medical research and optimal protection of the 
autonomy of research subjects. 
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Requirement of Community Consent? 
Traditional or indigenous societies may rule that individuals cannot dispose of their 
genetic samples and data without the approval of the group to which they belong. 
The participants of the dialogue concluded that such rules should be respected, and 
community consent be sought in these cases, in addition to individual consent (16). 
By implication, these communities have a right to ban all investigation of the genet-
ics of its population. 
In modern societies individuals can decide whether or not they want to contrib-
ute to research. Community consent is, so to speak, given through the legal frame-
work which condones the right to choose, subject to some minor restrictions such 
as mandatory review by ethical committees. The participants discussed whether one 
could go further and give groups in the society (patients, ethnic groups, age groups, 
etc.) a say in research projects which those groups feel could affect them. The idea 
was not taken up. The main argument was, that most of these “groups” are not 
really social groups or communities, but rather analytical classes or sets of people 
who share certain properties (typically: age cohorts). These classes of people are not 
incorporated as collective actors and have not entrusted speakers with a mandate to 
act for them. Patient organizations can speak for their members, but not for the 
patients (17). The participants concluded that the companies should address con-
cerns of people who are possibly affected by the envisaged research through com-
munity consultation (18). Consultations can involve patient organisations or other 
selective groups; they do not presuppose a representative mandate. 
Should Social Risks Be Disclosed for Informed Consent? 
This was the one question in which the standard rules of informed consent were not 
generally supported (20). These rules confine the duty to disclose risks to personal 
risks of the research subject. Several NGOs insisted that social risks must also be 
disclosed to enable subjects to reject research on the ground that it puts the society 
or groups in the society at risk. Other participants countered that arguments about 
social risks are usually contested, and that reliable information is scarce. The sugges-
tion that research subjects should be referred to the websites of the critics of genet-
ics was not accepted. The participants did not find consensus. They agreed, how-
ever, that social risks, which may result from the use or misuse of human genetic 
research, must be addressed by legal regulation, and that the companies should 
advocate such regulation (3). 
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4.3. Benefit Sharing 
Commodification of Samples and Data? 
There was consensus that it is unethical to “bribe” human subjects into the partici-
pation in research (24). Most participants also rejected schemes for benefit sharing 
with the subjects. The gift culture in which samples and data are donated to help 
science should not give way to a business culture in which they are sold to make 
money. Other participants, however, who were particularly involved with North-
South issues, held that benefit sharing should be mandatory and that it was, in fact, 
unethical to receive samples and data without paying for them. The position of 
these particular participants was apparently inspired by the Convention on Biologi-
cal Diversity (CBD) which requires benefit sharing for access to non-human genetic 
resources.  
Most companies took a pragmatic stance in the dispute. They considered free-
dom to operate their first priority and were prepared to negotiate a price for samples 
and data if it were necessary for easy and legitimate access (25). 
The discussions in the dialogue suggest that long-standing arguments against the 
commodification of participation in medical research are loosing ground. At least in 
a trans-cultural and transnational (North-South) setting the political and ethical 
assessments are ambiguous. Consequently, the participants concluded that it should 
be left to the individuals to decide according to their own cultural values whether or 
not they want to negotiate for a price in return for the samples and data they con-
tribute (nos. 22-23). 
The participants agreed that special issues of equity arise (and benefit sharing 
seems appropriate), when Northern companies pursue research with subject popu-
lations from the South or from indigenous communities (26). The underlying 
rationale was that these subjects are less likely to benefit indirectly from the research 
to which they contribute, for instance, through better health care (26-27).  
Benefit Sharing with the Community? 
Benefit sharing with a community may be required by law or stipulated by commu-
nities whenever they are partners in research contracts. The participants in the dia-
logue did not claim, however, that companies have a general moral duty to offer 
benefit sharing to the society when they negotiate the use of human samples and 
data in medical research for commercial purposes.7 Taxation and regulation (includ-
ing the possibility of price controls) remain as the proper means to redistribute 
benefits from companies to the society. 
                                                                    
7 Such a duty has been stipulated by the Ethics Committee of the Human Genome Organization; see The 
HUGO (Human Genome Organisation) Ethics Committee, “Statement on DNA Sampling: Control and 
Access” <http://www.gene.ucl.ac.uk/hugo/sampling.html>. 
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Negotiating Product Prices and License Fees 
The participants acknowledged that a gift culture of contributing to medical 
research will only be viable if the products of the research are affordable for those 
who contribute. They (cautiously) suggested that companies could commit them-
selves in research contracts to adapt their pricing and licensing policies accordingly 
(28-29). Whether robust commitments in this respect can really be expected, may be 
questionable, even though companies argue that in practice they act to assure that 
patients or groups who contribute to the research have access to the products of the 
research. Research subjects may increase their bargaining power by organizing in 
patient groups. Under certain conditions compulsory licensing could be an alterna-
tive approach. 
4.4. Research Consortia and Access to Databases 
Research Consortia to Release Results to the Public Domain 
The Final Report encourages companies to explore the feasibility of research con-
sortia (RCs) (30). The SNP (single nucleotide polymorphisms) consortium was con-
sidered as a model case, which could perhaps be extended to other fields of genet-
ics. The participants acknowledged, however, that the model may not be economi-
cally viable once the research comes closer to the competitive areas of product 
development (31, 34). 
Research consortia that place their results in the public domain were seen by 
some NGOs and experts in the dialogue as a means to reverse the tendency to 
obtain patents that restrict the free use of basic genetic information and research 
tools. RCs were also advocated as part of a broader vision that genetic resources 
should be defined as a common heritage of humankind and not appropriated under 
any exclusive rights. Although this vision resonated with the political preferences of 
a number of participants it did not become a topic for conclusions. Not only com-
panies received it with scepticism, but also NGOs and experts who supported the 
CBD approach, which grants a right to control the access to genetic resources to the 
nation state. 
Ensuring Access to Databases 
The participants shared the understanding that genetic databases are important 
infrastructures for research, which should be used as widely as possible to maximize 
the scientific benefits to be drawn from them. They concluded that research data-
bases built with public support should be accessible as public infrastructure, possibly 
for a fee, but on a non-exclusive basis (35-36, 38-39). It was understood that such 
rules reject the scheme of the Icelandic Health Sector Database which gives an 
exclusive license for commercial uses to the company that builds the database. On 
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the other hand, the participants were aware that investments to build the databases 
in the first place must be protected, and that it remains to be seen whether private 
investment to build a country-wide database can be mobilized without an exclusive 
license. The Estonian database project will perhaps provide a test case.8 
The companies in the dialogue pointed out that they see options to make their 
own private databases accessible to other scientists. The Final Report encourages 
the search for such options, and urges companies not to claim rights on the results 
of other scientists’ research in exchange for access to these databases (40-41). The 
Final Report also proposes that the possibility be considered that databases, which 
are not currently used by the companies, be placed under public control for general 
access. 
4.5. Patents on Genes 
Reformist Agenda Amidst Fundamental Controversy 
Several participants argued that the dialogue procedure should deal with alternatives 
to the patent system as such, because the system had increasingly become dysfunc-
tional as a means to promote creativity and innovation in the society (42). The 
deliberations discouraged such discussion. Even the critics admitted that alternatives 
to the patent system would also require alternatives for financing R & D (44), which 
could mean that drug development would have to be completely shifted from the 
private to the public sector. To consider these implications was outside the envis-
aged scope of the dialogue project.  
The fact, that many of the critics were themselves professional experts in patent 
law contributed to the willingness to adopt the reformist agenda advocated by the 
pharmaceutical companies. These critics were interested in exposing malfunctions 
of the patent system, as they see them, and exploring options to cope with these 
malfunctions within the system (43). Others reserved their fundamental objections 
and at least did not reject the agenda. The same type of procedural compromise 
occurred in the discussion of patents on genes. Critics who opposed such patents as 
a matter of principle became nevertheless involved in arguments over the specific 
problem and possible solutions. 
The Moral Objection Against Patents on Genes 
The argument that patents on genes are inherently morally wrong was upheld in the 
dialogue procedure by several stakeholders. However, it was not framed in the 
rhetoric that is often used in public debates. The technical expertise in patent law 
brought to the discussion by both the companies and their critics in the dialogue 
operated against the plain language of “ownership of life”. It was accepted, how-
                                                                    
8 The Estonian database may be a test case in this respect, see <http://www.genomics.ee>. 
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ever, that the moral objections may nevertheless be valid if, according to the cultural 
values held in the society, the granting of rights to control the use of genes for 
commercial purposes is considered to be an unacceptable devaluation of life. 
Many participants declared that they could not share this objection—among 
them several of the experts and NGOs who had vigorously confronted the compa-
nies on other issues. The blurry lines of conflict probably helped the participants to 
acknowledge the existence of moral pluralism in this question (45). It was agreed—
at least in the context of the dialogue—that there may be more than one morally 
acceptable position with respect to patents on genes, that democratic majority deci-
sion is legitimate, and that the granting of such patents cannot easily be equated 
with the violation of basic human rights (46-48). 
No Interpretation of the Morality Exception Under Patent Law 
The Final Report is silent about the question of whether unethical behavior during 
the research phase (e.g., access to genetic samples without informed consent, or 
theft of data) should constitute a case against the patentability of inventions derived 
from the research. This silence is in line with the standard interpretation of patent 
law (and TRIPS) which denies a patent only if the commercial use of the invention 
as such violates morality; the correction of flaws in the research leading to the 
invention is relegated to other legal remedies (damages or penal law). But the silence 
in the dialogue can hardly be interpreted as a general commitment to this interpre-
tation. In the context of traditional knowledge, the participants concluded that the 
documentation of lawful and rightful access should be a precondition for the grant-
ing of patents based on the use of such knowledge (89). 
The Dominance of Technical Experts 
In the dialogue procedure, the political debate over the limits of gene patents was 
largely a representative technical debate between the experts of patent law from the 
side of the companies as well as the side of the critics. The reason for the domi-
nance of the technical experts was that political debates usually make assumptions 
about what patents are and what their effects on the society will be. These assump-
tions are bound to be questioned in a deliberative setting; this implies reference to 
the expertise of specialists.  
The deliberations dealt more often with controversial empirical assessments 
than with conflicts over values. Many normative issues were uncontested—for 
instance, that freedom of research must be preserved, that innovation should be 
promoted, and that developing countries should not be put at a disadvantage. The 
participants disagreed, however, as to whether, or to what extent, patents on genes 
do in fact lead to problems in these respects. They proposed that further empirical 
investigation be undertaken to assess those issues (58-59). 
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The participants disagreed over whether the isolation of genes always counts as 
discovery, or whether this technique is patentable as invention in certain cases; they 
also disagreed over whether patents on genes are fair and can be justified as com-
pensation for the creative effort and investment made by the “inventor” (49, 50). 
These were clearly value conflicts, but they, too, had an empirical side. The parties 
shared the understanding that compensation is needed and justified to stimulate 
investment in R & D for new medicines. They did not share the assumption, how-
ever, that patents on genes are in fact necessary to that end. 
Intervening Variable: Licensing Practices of Patent Holders 
The companies frequently argued in the Dialogue that problems which can be asso-
ciated with patents on genes in theory will not occur in practice because of proper 
licensing policies of the patent holders. The critics countered by pointing to cases in 
which no such policies had been applied. In line with the objectives of the stake-
holder dialogue to explore what companies can do to avoid problems, it was sug-
gested that proper licensing policies should be made binding, at least, as best prac-
tice codes to which the companies commit themselves in public. These suggestions 
were sometimes, but not always, taken up, presumably because the companies 
wanted to reserve the right to decide on a case-by-case basis. 
Experimental Use Exception for Research Tools 
The participants agreed that patents on genes and gene products (e.g., receptors) 
must not preclude the access to these genes (and products) as research tools in sci-
ence. While the companies insisted that patents on such molecules, which may be 
drug targets, are essential for them (49), they accepted (with exception) the conclu-
sion that companies should pledge to make the good will policy of granting access 
for research purposes a stable and sustainable pattern. And, they supported the idea 
that options for compulsory licenses to guarantee freedom to do research be avail-
able if companies are uncooperative (53). 
The participants also acknowledged the need for a “fair experimental use doctrine” 
to deal with the question of whether one can do research with a (patented) gene and 
not just on the gene (52). The proposal came close to what is sometimes referred to 
as the “informal research exception”, namely, that patent holders normally do not 
sue for infringements which occur in the setting of purely academic research. It was, 
however, also emphasized that free access to research tools must still be balanced 
with the legitimate interests of the inventors (54). 
Addressing the Needs of Developing Countries 
The participants acknowledged that developing countries must be helped to cope 
with the patent system, to ensure their access to new technology. The Final Report 
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concludes that special procedures should be put in place to enable developing 
countries to challenge patents they consider invalid (59-61). 
The Range of Rules that Companies “Could Live With” 
Companies insisted that patents on genes are needed to sustain private investment 
in R & D for drug development (49), but they were flexible with respect to the 
scope of such patents. Apparently, they did not see a problem with adapting to the 
new, more restrictive interpretation of the inventiveness and utility requirements 
recently introduced by patent offices, although the new interpretation will probably 
make most of the thousands of applications that have been filed for patents on gene 
sequences in the last decade obsolete (50, 55). Companies also indicated that they 
could get along with the rule of the European Directive that patents on gene 
sequences should not be granted without indication of the biological function. 
Companies acknowledged that the interpretation of the statutory patent criteria 
by the appeals courts would probably add further restrictions to the scope of pat-
ents on genes, but they voiced no concern over this prospect. One representative 
even concluded that industry could live with the possibility that the European law 
might limit patent protection to the function disclosed (51). It was apparently 
inferred here that “function” refers to a biological level beyond the gene product 
and that this would be disclosed in the patent claim and not just in the description 
of the invention. In line with this assumption, it would be possible to cope with the 
“patent thicket” that troubles researchers who find that the genes (and gene prod-
ucts) with which they work are covered by broad product patents (55). Patent pro-
tection would be confined to the disclosed gene function and not extended to other 
(as yet unknown) functions. This conclusion, however, was not generally accepted 
by the representatives of companies in the dialogue procedure. Nevertheless the 
deliberations can perhaps be read as indicating that there is more flexibility over this 
point and more room for compromise than the usual public debates suggest. 
As a final comment, it must be noted, however, that the participation of indus-
try in the dialogue procedure was biased towards representatives the of big pharma-
ceutical companies. Small start-up biotech companies may be less willing to concede 
flexibility. 
  – 29 –
Appendix: Arguments from the Participants 
The materials presented in this Appendix are from the Circulars on Access to Human 
Genetic Resources (HGR) prepared by the WZB and distributed to the participants for 
criticisms and comments during the dialogue procedure. The first of these Circulars 
proposed the following analytical scheme of the problem areas related to access to 
HGR, which was adopted by the Working Group: 
 
 
Table: Problem Areas related to Access to HGR  
 
Access to HGR and 
protection of the rights and 
interests of individuals or 
populations 
Benefit sharing (BS) with 
individuals or populations 
who provide data or DNA 
samples 
IP protection and exclusive 
rights for the use of the 
databases and research 
findings. 
 
 • Individual informed 
consent (IC) • data protection • Independent ethical review 
of research protocols • Community consent or 
consultation 
• BS with individual 
subjects of research  • BS with the community 
• Freedom of research—
access to databases • Exclusive licensing to do 
commercial research • Patenting genes • Research consortia (RC) 
 
 
The Working Group dealt with most of these issues in recursive discussions organ-
ized by a series of Circulars marking the steps of the dialogue process (see p. 4 
above). The Appendix summarizes the “Survey of Arguments” (including questions 
posed to the participants), the “Synthesis of Responses by the Participants”, and the 
“Points to Be Considered for Conclusions”.9 These materials illustrate how the Dia-
logue proceeded to the point at which proposals for the Final Report could be 
drafted that where then discussed at the London Conference.  
                                                                    
9 The documents can also be inspected on the WZB website <http://www.wz-berlin.de/ipr-dialogue/> 
(under the rubric “Dialogue Documents”).  
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A. Informed Consent  
A1 Survey of Arguments 
The principle of IC is uncontested. Opinions differ on whether exemptions from the 
principle could/should be applied in certain cases. Traditionally such exemptions 
have been accepted for “retrospective” research that uses existing (anonymized or 
encrypted) health data and biological samples collected for other purposes than the 
envisaged research. The question is whether these exemptions should be extended to 
population research in human genetics. Controversy was, however, to a certain extent 
put at rest in our discussions because most industry representatives declared that it 
was the policy of their companies to minimize the use of such exemptions and require 
comprehensive IC in genetic research for all use of data and samples wherever the 
consent (and re-consent) is technically feasible. 
Similarly we have seen some convergence of opinion on how the rights of patients 
and donors to withdraw from participation in the research can be guaranteed. Finally 
there also seems to emerge some common understanding of when and how commu-
nity consent or consultation should be sought for genetic research. 
In view of theses convergences the WZB team suggests going one step further in the 
dialogue process and testing some preliminary conclusions. Therefore, you will not 
find further questions at the end of every section but rather proposed conclusions. 
These conclusions refer to the following questions: 
1. Is there a case for exemptions from the need to obtain informed consent 
when health data and biological samples are used in genetic research? 
2. Should general consent for unspecified genetic research in the future be 
admitted/asked for? 
3. Should IC have to disclose the possible risks of genetic research for the soci-
ety? 
4. Should IC have to disclose the possible commercial use and value of the data 
and samples provided? 
5. Are there limits to the right of participants in medical research to withdraw 
samples and data? 
6. Should not only individual consent but also community consent be sought for 
the use of population data and samples in genetic research? 
7. In Search of ‘Best Practice’. 
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(1) Exemptions from the need to obtain informed consent 
Question: Is there a case for exemptions from the need to obtain informed consent 
when health data and biological samples are used in genetic research? 
Main positions 
Pro Contra 
• It is accepted practice that data (and samples) 
which have been collected for other purposes can 
be used in retrospective (epidemiological) 
research without informed consent if the research 
has been but approved by an ethical review 
board. The Icelandic Health Sector Database is in 
line with that practice. [Arguments 4, 7, 8, 10, 
12, 14] 
• Using health information from disease registries 
may be possible with presumed consent, if the 
data are anonymized. Linking identifiable health 
data with genealogy and genetic data should only 
be admitted with an explicit consent from partici-
pants [Arguments 15, 22, 23, 24, 25] 
• Research on existing samples that are identifiable 
should be admitted after ethical review, if it does 
not exceed minimal risk to the donor. [Argu-
ments 14, 18] 
• In establishing databases and sample collections 
for genetic research companies should always 
obtain appropriate and explicit informed consent 
from patients that are enrolled in the research in 
respect to both samples and to data that are 
taken for this analysis. [Arguments 27, 28, 30] 
 
Arguments 
Issue Pro Contra 
Arguments over 
the Icelandic 
Health Sector 
Database (HSD) 
1. Informed consent for generating genetic 
data and for linking them to the medical 
information in the database is obtained at 
the time of blood collection form Icelandic 
volunteers. (Stefansson 1999: 30) 
2. [NGO1] The database act is an invasion 
of privacy … medical records of potentially 
every citizen of Iceland, dead and alive … 
[are] taken without asking. (M5/54-65) 
  3. By making identifiable health informa-
tion available without the consent of the 
patient the database violates the basic 
principles established to allow the use of 
(health information and biological samples) 
and at the same time uphold patient 
autonomy and dignity. (Zoëga et al. 
1999:45/58)  
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Issue Pro Contra 
Retrospective 
research with 
presumed 
consent 
4. [Industry4] Distinguish between pro-
spective medical research … which is 
conducted on live people [and] retrospec-
tive medical research which is research on 
available data; not on people. Genetic 
research is prospective in nature; you 
have to approach an individual … to give 
you a blood sample. All of the genetic 
research deCODE is doing is done with 
individual written informed consent. Retro-
spective medical research … is tradition-
ally performed with presumed consent. 
(M5/234/261/299) 
5. [NGO1] Taking the medical data without 
asking is justified with a nebulous concept 
of presumed consent … [however] this is 
really no consent at all but really the 
confiscation of peoples private information. 
(M5/72-80, 86) 
 7. [Industry4] Retrospective clinical 
research has been done at least a hun-
dred years … always with what we refer to 
as presumed consent, which means that 
we send a protocol to an ethics committee 
and if they approve it then we do the 
research on the available data. (M5/250-3) 
6. [NGO2] Mixing the prospective and 
retrospective story is confusing ... 
deCODE has utilized a consensus that 
was given for a different set of issues ... 
and that is actually what’s raising the 
problem. (M5/649-53) 
Parliamentary 
approval 
8. [Parliamentary notes to the Icelandic 
bill:] The disadvantage [of requiring 
informed consent] is that participation 
might be less, so that the database would 
be of less value. Clearly it would cost great 
effort, time and money to gain consent 
from every individual. (McGinnis 1999:2 ) 
9. The Icelandic government’s decision not 
to require informed consent because fewer 
people would be likely to participate, is 
unethical and unacceptable (McGinnis 
1999: 6) 
 10. [Industry4] Not requiring informed 
consent for retrospective [use of] clinical 
data is the standard. Those of you who 
have not worked in medical science may 
be confused by some of the different 
sources of information, but … when the 
Icelandic parliament made that decision it 
was following what still is the international 
tradition. (M5/299, 317) 
11. IC is the cornerstone of the ethics of 
medical research—it cannot be legislated 
by government [assent]. (McGinnis 
1999:4) 
 12. If it is incompatible with Western 
democracy to use information from medi-
cal records without informed consent, then 
there is no Western democracy. … The 
law of the HSD did nothing but endorse 
and put a legal frame around what is a 
common practice all over the world. (New 
England Journal of Medicine 2000: 2) 
 
Feasibility 
of IC 
 13. The scientific goals of the database 
could be just as easily obtained without 
violating the most basic ethical guidelines 
for investigations on humans. (Zoëga et al. 
1999: 59) 
Rules dis-
cussed 
14. In epidemiological research the prac-
tice has been that consent need not be 
obtained for non-intrusive research as long 
as approval has been obtained from an 
ethics board. (ESHG 2000: 28/9)I 
15. HUGO Ethics Committee 1998: 
archived samples can be used without 
consent [only] if they are anonymized. 
(ESHG 2000: 32) 
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Issue Pro Contra 
 16. British Royal College of Physicians 
(1999) Secondary of human material 
samples does not require express consent 
of the individual. Requiring consent could 
bring all research on existing, archived 
material to a halt. (ESHG 2000:  28) 
 
 17. It would be prohibitively expensive to 
try to obtain a new consent from each 
donor for reuse of existing samples. 
(ESHG 2000:32, Reilly 1999)  
 
 18. NBAC 1999: Research on existing 
samples that are identifiable does not 
require informed consent and may receive 
IRB review, provided that it does not 
exceed minimal risk to the donor. (ESHG 
2000: 29)  
 
 19. (Icelandic Act on Biobanks 2000): The 
board of the biobank may, if approved by 
the Data Protection Authority and the 
National Bioethics Committee authorize 
the use of biological samples for other 
purposes than those for which the samples 
were originally collected, provided that 
important interests are at stake, and that 
the potential benefit outweighs any poten-
tial inconvenience to the donor of the 
biological samples or other parties. (Art. 9 
paragraph 4) 
20. The Convention for the Protection of 
Human Rights (Oviedo 1997) requires IC 
for any future use of stored material (art 
22). The treaty has not yet been signed by 
Germany, UK, B, Ireland. (ESHG 2000: 
10)  
 21. Centralized data base in Sweden 
contains health information about all 
patients released from hospital. In it infor-
mation is retrieved without informed con-
sent, without asking doctors and without 
opt-out provisions. (Milton 1999: 1) 
22. In contrast to regulations governing 
disease registries the Icelandic database 
act does not simply legalize information 
collection, but allows combination with 
genealogy data and genetic data (Zoëga 
et al. 1999: 48) 
  23. The sheer amount of data collected 
about individuals—for a reason that is 
different than its original purpose—calls for 
a variant of informed consent. While some 
database research could reasonably be 
performed with a presumed consent, 
studies involving linking to genealogy and 
genetic database should only be per-
formed with an explicit consent from 
participants. (Zoëga et al. 1999:51) 
Evolving 
standards 
 24. In Sweden and the UK extensive data 
collections have recently been announced 
by claims that the Icelandic model is to be 
avoided. (Mannvernd 1999: 2) 
  25. Learning from mistakes Iceland made, 
the Estonian Genome Project requires that 
patients opt into the project after giving 
informed consent. (Estonia Genome 
Project 2001: 514) 
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Issue Pro Contra 
Industrial 
policies 
 26. [Industry1] We have as a guiding 
principle first of all emphasized … the 
autonomy of the patient … we recognize 
an individuals right to self-determinism and 
privacy, of course; we respect these 
international and local standards, laws, 
cultural tenets. (M5/781-3) 
  27. [Industry3]In establishing these data-
bases and these collections of patient 
samples (whether we are doing it our-
selves or through a third party) the com-
pany always obtains appropriate and 
explicit informed consent from patients that 
are enrolled in these kinds of studies in 
respect to both samples, tissue or blood 
samples and in respect to data that are 
taken for this analysis. (M7/577-81) 
  28. It is the policy of GSK to obtain appro-
priate signed informed consents before 
any genetic research is conducted. (GSK 
2001: 6) 
  30. Samples are collected from consenting 
individuals enrolled in clinical trials con-
ducted by Roche. The use of samples 
shall be restricted to the disease category 
and associated conditions studied in the 
clinical trial and/or to adverse effects 
encountered. (Roche 2001)  
Proposed conclusion 
In accordance with established professional practice and ethics exceptions from the 
requirement of IC should be granted for the use of anonymized health data and bio-
logical samples if such use is essential for relevant medical research and has been 
approved by appropriate review bodies.  
Parliaments may have a mandate to extend such exceptions further and allow also 
identifiable data and samples to be used without IC. As a rule, however, identifiable 
data and sample should only be accessed with IC.  
Researchers from companies should try to comply with this rule in all cases and seek 
IC for the use of identifiable data and samples even if exceptions from the principle 
of IC are legally conceded.  
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(2) General consent for unspecified genetic research 
Question: Should general consent for unspecified genetic research in the future be 
admitted/asked for? 
Main positions 
Pro Contra 
• Competent individuals should have the right to 
give consent to broadly defined research in the 
future. The goal of the IC requirement is not to 
prevent research but to prevent research subjects 
from feeling cheated, powerless, misled or 
betrayed. [Arguments 38, 40] 
• A blanket IC for unspecified genetic research 
projects in the future is in fact not informed con-
sent. It should not be asked for if the data and 
samples are identifiable in those future studies 
and hence it is possible to approach the subject 
for specific re-consent. [Arguments 33, 35] 
• Broad IC that would allow the use of data and 
samples for future, as yet unspecified projects, is 
not only an efficient and economical. It is also a 
legitimate approach, provided the research is 
approved by independent ethical oversight. 
[Arguments 31, 34, 36, 41] 
• Given modern information technologies it seems 
possible and appropriate to seek specific re-
consent for further research if the data and 
sample are identifiable (although they may be 
encrypted and the key only accessible by an 
independent third party). [Argument 43] 
Arguments 
Issue Pro Contra 
Practical 
needs 
31. [Industry4]There is a scientific need to 
broaden the consent … if we could only do 
a consent on one specific disease and no 
more and if we wanted to study another 
disease or use that individual as a control 
for a different disease we would always 
have to go back and re-consent. (M5/577) 
 
 32. [Industry3] Individual consent to a 
specific type of research and nothing 
else…that’s not very practical. So we have 
been contemplating … a broad consent 
which would allow patients to decide if 
they want to participate in a research 
project that may involve not only the 
specific disease we are approaching them 
for but … any protocol subsequently 
approved by the national ethics 
board.(M5/278-88) 
33. [NGO3] A consent that could be made 
to any sort of research in the future…is not 
informed … it would be made without 
respect to information about the use of the 
consent. (M5/491, 4966) 
Rules 34. A blanket informed consent that would 
allow use of a sample for genetic research 
in general, including future, as yet 
unspecified projects, appears to be the 
most efficient and economical approach, 
avoiding costly re-contact before each new 
research project. (ESHG 2000: 31, WHO 
1998) 
35. It is inappropriate to ask a subject to 
grant blanket consent for all future 
unspecified genetic research projects on 
any disease or in any area if these 
samples are identifiable in those subse-
quent studies. (American Society of 
Human Genetics 1996) 
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Issue Pro Contra 
 36. Perhaps more than for other samples, 
it seems appropriate to ask a subject in the 
setting of a clinical biopsy or surgery to 
grant a blanket consent for future unspeci-
fied genetic research projects on the 
disease this person suffers from. (ESHG 
2000: 32) 
37. [Industry3] Many people do want…a 
general [consent], for instance any neuro-
logical disease, any eye disease or even 
any disease… we should not take away 
the freedom of the individual to make 
those decisions if they want to … Freedom 
and self-determination should be the key 
to our approach to consent. (M5/293-9) 
Patient/donor 
autonomy 
38. Ethicists must recognize that research 
subjects, when well informed, have a right 
to participate even in broadly defined 
research. The goal of this approach is not 
to prevent research but to prevent 
research subjects from feeling cheated, 
powerless, misled or betrayed. (Greely 
1998) 
39. Informed consent in the strictest sense 
may not be possible for the database 
operation, however, a general consent 
requiring the operators of the database to 
outline the type of information entered, its 
potential use, and benefits and risks, seem 
a minimal requirement. (Zoëga et al. 1999: 
47) 
 40. It would be reasonable to give the 
individual the option to refuse permission 
for any secondary use … or permit any 
use without anonymization at the discre-
tion of the investigator. (Zoëga et al. 1999: 
29, Reilly 1999) 
 
Independent 
ethical 
oversight 
41. [Industry3] The approach which seems 
to be gaining some momentum is … 
ethical approval for such secondary use 
without specific informed consent through 
the use of some medical data panel, which 
I understand is a process operated in 
Denmark and which recently was favorably 
commented upon by the House of Lords in 
the UK. (M7/632-6) 
 
 42. [Industry1]Ultimately that should trickle 
down into a moral mandate, namely to use 
this information for certain purposes and 
not for others….for those that benefit the 
individual and those that help it….to get 
better health care (M5/748-51) 
 
Industry 
perspective: 
Seek re-consent 
43. For future epidemiological genetic 
databank initiatives, it may be possible to 
use de-identified samples/data…the code 
key held by a third party…[who is] able to 
identify participants [and can thus enable] 
specific informed consent for any future 
genetic research use to be sought. (GSK 
2001: 5) 
 
 
Proposed conclusion 
Research participants are entitled to full, specified information on the study to which 
they contribute data or samples. On the other hand, they have autonomy to be content 
with less than full information. They have the right to authorize that their contribu-
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tions might be used in future, as yet unspecified research. Ethical rules require that 
such consent should not be accepted if the research entails unreasonable risk for the 
individual. Compliance with such rules must be guaranteed by independent ethical 
review of all research projects.  
A different question is whether researchers, particularly from companies, should ask 
for broad consent and for how broad a consent. If data and samples have not been 
irreversibly anonymized specific re-consent of the research subjects might be feasible 
and should be considered if it does not imply unreasonable costs. Generally, it seems 
advisable, to circumscribe the type of diseases that could be studied in future 
research. Studies that can be expected to attract public concern, for instance in 
behavioral genetics or in the genetics of mental disorders, should only be performed 
with specific informed consent.  
(3) Disclosure of possible social risks 
Question: Should IC have to disclose the possible risks of genetic research for the 
society? 
Main positions 
Pro Contra 
• Subjects need to be informed about the risks of 
group discrimination that may be implied in the 
availability of genetic knowledge in the society. 
[Argument 46] 
• There is a responsibility of researchers to oppose 
discrimination and exploitation not only in 
research but in the society. However, the goal of 
IC is to disclose possible risks for the individual 
research subject. Social risks that may result from 
the application of research must be regulated by 
the society. [Arguments 47, 51] 
 
Arguments 
Issue Pro Contra 
Explaining the 
risks 
45. The nature and the purpose of the data 
collection is very broad and it is difficult to 
predict the risks to the individual. Thus 
even if participants volunteer, they are not 
informed and comprehending. (McGinnis 
1999: 6) 
 
Risks to society 46. Subjects need to be informed about 
the risks of group/individual discrimination 
that may be implied in the availability of 
genetic knowledge in the society. (Zoëga 
et al. 1999: 48) 
47. [Industry5] The creation of new knowl-
edge should be regulated by [professional] 
ethical framework, the application to health 
care should be regulated by society [and 
not through IC]. (Stefansson 1999: 32) 
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Issue Pro Contra 
Abuse of 
research 
48. [NGO4]Certain kind of data should not 
be analyzed below a certain level of 
aggregation, so that the possibility of 
individuals being put to risk is avoided 
institutionally (M6/243-52) 
49. Data collected in the Roche Sample 
Repository shall only be analyzed in the 
aggregate. The RSR will not provide 
genotyping data on the level of individual 
anonymized patient records except to 
regulatory authorities and data monitoring 
safety committees carrying out interim 
analysis in the interests of patient safety. 
(Roche 2001: 2) 
 50. The more information you collate, the 
more potential is there to abuse it. 
(Hodgson 1998: 1020) 
51. [Industry1] There is clearly a responsi-
bility among our part as we engage in this 
research to oppose discrimination and 
exploitation not only in the course of our 
research but on the policy type level. 
(M5/783) 
 
Proposed conclusion 
The goal of IC is to protect the individual not the society. Individuals are free to deny 
consent if they consider the research as politically or socially risky or undesirable. 
But  researchers can hardly be obliged to provide information needed for such deci-
sion. Criteria for what constitutes political or social risk are unclear. Protection 
against these risks must be provided by appropriate regulation. Researchers may have 
a responsibility to support such regulation. They must share the knowledge they have 
about possible impacts of the research on the society with regulators and the public.  
(4) Disclosure of possible commercial use 
Question: Should IC have to disclose the possible commercial use and value of the 
data and samples provided? 
Main positions 
• Potential research subjects should be told about the possible commercial value of the research and the 
possible embodiment of the work (or their tissues) as intellectual property.  
• The informed consent form includes statements that subjects will not benefit financially from participation 
in the study, that the research results could have commercial and intellectual property value, and that the 
company will own the results of the research [Arguments 52-55] 
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Arguments 
Right to know 52. Potential research subjects should be told about the possible commercial value of 
the research or the possible embodiment of the work (or their tissues) as intellectual 
property. (Greely 1998)  
Scope of IC 53. [Industry3] [The company asks for:] 1. consent to undertake the research, which is 
specified in the patient consent form with an indication of what that might lead to; 2. 
consent to follow patent applications on any arising inventions and 3. to be able freely to 
commercially exploiting those inventions. (M7/581-5) 
 54. The informed consent form includes statements that subjects will not benefit finan-
cially from participation in the study, that the research results could have commercial 
and intellectual property value, and that GSK will own the results of the research. (GSK 
2001: 6) 
 55. The subjects shall be informed that [they] will not be entitled to any financial gain 
from the participation in the study. [And it will be explained that] inventions, know how, 
and associated intellectual property originating from the use of [donated samples] shall 
become the intellectual property of Roche, except were agreed otherwise. (Roche 2001) 
 
Proposed conclusion 
IC forms must unambiguously point out that data or samples provided by research 
subjects will be used in projects that have a commercial perspective and that intel-
lectual property rights will be sought by the researchers for results or materials 
derived from the projects. Only if IC is clear in this respect researchers can legiti-
mately appeal to the willingness of subjects to provide access to data and samples as 
a gift. 
(5) The right to withdraw the data 
Question: Are there limits to the right of participants in medical research to 
withdraw samples and data? 
Main positions 
Pro Contra 
• The right to withdraw does not mean that all 
effects of participating in the research must be 
completely reversed. Material that has been pro-
duced from donated samples and results of 
studies already carried out can be kept. [Argu-
ments 61,65] 
• The patient who withdraws from the research has 
a right to withdraw all information about him/her 
from a data base to which he contributed during 
the research. [Arguments 56,58,60,61] 
• Anonymized samples, immortalized cell lines, 
shared samples and samples used for research 
protocols cannot be withdrawn. [Argument 66] 
• Research subject should have a right to withdraw 
data and samples that are identifiable (even if 
they are encrypted and the key only accessible 
by an independent third party). [Arguments 64] 
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Arguments 
Issues Pro Contra 
The principle   56. The Helsinki Declaration emphasizes 
that individuals are free to participate in 
research and that they can withdraw at 
any point without suffering negative con-
sequences. (1.2: 41) 
Arguments over 
the Icelandic 
HSD 
57. Icelanders will be able to opt out at any 
time as well as during a period of more 
than six months following the passage of 
the database law bill, but before any data 
are actually transferred to the database. 
(Stefansson 1999: 30) 
58. [NGO1] In the health database there is 
no ability to withdraw … opt out at any 
time means that only new data will not be 
entered but the old data will stay … this is 
particularly acute in the case of children …  
when they become eighteen their data will 
still be in the database and so they had 
never had the chance to really get out of 
the database. (M5/633-41) 
 59. One must not confuse the issue of 
being able to opt out of research per-
formed with a planned research protocol 
and being able to opt out of a data base 
containing health information. Everyone 
follows the main rule that individuals can 
quit participation in research that they 
have agreed to participate in. (Milton 
1999:1) 
60. The position of the World Medical 
Association is that if a patient withdraws 
from scientific research, i.e., the data 
base, he/she should be able to withdraw 
all information about him/her from the 
research. (Milton 1999) 
Future rules? 62. [This rule is] questionable if data are 
needed for research (public health) and 
encrypted—the data protection perspec-
tive of inalienable individual rights may not 
be in the best interest of the population’s 
health. (ESHG 2000: 34 Nuffield 2000) 
61. In most legislations individuals are 
considered to have an absolute right to 
give or withhold information about their 
genetic status and equally an absolute 
right to prevent their stored genetic data 
being transmitted. (ESHG 2000: 34) 
Industry 
perspective 
63. Control of the sample, including the 
right to withdraw while the associated 
clinical trial is in progress remains with the 
research participant. After that time the 
sample will be anonymized [more exactly: 
encrypted]and therefore can no longer be 
withdrawn. (Roche 2001: 2) 
64. For future epidemiological genetic 
databank initiatives, it may be possible to 
use de-identified samples/data … provided 
to researchers in a double-coded format 
and the code key held by a third party … 
The third party [will enable] participants to 
withdraw at any time if they wished to do 
so. (GSK 2001: 5)  
Limits of the 
right to with-
draw 
65. [Icelandic Act on Biobanks 2000] A 
donor of a biological sample can at any 
time withdraw his/her consent … and the 
biological sample shall then be destroyed. 
Material that has been produced from a 
biological sample by performance of a 
study or the results of studies already 
carried out shall, however, not be 
destroyed. (art. 7) 
 
 66. Anonymized samples, immortalized 
cell lines, shared samples and samples 
use for research protocols cannot be 
withdrawn. (ESHG 2000: 34) 
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Proposed conclusion 
Research subjects should have the right to withdraw their contribution (data or 
samples) at any time. This rule applies if the contribution is based upon free decision 
and not on legal duties. Withdrawal may become impossible or inappropriate if the 
data/samples are anonymized or shared with others or developed into secondary 
products. Such limits of the right to withdraw, or any other limit, should be disclosed 
in the IC form and specifically consented to. 
(6) Community consent 
Question: Should not only individual consent but also community consent be sought 
for the use of population data and samples in genetic research? 
Main positions 
Pro Contra 
• Doing human genetic research with populations 
from indigenous people presupposes not only 
individual informed consent, but also consent by 
the community. [Arguments 69, 71, 72, 88] 
 
• Human genetic research can have impacts on 
groups, for instance stigmatization or discrimina-
tion. It therefore requires a full group review and 
consultation and consent. [Arguments 67, 76] 
• Group level protection against risks of genetic 
research must be provided through societal 
regulation and legislation. Group consent is not a 
meaningful requirement. Most “groups” that 
become involved in research have no organiza-
tion or authority which can legitimately speak for 
the group. The indigenous communities are an 
exceptional case. [Arguments 85, 88] 
 • Medical researchers should seek the support of 
advocacy groups of patients of the disease they 
study. And they should engage in a dialogue with 
the public to address concerns over genetic 
research. [Arguments 87, 90, 91] 
 
Arguments 
Issues Arguments Pro Industry Perspective 
Principle 67. [NGO5] Bio-prospecting that’s going on 
in human genetic research … has impacts 
on groups and therefore requires a full 
group review and consultation and consent. 
(M6/38-41) 
68. [Industry4] We have to have two sets of 
responsibilities: responsibility toward the 
individual research subjects, … and 
responsibility towards the research com-
munity and ultimately towards society. 
(M5/222-6) 
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Issues Arguments Pro Industry Perspective 
The case for 
CC: 
Self-
determination
Nation/society 
as “community”
69. [NGO5] Each and every community has 
a right to make its own decisions about 
these questions. Basically that stems from 
a concept of sovereignty or self-determina-
tion…it's an inherent right and it’s not one 
that can be conferred upon groups of 
people by somebody else. (M6/41-7, 58-9) 
70. [Industry1] We seem actually to be on 
the same plane…self-determination is 
nothing else than what I called societal 
consensus. As a society (and what in 
Iceland the population was discussing for a 
year and a half) we need to make a deci-
sion whether we want or do not want to do 
it and what and how. (M6/98-103) 
Indigenous 
people as 
“community”
71. [NGO6] As an individual, because I 
belong to a tribe, I don’t have the right to 
give consent for my ancestry or for my 
future. (M6/168-73) 
 
72. [Industry1] If you go (as in the famous 
case for diabetes research) into an Indian 
population, it must be based on individual 
consent; it may very well, depending on the 
culture, be based on some sort of a com-
munity consent; I think that will vary from 
culture to culture. (M6/107-11) 
  73. [Industry1]We have as a guiding prin-
ciple first of all …the autonomy of the 
patient….we recognize an individual’s right 
to self-determination and privacy, and we 
respect these international and local stan-
dards, laws, cultural tenets. (M5/781-3) 
Protection 
against group 
risks
74. [NGO4] The Indian government decided 
not to pursue a bilateral project with a 
developed country regarding the immuno-
logical profile of Indian population because 
you could make the population vulnerable 
(in the event of germ warfare). … Surely 
we must debate and decide whether there 
are certain kind of data which we will not 
generate for certain populations, because 
that puts them at great risk in the current 
kind of society that we have. (M6/232-42) 
75. [Industry4]Clearly it’s the right of any 
group or individuals to exclude themselves 
if they don’t want to participate [in genetic 
research] … we had a discussion in Iceland 
whether we should exclude the psychiatric 
diseases because they were in some way 
more sensitive … it was quickly realized 
that if we left out that group of diseases we 
would be denying them the potential benefit 
(M6/280-90) 
Patient groups 
as “community”
76. Because findings of DNA studies could 
lead to stigmatization, prejudice, and 
discrimination against the Icelandic people, 
the Icelandic people should be consulted 
before any research is done on a country 
wide scale. (Annas 2000: 1831) 
77. [Industry1] When we talk about bio-
diversity [in medical research], what we are 
actually talking about primarily is the diver-
sity between health and illness … There 
has actually been very little population 
based genetic research so far … [in] the 
majority of the genetic research to date, the 
populations that it has focused on, are 
actually diseased populations. (M6/105-7, 
114-5) 
CC in the case 
of the Icelandic 
HSD? 
78. [NGO1] In this case the government 
has overstepped its legitimate powers. We 
see no pressing need in society that justi-
fies this extraordinary database act. 
(M5/170) 
79. [Industry4] The Icelandic Health Sector 
Database Law was passed by a 2/3 major-
ity in the parliament following 18 months of 
public and parliamentary debate … the 
democratic process comes together for a 
common decision. (M5/320-35) 
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Issues Arguments Pro Industry Perspective 
 80. The democratic process was flawed. 
The outcome was determined a priori by 
the government. DeCode misuses the term 
“community consent”. Icelanders were not 
asked whether they understand and 
[accept the details]. (Zoëga et al. 1999: 
34/59) 
81. [Industry4] Twenty thousand people 
have opted out of the database … after 
three years of [campaigning by the crit-
ics].That is not a lot. Seven percent of the 
population in Iceland do not agree with 
what we are doing and have opted out … 
that is clearly their right and we respect 
that. (M5/336-41) 
 82. [NGO5] Iceland definitely at least was 
respected in the sense that they were 
consulted and made choices and decisions 
for themselves, whether or not those are 
good decisions. (M6/303-6) 
 
 83. [NGO6] Roche’s work is sensitive to the 
consent of Icelandic people….One must 
really commend Roche for due diligence, 
because [as far as I can see from the 
material] … they will use the information 
but the actual material will be left in Ice-
land; there is work done by Icelandic 
researchers, that to me says: they forward 
in the right direction. (M6/200; 221-6) 
 
Regulation 
as CC? 
84. Action by the democratic parliament 
would be an indication of the community’s 
willingness to participate (Annas 2000: 
1831) 
85. [Industry1] [Industry] would actually 
welcome appropriate legislation … we want 
society to come up with rules how to use 
[genetic] information … we would, of 
course, like to participate when these 
guidelines are being decided upon. 
(M6/376-65) 
Special 
procedures for 
CC? 
86. ESHG 2000: If a population is to be the 
research subject, consent may be required 
at a group level (31). HGDP 1997: by the 
culturally appropriate authority. 
 
Support by 
patient groups 
as CC? 
 87. [Industry4] There is no community that 
is more actively supportive of genetic 
research actually than these patient advo-
cacy groups that exist for many of these 
diseases. (M6/115-9) 
Regulation as 
substitute for 
CC? 
 88. [Industry1] We need to protect individ-
ual research subject from direct harm…we 
need to ensure consent and protect their 
privacy…For the research community and 
society we need to conform to the rules, to 
the ethical standards. (M5/227-33) 
Community 
consultation 
89. Action by the democratic parliament 
which though desirable, is not necessary … 
rather what is required is a great deal of 
public discussion, so that all viewpoints an 
be aired and opposition can be expressed 
and addressed. (Annas 2000: 1831) 
90. [Industry1] We have the reality that 
people are concerned about genetics; there 
is this widespread fear which is perfectly 
understandable and quite legitimate and 
appropriate … along two lines: genetic 
manipulation [and] … dissemination of 
genetic information and the potential of 
misuse. (M5/ 724-30) 
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Issues Arguments Pro Industry Perspective 
  91. [Industry1] We as health care providers 
… [must] engage in a dialogue with the 
public … We want to do it in a neutral as 
possible fashion. It shouldn’t be patronizing 
like it so often is when scientists talk to the 
common public. It must be a give and take. 
(M5/759-66) 
 
Proposed conclusion 
Genetic research with indigenous people should only be done with both the consent 
of the individual subjects and the consent of the competent authority of the commu-
nity to which these subjects belong. The requirement of community consent reflects 
the fact that belonging to the community permeates all aspects of life for indigenous 
people.  
Indigenous communities are a special case. Communities have a different meaning in 
the modern sectors of the societies. Typically, the populations or “groups” that 
become involved in research: patient groups, age groups, even ethnic groups are 
aggregates of people who do not constitute bodies that could legitimately speak for 
their members.  
In modern societies the nation state can, of course, speak for all citizens. But under 
most legal constitutions nation states have to protect freedom of research, and they 
lack a mandate to decide whether individuals may or may not participate in a research 
project. Thus while parliamentary consent clearly reflects community consent it is not 
a prerequisite for legitimate access to individuals as subjects in research.  
Community consultation is advisable to increase awareness of public concerns that 
may exist with respect to the research that is planned. Such consultation must be a 
genuine dialogue to be meaningful. 
(7) In search of “best practice” 
Arguments 
Responsibility 
of industry 
acknowledged 
92. [Industry1] We as a company felt that it was very important to basically put on record 
how we think about genetics … what responsibility we have … in many ways just one 
facet of biology; but because of the sensitivities a somewhat special part of our 
research. (M5/777-80) 
Efforts of 
industry 
acknowledged, 
need for a legal 
framework 
93. [Expert2] What some companies are doing is actually trying to preempt legislation in 
the field … to demonstrate that there is no need for legislation, but…there is a process 
of actually moving towards enhanced legislation because the capability of the research 
community to auto-regulate the issue has not been really proven to be sufficient. 
(M6/332-6) 
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How to provide 
legitimacy in 
drug develop-
ment? 
94. [Moderation] If you do it that way, will you will steer clear of problems of legitimacy 
… or what else could be done in order to make this a legitimate strategy for the devel-
opment of drugs? (M5/840-3) 
Anticipate 
appropriate 
legislation 
95. [Industry1] We are trying to preempt [anticipate] legislation, but actually in an effort 
to be conservative…we are trying to go the extra mile if you will but primarily because 
there is very little [regulation] that would provide us with the security that we 
seek...[industry] would actually welcome appropriate legislation … we want society to 
come up with rules how to use [genetic] information … we would, of course, like to 
participate when these guidelines are being decided upon. (M6/376-65) 
Best practice 
for IC 
96. [Industry3] From our point of view we would take the position that it is important that 
the company complies with the best practice. (M7/588-9) 
 
A2 Synthesis of Responses by the Participants  
The principle of informed consent (IC) is unchallenged. Views differ, however, with 
respect to the regulations the principle implies. Industry tends to take a formal rule-
of-law view that emphasizes the autonomy of the research subjects. Accordingly, it 
should be the choice of the subjects to say “yes” or “no” to the conditions of the 
research relationship, that is, whether or not to demand benefit sharing, allow data 
and samples to be stored after the research project has drawn to a close, give broad 
consent to future projects etc. (R6: 1, 2, 5). Stakeholders, in contrast, tend to take a 
substantive political view emphasizing the contexts of power relations and inequality 
in which research subjects take decisions. From their perspective, IC is not just the 
acknowledgment of autonomy, but foremost a mechanism that empowers the weak to 
resist the strong. Accordingly, no decisions should be accepted by which research 
subjects give away control or do not use options for control extensively (“aggres-
sively”) (R6: 3, 4, 6). 
The difference may be more one of degree than of principle. Existing regulations do 
both: they acknowledge and strengthen subjective choice, and they impose some 
“objective” normative order that restrains choice. The Helsinki Declaration, for 
example, does not allow the research subject to give consent to unreasonable risk. On 
the other hand, autonomy is by definition politically ambiguous: it can be used to 
resist power, but also to give in. Perhaps one cannot remove this ambiguity com-
pletely without removing autonomy altogether. In any case, the specter of paternalism 
and elitism is around the corner. 
The middle ground between the extremes leaves room for controversy. If one accepts 
that subjects can give consent to future research and/or anonymization of their data 
and samples, how broad could such consent be, and how should future uses of data 
and samples be authorized? Observers from industry insist that clear reliable rules be 
defined (including the role of review bodies) which “settle” the issues and at the same 
time preserve space for the pursuit of research (R6: 2, 7). Stakeholders seem to 
envisage an ongoing process of testing and renegotiating rules (and roles); they argue 
that in a precautionary perspective doubts over risks and rules should operate against 
the research (R6: 4, 6). Accordingly, the parties disagree over whether exceptions 
from IC requirements should be allowed and/or extended to population genetic 
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research and whether existing ethical review mechanisms are adequate safeguards 
(R6: 4, 6). 
Informed 
Consent (IC) Industry Stakeholders/Experts 
Principles R6: 2 What is needed are laws with clear-
cut regulations that would not adversely 
affect research activities and would adopt 
safeguards to protect patient confidential-
ity. 
R6: 3, 4 Questions of IC must not be de-
contextualized from relations of power and 
inequality, the link with BS must not be 
severed. 
Exceptions from 
the rule of IC?  
R6: 2 In accordance with established 
professional practice and ethics, excep-
tions from the requirement of IC should 
also cover the possibility of proxy consent 
for patients who are unable to decide for 
themselves (children, unconscious people, 
mentally disabled people). 
R6: 4 A position of “no exceptions ever” 
might innocently foreclose a future benign 
opportunity. But the determination of 
exceptions must not be left to those who 
will benefit from them.  
R6: 4 IC was in fact not given, if there was 
even the possibility of exceptions known to 
the researchers at the time that the IC was 
obtained. Under this logic, the positing of 
exceptions to IC in advance nullifies the 
entire IC process. 
R6: 4 We need a kind of ethics version of 
the precautionary principle: the research-
ers need to demonstrate an adequate 
ethical schematic for their work in 
advance. Unless and until they do so, no 
exceptions should be permitted. 
R6: 4 There should be no exceptions to 
the principle of no exceptions! 
R6: 6 There is no wholesale or imperative 
“exemption” from the requirement of IC. 
Appropriately mandated ethics are per-
mitted to waive the requirement in certain 
exceptional circumstances for a specific 
research protocol, if no more than minimal 
risks are implied for the subjects. 
R6: 6 The risk of participating in genetic 
research exceeds minimal risk, because of 
the possibility of unexpected of results. 
Therefore, in general, waivers would not 
be expected in genetic research. 
R6: 6 Parliaments do not have a mandate 
to exempt research from IC requirements. 
Disclosure of 
risks to the 
society in IC  
 R6: 3 A researcher, company or institution 
could direct people to websites that dis-
cuss such risks, so that it would constitute 
prior informed consent. 
R6: 4 [Such risks must be disclosed]. No 
one can assert when, where and how 
unanticipated consequences of research 
mishaps will accrue, and to whom. Sci-
ence, and science-based corporations 
[operate] in a matrix of societal, cultural 
and power relations. 
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Informed 
Consent (IC) Industry Stakeholders/Experts 
R6: 6 Researchers must disclose risks to 
the society they know of. 
R6: 6 Results of genetic research can be 
both unexpected and predictive for others 
than the direct participant in a research 
project; therefore the risks involved will be 
significant for others, both family members 
and a more extended group. 
Broad consent 
vs. need to re-
consent 
R6: 2 Consent should not be limited to 
specific types of diseases, because then 
follow-up of coincidental research results 
with medical significance would be impos-
sible. 
R6: 6 Consent means a voluntary agree-
ment to a proposal or action and as such 
does not apply to something that is 
unknown or uncertain. 
R6: 4 Under an ethical perspective, 
research subjects do not have a “right” to 
diminish the protection of privacy and the 
role of consent in research. IC does not 
occur in a mythical, de-contextualized 
world, but in a complicated world of 
uneven power and information [therefore, 
just referring to the autonomy of research 
subjects is inappropriate]. 
R6: 6 The relationship between a corpora-
tion/researcher and a research volunteer is 
a mistrust-based relationship (unlike the 
trust-based patient-doctor relation-
ship).Blanket “non-consent” opens up an 
avenue of “cheating” by the researcher 
[and is therefore inappropriate]. 
R6: 4 [Broad consent] empowers the 
researchers who will directly and person-
ally benefit from further research to take 
the relevant decisions; that eviscerates the 
ethics that could be established by the IC 
process. 
Ethical review 
boards 
R6: 7 The need to have all research 
projects ethically reviewed [unduly] 
imposes more bureaucratic steps on 
genetic research. 
R6: 4 IRB review must not be used to 
replace the safeguards of IC—[it] cannot 
ameliorate the problem of allowing loop-
holes in the IC process. 
R6: 4 Ethical review boards cannot ade-
quately address the problems, as long as 
we populate our henhouse guardians with 
foxes. 
Community 
consent 
[Ethical review as community consent?] R6: 3 Indigenous communities should 
have the clear right to deny the use of their 
data or samples, especially if material was 
obtained previously without proper IC. 
R6: 6 Community consent should be 
sought in addition to individual consent. 
R6: 4 It is not apparent that non-indige-
nous people can have the state speak for 
them in ethical matters. 
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Informed 
Consent (IC) Industry Stakeholders/Experts 
The right to 
withdraw data 
and samples 
R6: 7 The right to withdraw should not 
jeopardize research efforts if data are 
anonymized or intimately shared with 
others. 
R6: 4, 6 Research subjects can withdraw 
their data or samples at any time. No 
exemptions should be made for uses 
shared with others or for secondary prod-
ucts. Consented anonymization and 
publication are the only exceptions. 
R6: 6 There should be assurances [moni-
tored by IRBs] that remaining data and 
samples are destroyed when a research 
project is finished. 
 
A3 Points to Be Considered for Conclusions 
• Should any genetic research be admitted without IC? Apart from data and samples 
completely anonymized with consent? Should old collections of data and samples 
be available? Which body should review/authorize such research? 
• To what extent can consent for future genetic research be granted? To what 
degree must the research be specified? 
• How should risks to the society that might emerge from the results of genetic 
research be dealt with during the consent process? 
• Disclosure of possible commercial uses and value of the data and samples. 
• The right of participants to withdraw samples and data. 
• Can community consent be interpreted as authorization by existing ethical review 
bodies? If not, which body has a mandate to give such consent? What is the 
middle ground between state control, on the one hand, and veto positions of a 
variety of mobilized groups, on the other? 
• What are critical points in which companies could/should go “an extra mile”? 
What are the necessary steps? 
• In view of the arguments discussed with regard to IC, can one think of elements of 
best practice that might be acceptable for both companies and stakeholders and 
could be taken up in some guidelines? 
Appendix: Benefit Sharing 
 – 49 –
B. Benefit Sharing 
B1 Survey of Arguments 
Different types of benefits are at stake, and they accrue to different beneficiaries: 
Benefits to individuals Contributing to a public good, medical treatment, monetary payment 
Benefits to community 
Contributions to economic growth, to 
public health, and science; monetary 
payment 
Benefits to humankind Contributions to health and science 
 
Benefits other than monetary payments seem to be less controversial. We therefore 
focus on arguments for and against granting direct monetary benefits to individuals 
and to the community. 
(1) Monetary benefits to individuals 
Question: Should direct monetary benefits go to individuals contributing to the 
research? 
Main positions 
Pro Contra 
• The fact that the research is done in a commer-
cial context challenges the culture. Altruism is 
undermined. Patients increasingly consider data 
and samples as a commodity. [Arguments 3, 5, 
6, 8] 
• gift relationship prevails with patients contributing 
data and specimens to medical research. The 
patients want to contribute to a public good. The 
gift culture should be upheld. [Arguments 2, 4, 7, 
16] 
• If research subjects were fully informed about the 
commercial value of their contributions and the 
IPRs that will eventually be based on them, they 
might rethink their altruism. [Arguments 8, 9] 
• The informed consent forms companies use to 
inform subjects about the research includes full 
disclosure of all commercial aspects of the 
planned research. [Argument 10] 
• People who offer themselves as research sub-
jects must not only be protected against risks; 
They must be treated fair; sharing the commercial 
benefits is a matter of fairness. [Arguments 13, 
14, 15] 
• Financial incentives are illegal. It is unethical. to 
“buy” consent to medical research. [Arguments 
1, 16] 
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Arguments 
Issue Pro Con Other arguments 
The principle of 
altruism 
 1. [Industry3] In Europe it is 
illegal to provide any financial 
inducement to patients to pro-
vide samples and so no com-
pensation is provided back to 
patients . . . consistent with the 
guidelines recommended by the 
MRC and that is the position 
that [our company] takes too. 
(M7/598-602) 
 
  2. [Industry] Patients are behind 
the company’s efforts [to build a 
database] because consumers 
like the idea of participating in 
something historical, and the 
company is dealing directly with 
patients in the hopes of making 
scientific discoveries. 
(Philipkoski 2000) 
 
Altruism 
undermined? 
3. [NGO] HSD makes the 
information on people’s health 
records into a commodity as raw 
material for a business venture. 
(Arnason 1998: 2: 16) 
  
  4. The intention of donors is to 
further a collective good. 
(Greely 1997) 
 
??? 5. [NGO] The assumption that 
samples and information are 
donated altruistically for the 
benefit of the greater good of 
the community is now being 
challenged. (Arnason 1998: 16) 
  
 6. [NGO] Increasing under-
standing among citizens that 
their genetic and health infor-
mation is a valuable commodity. 
(Arnason 1998: 16) 
  
  7. [Industry3] In English law it is 
unclear whether or not there can 
be any ownership of a patient 
sample . . . because of that 
uncertainty the MRC guide-
lines . . . recommend the adop-
tion of a gift relationship . . . 
thereby if the patient has any 
rights of ownership they are 
transferred with those samples. 
(M7/591-8) 
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Issue Pro Con Other arguments 
 8. It seems unlikely that the 
citizens of this welfare state 
would willingly make a large gift 
of their DNA to a for-profit US 
corporation. (Annas 2000: 1831)
  
Informed 
consent to use 
for commercial 
purposes 
9. Potential research subjects 
should be told about the possi-
ble commercial value of the 
research or the possible 
embodiment of the work (or their 
tissues) as intellectual property. 
A participant’s altruistic feelings 
might well change on the extent 
to which someone else stands 
to profit from the research. 
(Greely 1998) 
  
  10. [Industry3] The consent form 
used by the company includes 
consent to follow patent appli-
cations on any arising inven-
tions and to be able freely to 
commercial exploitation of those 
inventions. (M7/581-5) 
 
BS in the 
Iceland case 
11. [NGO1] There is no effective 
mechanism of BS. The data-
base cannot be used for the 
direct benefit of the patients that 
contribute data. (Zoëga et al. 
1999: 56) 
  
  12. [Industry5] Once risk genes 
are identified individual patients 
may benefit. (Stefansson 
1999: 28) 
 
New rules? 13. Researchers must recognize 
that research subjects have 
interests beyond safety. (Greely 
1998) 
  
 14. Great strides have been 
made to ensure that research is 
safe for human subjects, but 
thus far, too little attention has 
been paid to whether it is fair. 
On that question a social and 
legal consensus is lacking. 
(Greely 1998) 
  
Appendix: Benefit Sharing 
 – 52 –
Issue Pro Con Other arguments 
 15. A clear, generally accepted, 
and fair framework for the 
relationship with research 
subjects might impose some 
short term costs on researchers, 
but its absence is both danger-
ous to researchers and unfair to 
the people who offer themselves 
as human subjects. (Greely 
1998) 
  
  16. [Industry4] We do not want 
to create a culture where people 
sell biosamples and poor people 
would feel forced to contribute 
specimens. This would be 
unethical. (Response 1) 
 
  17. [Industry3] From our point of 
view we would take the position 
that it is important that the 
company complies with the best 
practice. (M7/588-9) 
 
 
(2) Monetary benefits to the community 
Question: Should direct monetary benefits go to the community in which the 
research is done? 
Main positions 
Pro Contra 
• Direct monetary benefits should be granted when 
the community makes special contributions to the 
research by providing additional infrastructure, as 
in the case of the Icelandic Health Data Base. 
[Arguments 22, 23, 24] 
• The research will enhance economic prosperity, 
health and science: These are benefits justify the 
research, provided the benefits accrue in the 
community that participates in the research. 
[Arguments 18, 19, 26, 27, 29] 
• The community should have a fair share of the 
commercial benefits if it contributes its DNA for 
the research. [Argument 21] 
• The companies bear the economic risks of the 
research; they should be entitled to enjoy the 
profits [within the general rules—taxes etc.]. 
[Argument 20] 
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Arguments 
Issue Pro Con Other arguments 
Indirect 
benefits are 
enough  
 18. The prospect of eco-
nomic gain for the country 
and scientific knowledge 
that would lead to new 
drugs may be sufficient to 
justify research. (Annas 
2000: 1831) 
 
  19. [Industry5] The benefits 
accrue in terms of more 
efficient health care, high 
technology jobs. 
(Stefansson 1999:  30-1) 
 
  20. [Industry4] The eco-
nomic risk is taken by the 
researcher/company. The 
health and science benefit 
is indeed shared, so the 
question is only about the 
economic benefit. 
(Response 1) 
 
Advance 
agreement on 
BS 
21. The community should 
have a realistic opportunity 
to benefit from the use of 
their DNA in research. It is 
critical that both the proce-
dures for access and the 
financial aspects of the 
research venture are spelt 
out and agreed to in 
advance. (Annas 2000: 
1831) 
  
BS agreements 
in the Iceland 
Case 
22. Decode has to pay a big 
sum for the license. There 
is debate on whether or not 
this is a fair return. At least 
the principle is recognized 
that here is a national 
resource constructed by 
medical doctors and the 
staff of health clinics; and 
the people who made it 
should get something 
back—a fee and the annual 
fee for making profit from it. 
(Palsson 2000: 3) 
  
 23. Decode promises that 
Icelanders will get any 
drugs or diagnostics based 
on their genes for free 
during the patent period. 
(Enserink 1998)  
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Issue Pro Con Other arguments 
BS agreements 
in the Iceland 
case 
24. [Scientist from Cancer 
Society] The promise is a 
joke. How many drugs do 
you think are going to be 
developed and how many 
people will really benefit 
from it? (Enserink 1998) 
  
 25. The Icelandic govern-
ment can make its own 
deal, but the deal would 
have been better had 
government bargained for a 
percentage ownership in 
the company (Annas 2000: 
1831) 
  
Safeguards, 
rules 
  26. The Helsinki Declara-
tion requires that the bene-
fits of experiments with 
human subjects should 
accrue to the nation where 
they are done. It is unethi-
cal to do [clinical testing] in 
a poor country where it is 
known that the drug will 
never be used. (Milton 
1999) 
   27. [NGO1] To ensure that 
benefits are returned to the 
community for whose 
collective good the sample 
was donated patient groups 
should be engaged… in 
UK: cancer patients kept 
control of intellectual prop-
erty to ensure that benefits 
are returned back to that 
community. (Arnason 
n.d.:16) 
   28. [Industry4] Perhaps it is 
up to each community to 
decide how it wants to deal 
with potential future benefits 
and whether it demands a 
direct share in the eco-
nomic benefits. (Response 
1) 
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Issue Pro Con Other arguments 
   29. [Industry4] There may 
be a difference between 
communities where the 
research is performed by 
members of the community 
and those where outsiders 
are responsible for the 
research. Perhaps this is a 
part of community consent. 
(Response 1) 
 
Questions posed to the participants 
• Which arguments are missing in the above exchanges? 
• Should one uphold the rule that no financial incentives be used to recruit people 
for participation in research projects? 
• Has one to rethink BS if the community (the state) contributes to the infrastructure 
(database) used in the research? 
• Should special rules apply when communities of indigenous people become 
involved in the research? 
B2 Synthesis of Responses by the Participants 
Questions of BS trigger responses in which the parties change sides, so to speak. 
Industry appeals to altruism, emphasizes a gift culture of not “buying” data and 
samples, and frames participation in research as cooperation for the production of a 
public good (even if that good will eventually be realized through commercial devel-
opment) (R2: 1, 4, 6). In contrast, stakeholders emphasize the economic self-interest 
of donors; they accept the commodification of data and samples, and frame participa-
tion in research more as an investment into a commercial venture (R2: 2, 3; R6: 3, 
6). A possible exception is admitted for clinical trials in drug testing (R2: 3). 
While there seems to be consensus that (legal restraints notwithstanding) research 
subjects must be able to decide whether they wish BS or not (R6: 7), stakeholders 
require additional controls. Companies should not be allowed to seek informed con-
sent for the use of data or samples without offering BS in the first place (R6: 6, 3 vs. 
R6: 7). The research subjects may then choose to accept the offer or not. Such a 
scheme would make BS the expected rule and not gift giving. 
Stakeholders thus proceed from the assumption that the research by companies means 
business, not science, and therefore research relations should be business-like 
(R2: 3). Research subjects may bargain for what they wish: upfront payments, profit 
sharing, or some control over IPRs derived from the use of data and samples (R2: 3; 
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R6: 6). Industry has the choice to decline the bargain if it considers the benefit claims 
out of proportion or an unacceptable restraint on its freedom to operate (R2: 5). 
Whether the business frame also applies for academic research where scientists seek 
personal gains through reputation needs to be discussed. 
With respect to BS with the community, observers converge in that no special rules 
should apply for indigenous and other communities (R2: 1, 3. 5, 6, 8). But they 
apparently proceed from different assumptions—industry implying that BS with the 
community should not be required (outside clear CBD rules), and stakeholders 
implying that it should be required. This difference may reflect underlying disagree-
ment over the legitimacy and justice of the profits made in (IP protected) drug devel-
opment. Notwithstanding such disagreement, participants may want to consider that 
one rationale given (by industry) for not sharing the profits from commercial prod-
ucts is that the community gets indirect benefits through new drugs, new science and 
economic growth (R2: 4). This rationale fails, however, if the community from which 
data and samples are retrieved is not the community in which the commercial devel-
opment and production takes place. (Along that reasoning the Declaration Helsinki 
strongly discourages clinical trials with populations that are not likely to benefit from 
the expected products.) 
Benefit 
Sharing (BS) Industry Stakeholders/Experts 
Trade or gift 
relationship? 
R2: 1, 4, 6 No financial incentives and BS 
should be involved for research subjects; 
“buying” consent and inducing trade in 
body parts must be avoided. A gift rela-
tionship should prevail with patients. 
R2: 5 When the contribution of individuals 
is critical for the research plan, financial 
incentives may be appropriate. The rule 
should be that companies must have 
freedom to operate. 
R2: 4, 6 Individuals benefit indirectly 
through better medical knowledge, health 
care and economic prosperity. 
R2: 2, 3 There is no rule in the U.S. that 
excludes financial incentives for subjects 
to participate in research. With BS, donors 
of HGRs will be more willing to participate, 
and relationships will become more trans-
parent and business-like. 
R6: 3 The concept of “gift” should not be 
assumed. If there is not an advance 
declaration of “reasonable” benefit sharing, 
individuals should not even discuss pro-
viding IC. 
R2: 3 Participation in non-commercial 
research, in clinical trials for drug safety 
and in research where the participants will 
benefit from the results [may be appropri-
ate without BS]. 
Including BS in 
the IC process 
R6: 7 Researchers can legitimately appeal 
to the willingness of subjects to provide 
access to data and samples as a gift. 
R6: 6 Researchers should declare that 
they are prepared to share benefits and 
research volunteers, patient groups and 
society should aggressively negotiate 
share of IP and return of benefits. 
R6: 3 In the case of a general consent to 
additional research, partners should agree 
to involve a third party to manage the 
increase in benefits if new outcomes are 
derived from the use of the data, including 
the licensing of patents or genes. 
Fair amount of 
BS  
R2: 5 BS must be commensurate with the 
real contribution; individual body samples 
contribute very little; the companies bear 
the economic risk of the research. 
R2: 3 Upfront payments are better than 
profit sharing. 
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Benefit 
Sharing (BS) Industry Stakeholders/Experts 
 R7: 8 Companies do not, as a rule, accept 
reach through claims on IPRs. 
R2: 3 IPRs derived from the research 
should be considered in BS arrangements. 
Use of 
databases 
provided by the 
public sector 
R2: 1 If the state is the custodian of 
samples and date, companies would 
expect to have to pay for access. BS is up 
to negotiations. 
R2: 3 The State may decide to charge the 
amount a private company would have to 
pay if it had to seek access to data and 
samples without the public infrastructure. 
 R2: 4, 6 Access to research infrastructure 
should be free; the public gets the benefits 
from the research. Compensation of costs 
may be appropriate, but not BS. 
R2: 2, 3 Some reimbursements of costs 
should be required; costs should be 
passed on for benefits the state hands to 
the private sector in the pre-commercial 
phase of research. 
BS with 
communities 
R2: 4 No BS should be considered, 
research enhances economic prosperity, 
health and science, these are benefits. 
R2: 5 BS with communities, too, must be 
commensurate with the contribution, e.g., 
authorizing individuals to participate in 
research. 
R2: 9 Perhaps it is up to each community 
to decide whether it demands a direct 
share in the economic benefits from the 
research [for which data and samples are 
contributed]. 
R2: 2, 8 Definition of community is 
unclear; benefits to the government may 
not be the right way—even not in Iceland. 
R2: 8 Benefits should be assigned to the 
community even if it does not contribute 
DNA or additional infrastructure. 
Special rules for 
BS with 
indigenous 
communities? 
R2: 1, 6 The same rules should apply to all 
peoples. 
R2: 5 Companies should follow state laws 
relating to indigenous communities. No 
specific rules except those in the CBD 
should apply. 
R2: 3, 8 Indigenous people should not 
receive more BS because they are indige-
nous.  
R2: 2 There should be a set of rules 
respecting the culture of the indigenous 
communities. BS with indigenous commu-
nities should be separate from BS with the 
state. 
Guidelines R2: 7 Developing countries and indige-
nous communities may lack parity in 
negotiating power; therefore, guidelines 
about what constitutes proper BS may be 
very useful. 
R2: 7 Guidelines should consider what the 
developing countries themselves say that 
they want to do, not what some outside 
groups think these countries should do. 
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B3 Points to Be Considered for Conclusions 
• Is it realistic/desirable to expect that granting direct monetary benefits to research 
subjects becomes standard in research relationships? Also for academic research 
and in the social sciences?  
• What are operational rules to define BS with the community in societies with a 
market economy? How would such BS fit the mandate of the state to regulate and 
tax the commercialization of new products? 
• Given that the bargaining power of research subjects is weak and no objective 
measure is available to determine the economic value of their contribution to 
research, how can endless controversy over the adequacy of BS be avoided? 
•  Balancing the different aspects, which BS-points suggest themselves as guiding 
principles (or elements of a code) for corporate behavior? 
C Research Consortia 
C1 Survey of Arguments 
We propose to focus further discussions of RCs on those aspects that are clearly 
related to the issue which is at the basis of the dialogue process, namely: What is the 
proper balance between the private and the public domain in dealing with genetic 
information? 
RCs provide a model of how competition can be replaced with cooperation, and how 
research results which might otherwise be exclusively appropriated through secrecy 
or IP protection can be kept in the public domain. What are the prospects of this 
model? What are the limits? 
Observers emphasize that RCs are feasible in areas of pre-competitive research. 
However, “pre-competitive” can hardly be defined in absolute terms. Genetic infor-
mation that is regarded as pre-competitive by large drug developing companies (like 
those who participated in the SNP [single nucleotide polymorphisms] consortium) 
may be regarded as competitive by e.g. start-up firms who seek to commercialize any 
new information—provided they can reserve some exclusive right to its use. 
Thus, it seems that institutional and legal frameworks play a role in defining or con-
stituting certain areas of research as “pre-competitive”. Accordingly, the arguments 
raised in the Working Group infer two types of reasons for considering research as 
pre-competitive:  
• functional prerequisites of successful research that make strategies of private 
appropriation technically unfeasible, 
• regulatory conditions that impose normative restrictions on the appropriation of 
research results. 
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Functional prerequisites  The need to collaborate:  
There are millions of SNPs; without collaboration nobody would ever 
figure out which are the 0.1 percent that are actually meaningful [see 
argument no. 15] 
Regulatory conditions Rules of private-public partnership: 
The Welcome Trust made a very substantial contribution to the SNP 
consortium under the condition that the data were going to be public 
domain. [see argument no. 24] 
Limits on patents on genes: 
The basic assumption of those who collaborated in the SNP consortium 
was that SNPs should no be patented. [see argument no. 43] 
Conditions for successful RCs: 
Question: Which are favorable/unfavorable conditions for the successful 
establishing of RCs? 
Main points 
Favorable Conditions  Unfavorable Conditions 
• The SNP consortium demonstrates that RCs are 
suitable to keep genomic data in the public 
domain and limit patenting strategies that might 
block the further use of genes in research and 
commercial development. The model of the SNP 
consortium could be extended to further steps in 
genomic research. [Arguments 1, 5, 36] 
• The SNP consortium worked because the 
research was clearly considered as pre-competi-
tive by the companies that participated. This con-
dition may not be fulfilled in research that investi-
gates full length genomic structures. [Arguments 
25, 37, 39] 
• “Pre-competitive” is a relative term. Some compa-
nies may consider SNPs as competitive informa-
tion and have an interest in patents that grant 
them exclusive rights over the commercial uses 
of SNPs. Hence, RCs can, apparently, be used to 
overrule company interests. [Argument 27] 
• RCs must be compatible with the interests of the 
companies. They will only come about if compa-
nies define the research as sufficiently pre-com-
petitive. [Arguments 46, 48] 
• Interests can be influenced by institutional 
arrangements and public policy. Public financial 
contributions to genetic research may only be 
granted under the condition that companies do, in 
fact, define the respective genomic information as 
pre-competitive and agree to join a RC that 
places the information in the public domain. 
[Argument 30] 
 
• The dividing line drawn by patent laws between 
knowledge in the public and the private domain 
can be adapted. Genetic information that cannot 
be protected through patents is likely to be 
defined as pre-competitive. Accordingly, RCs in 
that area would be facilitated. [Argument 49] 
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Arguments 
The arguments cannot easily be framed into a pro/contra exchange. Many points 
raised in the working group were uncontroversial. The most interesting issues for 
further discussion seem to be whether RCs provide a model that can be extended 
beyond the SNP case to balance public and private domains in genomics and whether 
the viability of that model could/should be enhanced by appropriate modifications of 
patent laws. We collect the arguments according to the following scheme:  
1. Functions/rules of RCs 
2. Rationales for RCs: The case for public involvement 
3. Rationales for RCs: Incentives for private companies 
4. Preconditions for a RC 
5. Examples of RCs (other than SNP) 
6. Can the SNP consortium become a model for further collaboration in genom-
ics? 
7. Should legal frameworks (IP regimes) be adapted to facilitate RCs? 
Functions/rules of RCs 
Issues Points raised 
Keep genomic 
data in the 
public domain 
1. [Expert1] The key point is the decision to release the data continuously and not to 
keep them secret until publication. That leads to an enormous scale up in public 
domain. (M7/76-83) 
 2. [Expert1] Data from the SNP consortium are released to the companies and the 
public domain at the same time, that is one of the key point of the rules. (M9/909-21) 
Defensive 
patenting 
3. [Expert1] All the data is freely accessible, and it is protected by submitting US patent 
applications to establish the data discovery. (M7/161-71) 
 4. [Expert1] The RC makes use of the patent system to guarantee that what was dis-
covered remains in the public domain; it is a defensive patent. (M9/887,919) 
Prevent patents 
that block the 
use of genes 
5. [Expert1] Gene patents are strong blocking rights, stronger than traditional patents, 
since they also inhibit other applications using the gene. With public-private RCs you 
eliminate some of these patents. (M7/347-60) 
 6. [Expert1] Since the data are placed in the public domain nobody can apply for a gene 
patent related to SNPs and restrict research. (M7/207-11) 
 7. [Industry3] The defensive patent can be activated as an invention registration; it gives 
you all the benefits of the date and serves to negate any subsequent patent application. 
(M9/924-7) 
 8. [Expert1] In the SNP consortium you can still get functional patents and a patent on a 
particular application. (M9/994-5) 
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Rationales for RC: The case for public involvement 
Issues Points raised 
Public domain 
data as a 
prerequisite for 
research 
9. [Expert1] Collaboration and ownership contradict each other. The patent development 
and privatization of data resources inhibit worldwide collaboration; the RC is an alterna-
tive to make data more accessible (M7/60-7) 
Prevent private 
data monopoly 
10. [Expert1] In the human genome project the public had to fight to keep the data in the 
public domain. It was only because the Welcome Trust doubled the same sum of money 
two days after CELERA announced its effort which drove the support of the NIH in 
preserving its funding. Otherwise there would have been a private data monopoly. 
(M7/90-101) 
Suitable public 
infrastructures 
11. [Expert1]The computing systems at the Center provides an infrastructure for partici-
pation in the SNP consortium, and people are organized so that they can do a vast 
amount of research in a short time. (M7/388-94) 
 12. [Expert1] If you fund academic research properly you can produce large amounts of 
data and knowledge very effectively without needing to have the strong profit motive 
which is always quoted in the pharm[ceuticals] industry as the driving force. (M7/395-9) 
Provide better 
access for 
researchers from 
poor countries 
13. [Expert1] By having the data in the public domain ion the RC you provide free 
access. If you have the data in the private domain, it does not matter how low the prize 
you charge for access, you are going to exclude a lot of researchers worldwide. 
(M7/376-9) 
 
Rationales for RCs: Incentives for private companies 
Issues Points raised 
Benefits from 
collaboration 
14. [Expert2] What is the motivation of companies to contribute to RCs and make data 
available even to those companies which do not contribute? (M7/404-6) 
 15. [Industry1] There are millions of SNPs; without collaboration nobody would ever 
figure out which are the 0.1 percent that are actually meaningful. (M7/427-30) 
 16. [Expert1] Companies are getting more out of the rest of the research: What would 
they loose by letting other companies see it? (M7/409-11) 
 17. [Expert1] As Allan Williamson (Merck) put it: You can only do a certain amount of 
research in your company; biology is just too complicated. For integrating all the infor-
mation, the integration of different peoples’ ideas and data becomes more and more 
critical. (M7/192-9) 
 18. [Expert1] Making data accessible becomes a centralized problem; if you are going to 
do research … potentially you require access to all this information regardless [of] 
whether you are a company. (M7/370-375) 
 19. [Expert1] If companies block access to private data, then they miss out on the analy-
sis provided in the public domain. So, from their point of view it is worth giving the data 
into the public domain because of all the research they get back. That is the argument 
that these consortia [use]. (M7/199-204) 
 20. [Expert1] From the companies’ points of view: the more free access there is, the 
more research gets done, [and] the more it benefits you on developing products. 
(M7/381-5) 
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Issues Points raised 
Failure of 
exclusive 
private strategy 
21. [Expert1] CELERA cannot report any genome from their data, but they can report 
from combining the public domain data and the private data. The whole genome job did 
not really work; CELERA was rescued by the fact that they could take a public domain 
mapped effort. (M7/112-3, 142-4) 
Distributing 
risks 
22. [Industry1] The project was such that no company by themselves was going to take 
the high risk. (M7/433-4) 
 23. [Industry2] Companies which are solely motivated by profit … nevertheless fre-
quently find research consortia to be the best way to proceed, typically when the 
research is pre-competitive and involves technology which would be too expensive for 
one party to develop. (M7/1105-15) 
Complying with 
conditions for 
private-public 
partnership 
24. [Industry1] Welcome Trust made a very substantial contribution to the SNP consor-
tium under the condition that the data were going to be public domain. (M7/421-2) 
Preconditions for an RC 
Issues Points raised 
Pre-competitive 
research 
25. [Industry1] The reason for companies to participate in the SNP consortium was the 
pre-competitive nature of the data. There was really no competitive pressure, and it was 
appreciated that unless you put the data in the public domain nothing was really going 
to come out of the research. (M7/421-34) 
 26. [Industry2] Companies frequently find research consortia to be the best way to 
proceed; but the conditions under which they find that to be true is that the research is 
pre-competitive. (M7/1110-14) 
 27. [Industry3] SNPs are pre-competitive for those who want to develop new drugs; our 
research tools are other people’s products. It is always pre-competitive with respect to 
the members of the respective consortium. (M9/1022-39) 
Limits to 
patents on 
genes 
28. [Expert2] The basic assumption of those who collaborated in the SNP consortium 
was that SNPs should no be patented. It would be a problem if SNPs could be patented 
in any country (M9/935-6) 
 29. [Expert1] In the SNP consortium you can still get functional patents and a patent on 
a particular application .(M9/994-5) 
Incentives 
through public 
contributions 
30. [Industry1] Welcome Trust made a very substantial contribution to the SNP consor-
tium under the condition that the data were going to be public domain. (M7/421-2) 
 31. [Expert1] The computing systems we have at the center provide the infrastructure for 
the SNP consortium. (M7/388-94) 
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Examples of RCs (other than SNP) 
Issues Points raised 
 32. [Industry2] In two examples consortia generated [environmental] for the public; but 
when companies began to use the technology for themselves it became proprietary. 
The consortia ended and the participants patented the technology and applied it to 
individual commercial advantage. The public interest of having the right goods or the 
best services in the shortest time is generally met by a mixture of both public and pri-
vate. (M7/1119-30). 
 33. [Expert1] There are plans that companies submit a list of structures that they are 
interested in determining; this list will be merged to remove redundancy, the attempt will 
be to get genomic coverage of structures. You apply for a patent to get the date on the 
structure and the data can be free available. (M7/185-91) 
 34. [Industry1] Harvard wants to put up a structural biology consortium (M7/435) 
 
Can the SNP consortium become a model for further collaboration in genomics? 
Issue Pro Con Other arguments 
Public domain 
data as a 
public policy 
goal 
35. [Expert1] Patents and 
privatization of data 
resources inhibit worldwide 
collaboration; the RC is an 
alternative to make data 
more accessible (M7/60-7) 
  
SNP RC as a 
model 
36. [Expert1] Having done 
the SNP consortium it is 
easier to present RC as a 
possibility for the future 
(M9/809) 
  
The limited 
value of the 
SNP model: 
pre-competitive 
research as a 
precondition 
 37. [Industry2] The SNP 
consortium is an example 
that works: If the database 
were for full length gene 
sequences, it could be 
different. (M7/1130-36) 
 
  38. [Expert2] All RCs so far, 
obviously, happened in the 
pre-competitive area. 
(M9/879-80) 
 
  39. [Industry1] The pre-
competitive nature of the 
data is the difference 
between the SNP consor-
tium and a structural biol-
ogy RC, or the FLEX con-
sortium that Harvard wants 
to put up. When it comes to 
full length clones, the 
prospects for RCs are less 
clear. (M7/423-36) 
 
Appendix: Research Consortia 
 – 64 –
Issue Pro Con Other arguments 
Balancing 
private and 
public domains  
  40. [Expert1] Not everything 
should be public property. 
But the use of infrastruc-
tures of research will be 
more efficient when you 
keep them in the public 
domain. (M7/1098-9) 
Guidelines for 
establishing 
RCs 
  41. [Industry2] One should 
define the characteristics 
when it is appropriate and 
why to collaborate in an 
RC. Guidelines and sug-
gestions might be offered to 
different groups which find 
themselves in a comparable 
situation. (M9/800-5) 
 
Should legal frameworks (IP regimes) be adapted to facilitate RCs? 
Issue Pro Con Other arguments 
 42. [Expert2] RCs require a legal 
environment; to provide this 
environment is a public policy 
issue. (M9/876-8) 
  
Preclude 
patenting SNPs 
43. [Expert2] The basic assump-
tion of those who collaborated in 
the SNP consortium was that 
SNPs should no be patented. It 
would be a problem if SNPs 
could be patented in any coun-
try (M9/935-6) 
  
  44. [Industry1] The consortium 
has a protection in US and in 
Europe, where it matters. If 
somebody patents SNPs in 
Nepal, let him do research 
there. (M9/961-3)  
 
Constitute pre-
competitive 
information by 
limiting the 
availability of 
patents 
45. [Expert2] Define the dividing 
line between what should be 
patentable and what not. At 
which stage should patents 
come in, what information 
should be regarded as pre-
competitive? (M19/971-5) 
  
  46. [Industry1] If you can get the 
consortium together to work, 
then you have by definition an 
issue that is sufficiently pre-
competitive to allow the RC. 
(M9/1000-2) 
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Issue Pro Con Other arguments 
 47. [Industry3] SNPs are pre-
competitive for those who want 
to develop new drugs. Our 
research tools are other 
people’s products. “Pre-
competitive” is always defined 
with respect to the members of 
the respective consortium. 
(M9/1022-39) 
  
  48. [Industry1] The definition of 
pre-competitive comes out of 
the prospective RC. (M9/1054) 
 
Demarcation of 
pre-competitive 
information as 
a public policy 
issue 
49. [Expert2] It is a public policy 
issue: If you do not have patent 
protection for certain kind of 
information RCs are much more 
likely, because there is no way 
to make it competitive informa-
tion. (M9/1007-9) 
  
Limits of 
patents on 
genes 
50. [Expert2] The only way to 
have a RC working and avoid a 
situation where patents like the 
one on BRCA block research, is 
to exempt the gene from pat-
enting. (M9/989-91) 
  
 51. [Expert2] It is not in the 
public interest to have patents at 
the level below actual products 
… to have patents on genes 
when there is no product in 
sight. (M9/1033-5) 
  
  52. [Industry2] Disagree that the 
research plan that enables you 
to patent a gene does not have 
a product in sight … a gene is 
halfway toward the ultimate 
product and may sometimes be 
the product. The [proposal to 
limit patents on genes] would be 
very difficult for us as a group to 
consider, but we could agree on 
something that is regarded as 
pre-competitive. (M9/1039-43, 
48) 
 
 
Questions posed to the participants 
• Is the argument that joint efforts of public and private research are necessary to 
cope with the complexities of genetic data valid beyond the gene sequencing pro-
ject? Can it be applied to structural or functional genomic research? 
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• Is public-private partnership within RCs (which are public domain oriented) a 
viable strategy for the drug developing companies to establish the knowledge base 
for structural genetics, gene products, gene functions, and genetic factors associ-
ated with specific diseases? 
• Would legal changes that restrict the options for patent protection of genetic infor-
mation enlarge the opportunities for RCs? Under what conditions would such 
restrictions become a disincentive for drug development? 
• Are these the wrong questions? Is any important argument missing? 
C2 Synthesis of Responses by the Participants  
The responses underline that the SNP consortium discussed in the working group 
must be distinguished from the usual types of joint ventures and public-private col-
laborations or networking (R3: 1, 3, 5, 7). Whereas the latter may aim at the devel-
opment of a commercial product, including the establishment of exclusive rights on 
the results and allocating ownership of the data to the party that produced it, the for-
mer is explicitly designed to release useful information in the public domain (R3: 6). 
The leading question in the 3rd Circular was, whether the SNP model could be 
extended to research further down the chain towards new products, e.g. to investiga-
tions of functional genetics and gene-disease associations–the implication being that 
the possibility to reserve exclusive rights would also be postponed to information 
further down that chain, e.g., to drug targets discovered on the basis of those investi-
gations.  
Stakeholders tend to argue in favor of such extension, not only for technical reasons 
(efficiency of research), but also as a policy principle that restricts the scope of exclu-
sive rights granted for genetic information. The open source software is inferred as a 
model in this respect (R3: 2, 4). Representatives from industry have doubts. While 
not excluding such RCs altogether they anticipate incompatibility of interest, because 
the RCs would include knowledge considered as competitive (R3: 1, 3, 5, 7). The 
“business driver” for RCs is the pooling of costs and the sharing of risks in develop-
ing a knowledge base (R3: 1, 7). RCs are only viable if the interests of all parties can 
be met. For industry this would, as a rule, include the right to obtain patents (R3: 1, 
3). Large companies may, however, also join RCs—and put the results in the public 
domain—to avoid that genetic information on which they will have to rely in the 
development of new products is patented by small start ups (R3: 6). If the results of 
RCs have to be placed in the public domain, companies must determine whether for 
them the benefits, e.g., in terms of public funding or freedom to operate, outweigh the 
price that they cannot claim exclusive rights on results and use these rights to protect 
and recover the investments in subsequent product development. 
(Participants commented extensively on the question of whether restricting patents on 
genes would amount to a disincentive for drug development. These points are 
included in the next section on Gene Patents. The same applies for arguments that a 
proper balance between private and public knowledge can be achieved through 
existing mechanisms of patent law and that there is no need for “rebalancing”.) 
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Research 
Consortia (RCs) Industry Stakeholders/Experts 
Extending RCs 
to functional 
genetics? 
R3: 6 The argument that joint efforts of 
public and private research are necessary 
to cope with the complexities of genetic 
data is incorrect. Private research has all 
the means to cope with such complexities. 
R3: 2, 4 If RCs were seen as useful for  
sequencing efforts and mapping, by that 
token, they should be even more useful for 
structural or functional genomic research. 
RCs are creative forces and give back 
more than you put in. 
Efficiency of 
RCs 
R3: 7 With so many genes whose function 
and structure await determination, pooling 
resources allows a higher volume of 
opportunities to be processed more 
quickly. If parties wish to collaborate in a 
research consortium, they should be free 
to do so. 
R3: 3, 5 There are already a lot of RCs 
(contracts, joint ventures, networking 
between private and public institutions). 
R3: 1 RCs can be fruitful and cost-effec-
tive ways to develop and share technol-
ogy, but they can only succeed if all par-
ties find the collaboration to be consistent 
with their long-term objectives. 
 
Results in the 
public domain? 
R3: 7 Whether or not patent rights are 
obtained in RCs, access to such rights is 
available by members and non-members, 
and results are put into the public domain, 
should be agreed upon by the parties. 
 
Competitive 
research 
R3: 1, 6 Functional genomics is a very 
competitive field. You are working with the 
utilities for genes and their associated 
expression proteins, which define the 
prime inventions in the area; and private 
entities would likely be very cautious in 
undertaking collaborations, which could 
greatly impact their right to develop and 
sell particular products. 
R3: 7 The business driver for public and 
private partnerships relating to functional 
and structural genomics is not only the 
public/private domain issue but also the 
cost of the underlying work.  
 
Joint ventures—
normal rules 
R3: 3 You need a win-win situation for the 
partners, i.e., incentives and costs are 
shared, including the possibility to obtain 
patents on the results. 
R3: 6 Collaboration and ownership of data 
is not a contradiction. In pharma-public 
research collaborations ownership of data 
is usually allocated to the party that pro-
duced it, e.g., the public. Additional royal-
ties can be offered in return for the grant of 
exclusive rights. 
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Research 
Consortia (RCs) Industry Stakeholders/Experts 
SNP 
consortium: 
exceptional 
case or post-
competition 
culture? 
R3: 6 The SNP consortium is an exception 
to the classic collaborations, its objective 
being to release data in the public domain, 
which are pre-competitive and not pat-
ented. 
R3: 6 The rationale for the SNP consor-
tium was not just the desire to develop a 
research tool that will be publicly available 
and freely accessible to the entire scientific 
and medical community. It was also based 
on the need to create a commonly 
accepted SNP map more quickly, and with 
shared financial risk and less duplication of 
effort. 
R3: 6 The primary goal pursued by private 
research through an RC that releases the 
genetic information in the public domain is 
to avoid patenting of the information by 
start-up biotech companies. 
R3: 4 One should not focus on pre-com-
petitiveness as a condition of RCs, but 
draw an analogy with open-source soft-
ware as an example of a post-competition 
culture. The resource is open to all, yet 
there are companies competing out there 
to sell this software.  
 
C3 Points to Be Considered for Conclusions 
• One question in the 3rd Circular was whether (public-domain oriented) RCs are 
feasible in functional genetics. Following the advice of an observer from industry 
we would like to ask “the meeting parties for actual suggestions and test whether 
any consensus exists” (R3: 1).  
• Is public funding of RCs (and competition with private company efforts) an advis-
able strategy to bring public-domain oriented RCs together in functional genomics 
and research on gene-disease associations?  
• Can one define elements of best practice for corporate strategies with regard to 
RCs? 
D. Access to Databases  
D1 Survey of Arguments 
Health data bases and DNA sample collections are becoming important research tools 
in human genetics research. On the other hand, these tools are often private property. 
Even if the public sector contributes to the development of databases and sample 
collections, exclusive private rights may be granted for using them, as in the example 
of the Icelandic Health Sector Database (HSD) which has been exclusively licensed 
to deCODE by the government. The issue that emerges is the proper balance between 
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the private and public domain in regulating such tools/infrastructure for research. 
How should access to data and samples be granted? 
Various questions arise in this respect:  
• Should databases and sample collections be placed in the public domain because 
they comprise data and samples individual donors have contributed as a gift?  
• Should they be in the public domain because/if they have been established with 
public support?  
• What are proper conditions for licensing the use of the database? Should exclusive 
licenses be granted when access is sought for research with a commercial pur-
pose? Should access be granted just for a fee? Is it proper policy to license the use 
of databases with reach-through provisions that allow the owner of the database to 
seize rights on results that will be achieved with the data?  
Not all of these questions have been extensively covered by the participants of the 
dialogue process. We summarize some main arguments from our discussions and 
from the documents consulted. We confine ourselves to the issues of access to non-
patented research tools. Questions relating to patentable research tools will be dealt 
with in the Section on Gene Patenting. 
Should databases and sample collections for human genetics 
research be placed in the public domain?  
Question: Should databases and sample collections for human genetics research be 
placed in the public domain, or, at least, be accessible with minimum 
restrictive conditions? 
Main positions 
Pro Contra 
• Data bases of health information and biological 
samples are crucial research tools for the 
advancement of medical knowledge. Unlike e.g. 
chemical libraries they build upon the personal 
involvement of large populations who contribute 
what they consider a gift for the collective good 
and not normally as a tradable commodity. Such 
databases should be accessible in the public 
domain to guarantee their maximum use for the 
collective good.  
• Human subjects can legitimately transfer control 
of their data and samples to the owner of the 
database – including the right to use data and 
samples for commercial purposes. In fact, such 
transfer of control is often a precondition for 
mobilizing the investments needed to establish 
the database. Contributions to the collective good 
can still be expected: new products (diagnostics 
or therapeutics) will be derived from the commer-
cial use of the database. 
• In those cases where the public supports the 
database, through investment or special legisla-
tion, the database should be treated as a public 
infrastructure accessible in the public domain. 
Private investment could be compensated by the 
right to charge a fee for access, not by granting 
an exclusive license to use the data base.  
• In a private-public partnership the private invest-
ment may only be available if exclusive rights to 
exploit the database are granted. Moreover, 
exclusive licenses may be needed in certain 
cases to provide incentives to use the database, 
e.g. in research on orphan diseases. 
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Pro Contra 
• Licenses for access to databases and sample 
collections should not impose undue restrictions 
of the investigators’ freedom of research, such as 
reach-through provisions that give the licensing 
agent the right to claim the intellectual property of 
the results of the research.  
• Licensing conditions should be left to the bargain-
ing process between interested parties. 
• Some companies have policy models under 
which they grant free access to their databases.  
• The models apply for pre-competitive data, such 
as ESTs (see Research Consortia). They are not 
viable for numerous small companies that spe-
cialize on the commercialization of the database 
as a product or service. These companies will try 
to protect their databases as trade secrets.  
 
Arguments 
Issue Pro Contra 
Arguments over 
the Icelandic 
Health Sector 
Database (HSD) 
  
Violation of 
Freedom of 
Research? 
1. The exclusive license for deCODE to 
exploit the data will stifle independent 
research and hinder freedom of inquiry 
and entrepreneurship. (Mannvernd 1999: 
2) 
2. [Industry4] We are not imposing any 
new restrictions on the access by either 
academic or commercial scientists to 
hospital health data or genetic material. 
(M5/417) 
 4. Icelandic investigators are concerned 
that patients will be in fact “locked in” to 
the licensee. (Mc Ginnis 1999: 6)  
3. [Industry4] The original data stays in the 
hospitals and may be accessed by physi-
cians and scientists just as it has been for 
the last hundred years. (M5/324-7) 
Monopoly? 5. It is disturbing that at a time when 
monopolies and special licenses are being 
done away in many fields this very ideol-
ogy is introduced in biotechnology, one of 
the most important knowledge base of the 
future. (Erlendsson, Adviser to the Ice-
landic Prime Minister 1998) 
6. The HSD will not exclude others from 
access to data from Icelandic patients nor 
give exclusive rights to develop new drugs. 
(McGinnis 1999: 5) 
 7. [NGO7] Giving one company exclusive 
rights on the database of a whole country 
is a little bit scary. (M5/478)  
 
Unequal access 
to a research 
tool? 
8. The data base is an important [tool] for 
genetic research. The exclusive license 
creates inequity between scientists in 
Iceland regarding access to the database. 
(Zoëga et al 1999: 52/3) 
9. Access to the database is free for the 
government and for academic researchers 
who agree not to hand over data to com-
mercial clients. (1.1:30 deCODE) 
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Issue Pro Contra 
 10. Access for scientists from collaborating 
institutions is negotiable for non-commer-
cial purposes, but not legally binding; 
scientists outside collaboration must pay 
market prices for access. (Zoëga et al. 
1999: 52) 
11. [Industry4] We have to make sure that 
access is sought for academic research 
and that it does not undermine our com-
mercial use. (M5/390-3) 
Non-exclusive 
access to health 
data 
12. [NGO1] Contracts deCODE is making 
with the hospitals state that the access is 
only for the employees of the hospital and 
not for the academics not connected with 
the hospital (M7/456-8) 
13. [Industry4] Employees of those hospi-
tals will have free access to the database 
… [but] we will still grant access to, for 
example members of the university … it is 
stated in the contracts that it not excludes 
others. (M7/465-8) 
  14. [Industry4] It would be ridiculous for us 
to try to block access to the HSD because 
when we build something and then not use 
it; … we could sort of sit on the central 
database. (M5/564-6) 
Exclusive  
access to 
genetic data 
15. [Industry4] So other people can access 
that database. But what they discover 
does not get revealed until the exclusive 
rights holders [contractors] decides 
whether it is something they have the 
exclusive rights to know. (M7/501-3) 
16. [Industry4] For the genetic data we 
have made an agreement with [company] 
for exclusive rights for the development of 
diagnostics and drugs … so to summarize: 
we have non-exclusive access for the 
database, and we are offering exclusive 
access for specific disease projects. 
(M7/468-70, 480-1) 
  17. [Industry4] The use of the database will 
be limited by the priority that comes from 
the contract with the [company] (M7/497-8) 
Unequal 
opportunities to 
commercialize  
18. The exclusive license to exploit the 
database for commercial purposes creates 
inequity between scientists in Iceland with 
respect to commercialization. Commercial 
funding is an important resource for doing 
genetic research. (Zoëga et al 1999 
:52/53). 
19. The exclusive right to commercialize 
the database is in exchange for bearing 
the costs for establishing and operating 
the database. The licensee is putting forth 
the capital to establish the database and is 
entitled to the benefits of the investment. 
(McGinnis 1999: 5) 
 20. The exclusive license amounts to a 
monopoly on the collective property of a 
whole nation. (Enserink 1998)  
21. [DeCODE] The exclusive license is an 
absolute necessity to make the project 
viable. (Enserink 1998) 
  22.  [Icelandic Research Council] The data 
base provides a rare opportunity for Ice-
land’s researchers to become involved in 
some exciting science, which the govern-
ment—whose annual research budget 
amounts to US $ 120 million—would never 
be able to afford. (Masood 1998: 1) 
Should research 
infrastructures 
be kept in the 
public domain? 
23. [Expert1] Infrastructures for research 
should be kept in the public domain. 
(M7/1098-9) 
24. [Icelandic government] While undoubt-
edly desirable, public sector investment in 
a data base is beyond [Iceland’s] reach, 
and private sector finance is needed. 
Without the carrot of an exclusive license, 
no company would be willing to shoulder 
the required investment. (Masood 1998: 2)  
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Issue Pro Contra 
Publicly funded 
collections or 
databases 
25. [UK Medical Research Council] It is not 
appropriate for any one company to be 
given exclusive rights of access to collec-
tions of samples made with the benefit of 
public funds. (MRC 1999:6) 
26. [Health Committee of the Althing:] The 
free access to the HSD for Icelandic 
academic scientists can be considered as 
a payment by the licensee for access to 
data from the respective health institutes 
and independent health workers. 
(Erlendsson 1998: 2) 
  27. [UK Medical Research Council] Exclu-
sive access to data derived from research 
using the samples is acceptable to give 
sufficient time to secure patent protection. 
(MRC 1999: 6) 
Access for a fee 28. [UK Medical Research Council] 
Researchers may not sell for profit 
samples that they have collected with 
MRC funding. Recovery of reasonable 
costs, based on standard accounting 
systems is, however, acceptable. (MRC 
1999: 5) 
29. [Expert3] [Even if] the contents of the 
database must not be subject to any 
protection by IPRs … what allows the 
owners of the database to ask for a fee is 
the added value, the fact that they com-
piled [it].… The result will be [some exclu-
sivity]. (M7/1145-57) 
Estionan 
scheme 
30. [Estonian Genome Project] Ownership 
of raw data and samples resides with a 
non profit foundation formed together with 
the Health Ministry. Local academics get 
free or cheap access. The foundation 
creates a for profit company to commer-
cialize the data under non-exclusive 
licenses. (Estonia Genome Project: 2001) 
 
Industrial 
policies 
31. [Industry3] We all have an interest in 
promoting medical research..[therefore the 
company makes] licenses generally avail-
able for using as research tools … to 
academic institutions on favorable terms; 
[and] … also to commercial organizations, 
but on certain competitive terms. (M7/637-
42) 
 
 32. [Industry3] [The company] does not 
have a position… simply because we do 
not have a patient population database at 
the moment which is available for access 
… but my own personal view is that gene 
sequence databases are a research tool 
and therefore not different in principle to 
biological samples … and providing that 
the data sets are free from obligations to 
third parties, then one could make those 
available. (M7/643-51) 
33. [Expert1] Some private companies 
tried to stop public investment in genome 
sequencing because they were going to do 
that. … The consequence [would have 
been] … a private data monopoly. (M7/90-
101) 
 34. [Industry2] I don’t view my job as 
controlling other peoples‘ right to do 
research. [The company] freely granted 
research rights to the use of what some 
people think was a revolutionary research 
tool. (M9/172-181) 
35. Some biotechnology companies 
license the use of their databases with 
restrictive reach-through provisions that 
give the company options to intellectual 
property rights considerably downstream 
of discoveries made by using the data-
base. (NRC 1997) 
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Issue Pro Contra 
 36. The NIH cautions investigators not to 
accept licenses with reach-through provi-
sions which might impose unreasonable 
restraints on their work and restrict pro-
gress. (NRC 1997)  
 
 37. [Expert1] The alternative approach to 
having companies do it privately and then 
sell it … is consortia, where companies get 
together and…all the data [and samples] 
gets collected in the public domain and is 
available to everyone. (M7/155-9) 
 
 
Questions posed to the participants 
• Should special rules apply for the access to databases that have been established 
through private-public-partnerships? 
• Should commercial research be treated different from academic research? Can 
access for academic and commercial purposes easily be distinguished? 
• Should exclusive licenses for the use of databases be dismissed as a matter of 
principle to ensure maximum use of the research tool? 
• Should one insist that licenses for database use must not be combined with reach-
through provisions that seize downstream rights for what is done with the data? Is 
competition between databases the only way to prevent such practices? 
• What are other pertinent questions/problems? 
D2 Synthesis of Responses by the Participants 
The leading question was whether special rules should apply if a DB was built with 
public support. Public support could either mean public spending, or authorizing the 
inclusion of data available in the public sector, or granting an exclusive license to 
build the database (creating a monopoly). 
Observers from industry insist that the rules for access to the DB would have to be 
negotiated between the partners (R7: 5) and investments must be recognized in order 
to have the DB in the first place (R7: 6). These are obvious requirements. They apply 
regardless of whether the DB is built for commercial purposes or not. The same is 
true for the demand that the public partner should strive to secure effective sharing of 
benefits (profits) derived from commercial uses of the DB (R7: 4). 
In contrast, other observers, both from industry and stakeholders, emphasize that 
access to DBs built with public support should be free and cheap (R: 1, 7, 8) The 
underlying rationale apparently is that such DBs must be considered (and operated) 
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as public infrastructure and not just as a commercial enterprise. Therefore, access 
rules must reflect the public function of the DB. 
All observers find it difficult to distinguish between academic and commercial 
research. Some still advocate preferential rules of academic access to the DB on the 
basis of that distinction (R7: 1, 3, 4). Others reject such treatment as discriminatory 
and unfair competitive advantage for public scientists (R7: 5, 8). One observer 
acknowledges that commercial perspectives cannot be disregarded in academic sci-
ence, but explicitly demands that the privileges of academic science should be 
extended to research with a commercial goal (R: 7). 
Exclusive licenses to use the DB are treated as a purely technical matter by some 
participants from industry. Accordingly, such licenses are admitted if they allow 
efficient use of the DB (R7: 1, 5, 6). Others (including from industry as well) oppose 
exclusive licenses on grounds of public policy (R7: 2, 5, 7, 8). 
Six of eight respondents are against reach-through provisions to compensate for 
access to the database. The reasons given oscillate between economic and public 
policy arguments (R7: 1, 6, 8 vs. R7: 2, 3, 4, 5, 7). 
Access to 
Databases (DBs) Industry Stakeholders 
Public-private 
partnerships 
Negotiated rules 
R7: 5, 6 Rules and conditions will always 
be negotiated between the partners. Public 
or private, whoever puts together a data-
base may or may not find it in his best 
interest to grant free access to his data-
base. General rules must apply. 
R7: 6 The rights of the party who invests 
effort and money in creating a database 
must be recognized. Otherwise, fewer 
databases would be created. 
R7: 2 Ownership of DBs should not lead to 
different treatment. 
Special rules for 
DBs with public 
support 
R7: 1 If the partnership is funded by the 
public, then the public should have access 
to the data. 
R7: 8 Applying the same rules as are 
applied for private databases would hinder 
the sharing of genetic knowledge because 
access costs would be prohibitive to the 
public sector. 
R7: 7 Databases established using contri-
butions from public resources, such as the 
Icelandic database, should grant the same 
public access without strings. 
Preferential 
treatment of 
academic 
research 
R7: 1 If possible, academic and commer-
cial research should be treated different. 
R7: 4,3Academic research often reaches 
the public domain without patent protec-
tion. Academic researchers must disclose 
their current or future, intended or potential 
corporate applications of the research. 
R7: 7 To limit access to purely academic 
work stifles creativity by preventing aca-
demic scientists from exploring their ideas 
commercially. 
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Access to 
Databases (DBs) Industry Stakeholders 
Same rules for 
academic and 
commercial 
research? 
R7: 5 Differential treatment of academic 
and commercial research would be dis-
criminatory and counterproductive to the 
co-operation and networking between 
academic and industry researchers. 
R7: 5 If Academic scientists are exempted 
by any access rules/costs, they would 
have an unfair competitive advantage. 
R7: 2 Research both for commercial and 
scientific purposes should be free from any 
restriction. 
Exclusive licenses 
for using the DB? 
Public policy 
reasons 
R7: 5, 8 Exclusive licenses could block or 
hamper new developments in medical 
research; exclusive use of public data-
bases would be detrimental to the aim of 
the public sector to share knowledge and 
foster advancement of science. 
R7: 5 A license-selling body/company 
would be ill-advised to grant exclusive 
licenses for tools which are needed by 
many teams in academia and industry—
the body/company could be stuck with 
such licenses. 
R7: 7 Exclusive licenses and monopolies, 
as in the Icelandic case, have no role and 
should be dismissed as a matter of prin-
ciple, to ensure maximum use of the 
research tool. 
Economic 
reasons 
R7: 6 To prevent exclusive licenses would 
be counterproductive and would either 
lead to databases being created in secrecy 
or not at all. 
 
Reach-through 
provisions 
Public policy  
reasons 
R7: 5 If you create knowledge out of these 
data, this is your own achievement and 
there is no reason for reach-through 
provisions. It should be in the natural 
interest of every licensee to make sure 
that no unacceptable and hindering 
restraints are imposed on his work. Com-
petition is the best way to prevent it. 
R7: 7 A database should not get down-
stream rights for somebody else’s creative 
use of the data. The database would then 
appropriate intellectual property from that 
person. 
Economic 
reasons 
R7: 8 Industry usually does not use public 
or private databases imposing reach-
through provisions. If public database 
holders pursue reach-through provisions 
they run the risk of losing all private users. 
 
 
D3 Points to Be Considered for Conclusions 
• Should DBs established with public support be operated as public infrastructure, 
which means free and equal access (eventually for a fee)? 
• DBs (whether private or public) are research tools. Should this aspect be consid-
ered in defining conditions for licensing the use of a database? Exclusive licenses? 
Benefit sharing? Reach through claims? 
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• What could be proposed as best practice for corporate handling of DBs in genet-
ics? Both DBs owned by a company alone and DBs established through private-
public partnerships? 
E Patents on Genes 
E1 Survey of Arguments 
Patents on genes, and patents on parts of organisms or whole organisms, spark public 
controversy. The issues raised are heterogeneous. On the one hand there are moral 
arguments that the concepts and rules of intellectual property, as a matter of principle, 
should not be extended to living materials or living beings. The “No Patents on Life” 
postulate tries to capture these arguments. On the other hand, critics argue that the 
patents impose excessive restrictions on the access to (and the use of) the inventions 
of modern biotechnology. While the latter arguments also voice moral concerns about 
justice and fairness, they do not reject the very notion of patenting; rather, they chal-
lenge the scope of protection granted through patents. In particular it is held that 
some of the safeguards patent laws provide to secure a balance between private prop-
erty and public interests, such as research exemptions and licensing mechanisms, are 
insufficient or do not work properly when it comes to patents on biological materials.  
This circular will be brief in dealing with the moral debate over “No Patents on Life”. 
(The issue was not discussed at any length in Montreux.) We will also only briefly 
touch upon the discussion we had over the proposal for a Treaty on the Genetic 
Commons. The main theme of this Circular is the problems of access to inventions 
and of the scope of patent protection.  
With respect to the scope of patent protection a key question is whether product pat-
ents should be granted for genes (DNA sequences) under the same conditions under 
which they are granted for chemical molecules. Critics argue that such product pat-
ents offer too much for too little. The frame of reference for stating the “too much” is 
provided by societal functions, traditionally associated with and underlying the patent 
system, namely to compensate for investment in R & D. Accordingly, specific argu-
ments raised are that product patents on biological materials imply undue restrictions 
of scientific research, and that they stifle innovation in the fields covered by the pat-
ents. We have used these arguments as leading questions in our survey. 
Participants did not discuss the legal technicalities of the IP system for their own 
sake. A major concern was that developing countries might be put at a disadvantage 
through the operation of the system. We have collected these arguments under ques-
tion 5. It goes without saying that the survey cannot be representative of the whole 
range of related North-South issues (e.g., national sovereignty over genetic 
resources). Nor does it imply any judgment as to the particular question of whether 
biological materials received from the South should be categorically kept free from 
any type of access-restricting IPRs in the North. Issues of IPR and access to medi-
cines are surveyed in Circulars 5 and 8. 
The merits of many arguments can only be assessed when the meaning and the con-
ditions of patents on genes are clearly defined. While it is impossible (and perhaps 
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not the proper function of the dialogue process) to display all the technicalities of 
patent law, we have decided to summarize some (selective) propositions from legal 
documents and commentaries to illustrate The Legal Framework for Patents on 
Genes. These propositions are included in the long version of the argumentation only.  
The architecture of this survey as follows:  
A. The Legal Framework for Patents on Genes  
B. Leading Questions: 
1. Do patents on genes violate basic moral principles?  
2. Should a policy be adopted that makes organisms and living matter in gen-
eral, including genes, unpatentable and non-tradable goods?  
3. Are patents on genes (or gene fragments/derived gene products) a barrier to 
research? 
4. Are patents on genes blocking the development of innovative products? 
5. Are patents on genes undermining the access of Developing Countries (DCs) 
to new technology? 
The Legal Framework for Patents on Genes 
Genes are 
patentable, 
although they are 
naturally 
occurring 
US: DNA compounds having naturally occurring sequences are eligible for patenting 
when isolated from their natural state and purified, and when the application meets 
the statutory criteria for patentability. 
A patent on a gene covers the isolated and purified gene but does not cover the gene 
as it occurs in nature (USPTO: Utility Examination Guidelines, effective as of Jan. 5, 
2001) 
 EU: Biological material, which is isolated from its natural environment or produced by 
means of a technical process may be the subject of an invention even if it previously 
occurred in nature (EU: Directive 98/44/EC, Art. 3.2) 
Sequence data 
alone is not 
patentable 
US: The genetic sequence data represented by strings of the letters A,T,C and G 
alone is raw, fundamental sequence data, i.e., non-functional descriptive information 
(USPTO: Utility Examination Guidelines, effective as of Jan. 5, 2001) 
While descriptive sequence information alone is not patentable subject matter, a new 
and useful purified and isolated DNA compound described by the sequence is eligible 
for patenting, subject to satisfying the other criteria for patentability (USPTO: Utility 
Examination Guidelines, effective as of Jan. 5, 2001) 
 EU: Whereas a mere DNA sequence without indication of a function does not contain 
any technical information and is therefore not a patentable invention (EU: Directive 
98/44/EC, rec. 23) 
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Disclosure of the 
biological function 
of the gene as a 
necessary 
condition for 
“utility”/“industrial 
applicability” 
US: (Use as a probe is not enough.) 
If a patent application discloses only nucleic acid molecular structures for a newly 
discovered gene, the claimed invention is not patentable. But when the inventor also 
discloses how to use the purified gene isolated from its natural state, the application 
satisfies the “utility” requirement (USPTO: Utility Examination Guidelines, effective as 
of Jan. 5, 2001) 
Specific utility … means the applicant has to know what the gene does. In the past, 
patenting of a gene sequence was allowed based on general claims such as using 
the sequence as a probe; now, such a claim would be insufficient (J. Grisham, 2000) 
 EU: Whereas, in order to comply with the industrial application criterion it is 
necessary in cases where a sequence or partial sequence of a gene is used to 
produce a protein or part of a protein, to specify which protein or part of a protein is 
produced or what function it performs (EU: Directive 98/44/EC, rec. 24 
The industrial application of a sequence or a partial sequence of a gene must be 
disclosed in the patent application (EU: Directive 98/44/EC, Art.5.3) 
 US: (Not a substantial utility!) 
(Substantial utility) means that the sequence must have a real-world use, such as use 
as a diagnostic or a treatment for a disease. … It is not enough to make a general 
utility claim such as using the sequence to make a protein, without giving a real-world 
use for that protein. (J. Grisham, 2000) 
Disclosure of the 
biological function 
of the gene as a 
necessary 
condition for 
“inventive step”/ 
”non-
obviousness“ 
(Non-obviousness) 
The balance between costs and benefits should be taken into account in deciding the 
patentability of ESTs or SNPs or other research tools. This can be done under tradi-
tional law doctrines by, for example, finding “non-obviousness” less readily satisfied if 
the ultimate application of the information or tool is unknown (J. Barton, 2000) 
Disclosure of the 
biological function 
of the gene in the 
patent application 
as a sufficient 
condition for 
“utility”/“industrial 
applicability”? 
EU: “… whereas the industrial application of a sequence or partial sequence must be 
disclosed in the patent application as filed” (EU: Directive 98/44/EC, Rec.22) 
 §1a III of the Draft German Bill stipulates that the criterion of industrial applicability of 
a gene or partial sequence of a gene be met by stating in the patent application as 
filed the precise function fulfilled by the claimed gene or partial sequence“ Thereby 
the threshold of industrial applicability can be overcome, however, without any 
restrictions per se as to the scope which can be claimed. (Schrell, 2001) 
 Apparently, the legislator starts out from the assumption that the subject matter is 
defined by the function and absolute product patent protection can be obtained for 
that matter as defined by said function. In principle, this objective is to be welcomed. 
However, the proposed implementation fails to take into account that the subject 
matter might not be necessarily fully defined by the disclosure of a function in the 
application, especially the description and sufficiently delineated against subject 
matter which is equal in structure but different in function. Only the disclosure of the 
function in the claims might entail any limiting effect as to the scope of the patent in 
the course of legal actions to be taken (Schrell, 2001) 
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Scope: Product 
patents on 
genes—When one 
utility is 
described, can all 
utilities be 
claimed? 
US: The patentee is required to disclose only one utility, that is, teach others how to 
use the invention in at least one way. The patentee is not required to disclose all 
possible uses, but promoting the subsequent discovery of other uses is one of the 
benefits of the patent system. When patents for genes are treated the same as for 
other chemicals, progress is promoted because the original inventor has the possibil-
ity to recoup research costs, because others are motivated to invent around the 
original patent, and because a new chemical is made available as a basis for future 
research. Other inventors who develop new and non-obvious methods of using the 
patented compound have the opportunity to patent those methods. (USPTO: Utility 
Examination Guidelines, effective as of Jan. 5, 2001) 
 EU: “… whereas, according to this Directive, the granting of a patent for inventions 
which concern such sequences or partial sequences should be subject of the same 
criteria of patentability as in all other areas of technology: utility, inventive step and 
industrial application, whereas the industrial application of a sequence or partial 
sequence must be disclosed in the patent application as filed”. (EU: Directive 
98/44/EC, Rec.22) 
 If the inventive step as tested against prior art merely consists of the discovery of a 
function the applicant can be obliged at any stage in the application, interference or 
appellation procedure to amend his claims accordingly by disclosing the function of 
the claimed DNA sequence, i.e., to combine the sequence with the function associ-
ated, thereby restricting the scope of the patent. Third parties which make use of said 
DNA sequence for any purpose other than the one claimed don’t violate the patent. 
But if the disclosure of the DNA sequence itself has to be seen as the decisive step, 
absolute product patent protection with all the ensuing issues of dependency is still 
fully justified, albeit such an unrestricted scope of protection might meanwhile only be 
granted in exceptional cases (J. Straus, 2001) 
 “I also want to strongly emphasize that it is definitely desirable to limit the patent 
rights given to a well-defined and clearly proven useful function, since we know now 
that each single gene—of which we may have only 25000 to 40000 altogether in one 
human genome—may be involved in the production of a ten or twenty fold number of 
functional proteins, and many such proteins may be enmeshed in a number of differ-
ent functions of an organisms’ body. Assigning broadly defined patent rights to a 
specific gene plus its protein, for which only one function has been described, in such 
a way that all additional functions described in the future are also covered—even 
though common practice when receiving traditional patents on chemical or pharma-
ceutical substances—could be ruinous to an economic landscape of biotech start 
up’s, because the actual inventor of a completely new marketable use would immedi-
ately be subjected to license-serfdom under someone else who did not contribute his 
own creative intellectual or practical efforts to that sort of new development. Sweep-
ing genetic technology patents could thus sweep a promising new industry all too 
easily down to the drain.” (Markl quoted in Straus, 2001) 
Flexibilities of 
TRIPS 
There is no obligation under the TRIPS Agreement to adopt an expansive concept of 
“invention”, as is currently done by many developed countries. In particular, nothing in 
the Agreement obliges members to consider that substances existing in nature, 
biological or not, are patentable, even if isolated and claimed in purified form. (C. 
Correa, 2000) 
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(1) Violation of Basic Moral Principles? 
Question: Do patents on genes violate basic moral principles? 
Main positions 
Pro Contra 
• Patents on genes constitute ownership of life, 
which is morally wrong. A patent involving human 
genes is an act that offends against human dig-
nity. (Arguments 1, 3, 5) 
• A patent gives no rights to use the invention. 
Holding a patent on human genes does not, 
therefore, amount to owning a human being or 
any part of him/her. To warrant the verdict of 
“offense to human dignity” there would have to be 
a societal consensus that patents on human 
genes are clearly inconceivable. No such con-
sensus exists. (Arguments 4, 6, 2) 
• Patents on genes devaluate living nature by 
reducing it to an industrial product. (Argument 7) 
• While such devaluation may be morally offensive 
to some people, it is considered acceptable by 
many others in the society. Thus the objection 
falls into the pluralist realm of moral views in 
modern societies. As such it cannot demand 
general compliance. (Argument 8) 
 
Arguments 
Issue Pro Contra 
Patenting of 
human genes as 
immoral act? 
1. [Critics in EPO Relaxin:] Patenting 
human genes is intrinsically immoral. It 
violates Art 53(a) EPC which excludes 
patents “the exploitation of which would be 
contrary to morality” and EU Directive 
98/44 which prohibits patents “the use of 
which offends against human dignity 
(recital 38). 
2. Patenting human genes cannot be seen 
in line with what counts, for example in EU 
Directive 98/44, as violation of morality: 
patents on cloning of human beings, on 
modifying germ line genetic identity, on 
commercial uses of human embryos and 
on producing chimeras from human and 
animal cells (Art. 6 (2), recital 38). 
Violation of 
human dignity? 
3. [Expert2] In a case before the European 
Patent Office critics argued that a patent 
involving human genes was an offence 
against human dignity, because it was 
some form of slavery. (M9/49-54)  
4. To invoke the moral prohibitions under 
patent law one must “consider whether it is 
probable that the public in general would 
regard the invention as so abhorrent that 
the grant of patent rights would be incon-
ceivable. If it is clear that this is the case, 
objections should be raised under Art 53 
(a), otherwise not.”(Goldbach et 
al.1997:79) 
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Issue Pro Contra 
Ownership of 
life? 
5. [NGO3] Patents on genes amount to 
ownership of life, which has gone further 
down the road than it is comfortable for 
some members of the society and must be 
limited. (M7/1165-74) 
6. [European Patent Office:] Patents 
covering DNA encoding a human gene do 
not confer their proprietors any rights 
whatever to individual human beings. No 
woman is affected in any way by the 
patent on relaxin—she is free to live her 
life as she wishes and has exactly the 
same right to self-determination as she 
had before the patent was granted (EPO 
Relaxin) 
Devaluation of 
living nature? 
7. Patents on life devaluate the living 
nature because they reduce it to an indus-
trial product. (Greenpeace Germany, 
Press release 19-11-2000) 
8. [Modern cultures accept that plant and 
animal life is in many respects treated as a 
product, as private property and as a 
commercial commodity in the society.]  
 
Question posed to the participants 
• What is implied in the argument that one should “acknowledge” (rather than 
merely “tolerate”) that indeed for some people patents on genes are morally offen-
sive? 
(2) Should living matter be unpatentable?  
Question: Should a policy be adopted that makes organisms and living matter in 
general, including genes, unpatentable and non-tradable goods? 
(Refers only to the proposed Treaty on the Genetic Commons) 
Main positions 
Pro Contra 
• Under the terms of the Treaty on the Genetic 
Commons genes cannot be claimed as commer-
cially and negotiable goods or intellectual prop-
erty. The national rights (granted by the CBD) to 
control access to genetic resources shall, how-
ever, remain intact. (Arguments 9, 11, 13) 
• The issues of commercialization and monopoliza-
tion through intellectual property rights should be 
kept separate. The Treaty destroys the prospects 
of sharing the benefits from commercial uses of 
genetic resources. (Arguments 10, 12, 16) 
• The Treaty on the Genetic Commons envisages 
for human genetics something similar to what the 
General Public License achieves in (open) soft-
ware development: namely, to make genetic 
resources widely usable without commercializing 
them. (Argument 15) 
• The proposal of the Treaty is at odds with recent 
trends in legislation which all condone patents on 
genes under certain conditions. (See section A 
above.) 
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Arguments 
Issue Pro Contra 
Proposed 
“Treaty on the 
Genetic 
Commons” 
9. [NGO3] The proposed Treaty on the 
Genetic Commons provides that “genes 
will not be allowed to be claimed as com-
mercially and negotiable genetic informa-
tion or intellectual property”. (M7/701-3)  
10. [Expert2] The issues of commercializa-
tion and of monopolization through intel-
lectual property rights should be kept 
separate. There may be a number of 
arguments to object to patenting pharma-
ceuticals, the commercialization aspect as 
such is not frightening. (M7/748-56)  
Genetic 
commons and 
relation with 
CBD 
11. [NGO3] The Treaty on the Genetic 
Commons is not intended to extinguish the 
ability to insert control, what it does, it 
attacks the ability to commercialize. 
(M7/962-4)  
12. [Expert2] One should not return to the 
concept of the common heritage of 
[hu]mankind which basically gave compa-
nies the free right to use genetic 
resources. With the adoption of the CBD 
national sovereignty over genetic 
resources countries has been established 
(M7/1177-84)  
 13. [NGO8] The “Treaty on the Genetic 
Commons” rejects a sui generis regimes 
for access to genetic resources that seeks 
compensation in a commercial sense from 
these resources. It goes the route of less 
ownership, of anti-commercialization. 
(M7/902-4)  
14. [Expert2] With the adoption of the CBD 
and the establishment of national sover-
eignty over genetic resources countries 
have a right to claim benefit sharing for all 
benefits which resolve from the use of 
genetic resources. (M7/1177-84)  
Open source 
software 
analogue  
15. [NGO8] The Treaty on the Genetic 
Commons proposes to have an analogue 
for human genetics to what the GPL 
(General Public License) is in software 
development. Nobody has ever commer-
cialized a product developed under a GPL. 
(M7/951-3)  
16. [Industry2] Debates over patentability 
are frequent when you have a new tech-
nology where change is rapid and people 
are uncertain as to where that change will 
take you…I have heard this same discus-
sion on three technologies: integrated 
circuits, software and now on biological 
materials … Rights in genes are fair and 
reasonable. (M9/147, 337)  
Is gene 
patenting likely 
to prevail? 
 17. New areas of technology do not create 
the need for a whole new specialized 
patent law. In many ways the arguments 
used for DNA sequence technology 
resemble those voiced 30 to 40 years ago 
when polymer chemistry was an emerging 
technology. (Doll 1998:689)  
 
Questions posed to the participants 
• Given the fact that patent on genes have become a reality in the developed coun-
tries, should one not turn to the options and needs to have a better “fine-tuning” of 
the respective granting practices—in terms of standards of inventiveness and util-
ity, scope of claims, research exemptions, licensing conditions? 
• The International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture 
(formerly International Undertaking) provides that recipients of plant genetic 
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resources from the FAO-Multilateral System should not claim any intellectual 
property rights or other rights that limit the facilitated access to plant genetic 
resources for food and agriculture, or their genetic parts and components, in the 
form received. Should this approach be applicable to other subsets of biological 
diversity? From which sources? 
(3) Are patents on genes a barrier to research? 
Question: Are patents on genes (or gene fragments/derived gene products) a barrier 
to research? 
Main positions 
Pro Contra 
• Patents on genes grant broad claims that restrict 
the use of what are essentially research tools. 
Access to these tools, and hence the progress of 
science, is slowed down through the need to 
obtain multiple licenses and through the escala-
tion of research costs from license fees. (Argu-
ments 18-20, 8-34) 
• The problems of broad claims can be handled 
within the patent law. The claims have already 
been considerably down-sized through stringent 
application of the existing standards of pat-
entability. Some of the patents with broad claims 
may, in fact, be invalid. Moreover, research 
exemptions provide additional leverage to use 
patented inventions in subsequent (non-commer-
cial) research. (Arguments 21, 22, 23, 26) 
• Research institutes are not equipped to litigate 
invalid patents, and research exemptions are lim-
ited—in general they only allow one to work on, 
but not with, the patented invention. Therefore, 
licenses are still needed, and they often impose 
conditions (e.g. reach-throughs) that threaten the 
freedom of researchers to operate. (Arguments 
25, 27, 37, 43) 
• Patents on genes and license fees are appropri-
ate. Without them small companies, who account 
for a large part of the dynamics of biotechnology 
research, would not be viable. On the other hand, 
no rational company would try to suppress or 
control academic research on the basis of a claim 
to a gene. Nor would it try to collect damages 
from an academic patent infringer. (Arguments 
33, 36, 38, 40) 
 
Arguments  
Issue Pro Contra 
Blocking 
research? 
18. [Expert1] Gene patents are quite strong 
blocking rights, much stronger than tradi-
tional patents. [The BRCA patent] inhibits 
not just applications for diagnosis, but a lot 
of other applications using this gene as 
well; so this gene is blocked. … Research 
groups developing new protocols … are 
getting letters from people claiming patent 
rights and saying they shouldn’t be work-
ing on this. … The public is not getting 
access to new research because of these 
blocking rights. (M7/347-57)  
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Issue Pro Contra 
 19. [Expert2] If one company identifies one 
specific function of a gene and gets the 
product patent for the gene as such [this] 
basically would require every other user of 
that gene, even if the gene shall be used 
for completely different purposes, to 
require a license from the original patent 
holder. (M9/104-14)  
 
Broad claims 20. Those who wish to introduce a new 
pharmaceutical product must negotiate an 
unwieldy number of licenses with firms that 
have patents on various steps in the 
research. … The problem is likely to 
become increasingly serious in biotech-
nology ... where the practical limit of claim 
breadth seems to be only the imagination 
of the claim drafter. (Barton 2000: 1933) 
 
Rules restricting 
broad claims 
 21. [The scope of patents on DNA 
sequences is being restricted] The grant-
ing of comprehensive claims to down-
stream DNA products such as full length 
genes or to ultimate proteins is unlikely in 
the absence of a significant amount of 
information about the gene and protein 
being disclosed in the patent application. 
(Doll 1998:690) 
  22. [Patent offices of Europe, Japan and 
the U.S.] Regardless of whether the 
specific function (e.g., the relationship to a 
specific disease) of a receptor protein is 
disclosed, the claims for agonists (active 
compounds) in general identified by the 
said screening methods … do not meet 
enablement and/or support requirements, 
considering the general scope of the 
claims. (Trilateral Project 2001: 18) 
The defense of 
invalidity  
24. Under the current USPTO reexamina-
tion less than a quarter of the patents 
reexamined survive without change. 
(Barton 2000:1934). Only recently, several 
patents filed in the eighties on TAQ-
polymerase (an essential research tool 
with PCR) have been found to be invalid in 
the US and Europe (Nature Biotechnology 
2001: 607)  
23. [Patents on research tools that claim a 
broad range of research activities may be 
vulnerable to litigation.] They are more 
likely to be invalid for insufficient disclo-
sure because the original specification [at 
the time the patent application was filed] 
was not directed at that activity and may 
not have been contemplated it. 
(Gogoris/Ancona 2001: 1076) 
 25. [Researchers, especially from acade-
mia, may not be able to litigate the patent. 
Therefore, even invalid patents can have 
blocking impacts.] Current [U.S.] law 
creates a statutory presumption that 
strongly favors the holder of even an 
invalid patent. (Barton 2000: 1934) 
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Issue Pro Contra 
The defense of 
research 
exemptions 
27. Research exemptions are quite limited. 
German Patent Law grants the exemption 
only for research for testing purposes” (Art 
11, no. 2). This would, according to estab-
lished court rules, include the search for 
novel functions and applications of the 
protected genes. It would not, however, 
include the use of the gene as a tool for 
research that is work with rather than on 
the invention. 
26. [Industry2] There are things like 
research exemptions and compulsory 
licenses on working requirements, [so] 
even if we [as a company] were uncoop-
erative, people would have research 
access to our patented technology. 
(M9/337-45)  
Relevance of 
the problem 
28. Difficulties [are] created when research 
on complex systems is restricted by a 
thicket of patents on individual compo-
nents of the systems. (NIH 1997-1:7) 
 
 29. [Merck] Problems can arise when 
access to related components of biological 
systems is blocked. For example, … a 
rational approach to discovery of improved 
schizophrenia drugs would be to target 
specific dopamine receptors. But if differ-
ent companies hold patents on different 
receptors, the first path to an important 
and much needed therapeutic advance 
can be blocked. (NIH 1997-1:7)  
 
 30. Research on a complex system, for 
example receptor biology … [may] require 
obtaining multiple licenses on individual 
components of the system. (NIH 1997-1:7) 
 
 31. Proteins and even parts of proteins, 
characteristic arrangements of molecules 
(motifs), folds and subsections are already 
subject to the same welter of patent claim 
and counter-claim as DNA sequences. 
(Bobrow/Thomas 2001: 763)  
 
 32. [Bristol-Myers] The biomedical com-
munity has not yet truly grappled with the 
possibility that a large number of genes 
could be controlled by the rights of a 
relatively small number of parties (NIH 
1997-1:12) 
33. [Small biotechnology companies need 
patents to mobilize venture capital] There 
are upwards of 2,000 biotechnology 
companies in the United States; they 
represent a market capitalization of 60 
billion [US dollars], of which 46-7 billion a 
year is spent on research. (NIH 1997-1:6) 
The need to 
negotiate 
multiple 
licenses 
34. Patents on materials  … are essential 
research tools … e.g., receptors needed to 
screen drug candidates. … Because much 
research requires a multiplicity of such 
research tools, the stacking of royalties 
required greatly escalates research costs. 
(Murashige, 2000) 
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Issue Pro Contra 
The availability 
of licenses 
35. To learn as much as possible about 
the therapeutic effects and side effects of 
potential products at the pre-clinical 
stages, [researchers] want to screen 
products against all known members of 
relevant receptor families. But if these 
receptors are patented and controlled by 
different owners, gathering the necessary 
licenses may be difficult or impossible 
(Heller/Eisenberg 2000: 699) 
36. [Industry2] I don’t view my job as 
controlling other people’s right to do 
research. [Our company] freely grants 
research rights to the use of what some 
people think was a revolutionary research 
tool, the gene gun. … In fact it’s unethical 
for me as an attorney to imply that they 
don’t have the right to use the gene gun. 
(M9/171-86)  
Practices of 
companies 
holding patents 
on research 
tools 
37. Cetus Corporation initially offered the 
scientific community to license PRC under 
a reach-through agreement to pay royal-
ties on all second-generation products 
derived through research with PCR (NIH 
1997-1:4) 
38. Human Genome Sciences: “We would 
not block anyone in the academic world 
from using [the CCR5 receptor] for 
research purposes”. But if anyone wants to 
use the receptor to create a drug, HGS will 
enforce its claim. (Hollon 2000) 
 39. [Merck] We placed the Carrageen 
footpad assays in the public domain, and 
many companies used them to develop 
new drugs. Today, Merck would patent 
such an assay and use its patent to trade 
with other companies for access to other 
research tools. (NIH 1997-1: 7) 
40. Any attempt to suppress research on 
the basis of a claim to the gene itself is 
bound to attract opposition from a number 
of research groups and not solely in 
academia or hospitals. (Crespi 2001:10) 
  41. [Bristol-Myers] We all know that it is 
not good form to sue researchers in aca-
demic institutions and stifle their progress. 
Consequently, much potential litigation has 
been held in check. … I hope that this 
rational forbearance will continue. (NIH 
1997-2:5) 
  42. Damages in the case of patent 
infringement generally cannot be collected 
from an infringer who is merely engaging 
in research. (NIH 1997-2:5) 
 43. For-profit organizations must minimize 
the encumbrances they seek to impose 
upon not-for-profit organizations for the 
academic use of their tools. Reach-
through royalties or product rights, unrea-
sonable restraints on publication and 
academic freedom, and improper valuation 
of the tools impede the scientific progress 
whether imposed by a not-for-profit or for-
profit provider of research tools. (NIH 
1999) 
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Questions posed to the participants  
• Should the experimental use (research) exemptions be extended by adopting a 
kind of “fair use doctrine” that gives free access to patented matters for research 
purposes (except perhaps when the research tool is provided as a marketable 
product, e.g., an instrument or a test kit)? 
• Can “fair use” granted for research purposes be reliably distinguished from use for 
commercial development? 
• The impact of gene patents on the dynamics of biological research may be 
ambiguous. Blocked access to research tools can operate as a barrier for some 
research institutes. On the other hand, small biotechnology companies that 
develop such tools depend on intellectual property protection to raise the venture 
capital for their work. These companies contribute considerably to the dynamics 
of research. Should one treat this tension as a question of efficiency (resource 
allocation) or as a question of public policy principles (proper balance of private 
and public knowledge and research)? 
(4) Are patents on genes blocking innovation? 
Question:  Are patents on genes blocking the development of innovative products? 
Main positions 
Pro Contra 
• Patents on genes create monopolies for inven-
tions to be used early in the R & D path towards 
useful products. They grant the patent holder 
rights to veto (or to charge license fees for) a vast 
number of potential downstream products, 
including applications that were not known when 
the patent was filed. These rights block the effi-
cient translation of the invention into products. 
(Arguments 50, 52, 54, 58, 59) 
• The monopolies granted by patents are the 
proper price society pays for the incentives for 
invention and disclosure. The dynamics of bio-
technology research seem to suggest that the 
patent system functions and patents on genes do 
not pose great problems. New inventive applica-
tions of a patented invention can be protected by 
secondary patents (Arguments 51, 53, 57) 
• Secondary patents are dependent. A license for 
using the first invention is still needed. With pat-
ents on genes any useful product is likely to cross 
the boundaries of several patents. Royalty stack-
ing and reach-through licenses threaten to make 
the development of new products economically 
unfeasible. (Arguments 55, 58, 60) 
• Companies can retain freedom to operate 
through cross-licensing negotiations. Reach-
through agreements are not per se inequitable. 
They are a means to relate the value of the pat-
ented invention to market values; this method is 
also applied in benefit-sharing arrangements 
under the CBD. (Arguments 56, 61, 62, 63) 
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Arguments 
Issues Pro Contra 
 44. [Expert1]It is not in the public interest to 
have patents at the level below actual 
products; … [when you] have patents on 
genes there is no product in sight. 
(M9/1033-5; no. 994) 
45. [Bristol-Myers] If the gene was secured 
only after years of investigation. … Direc-
tors of corporate research ... would have to 
think hard before recommending a course 
of action that could result in widespread 
availability of that target in the community 
at large. (NIH 1997-2:4) 
 47. The patenting system should help 
people channel their energy towards 
inventions of genuine therapeutic or 
diagnostic value and discourage frenetic 
cataloguing DNA sequences that are a 
long way from being a final useful product. 
(Bobrow/Thomas 2001: 763) 
46. [Industry2] [We] disagree that the 
research plan that enables you to patent a 
gene does not have a product in sight. … 
A gene is halfway toward the ultimate 
product. (M9/1039-43, 48)  
Broad claims 48. [NGO1] Unlike chemicals genes have 
variation. If you have a variant, you will get 
a protein that behaves totally differently 
and [the use of that difference] is pre-
vented by that patent. (M9/420-2; no. 942) 
49. [Industry3] Agreement between us in 
terms of the undue breadth of claims that 
are granted … given the existence of a 
patentable invention. …The scope of the 
claim should be commensurate with a step 
forward in the art that the invention repre-
sents. (M9/562-7) 
Patents on 
genes create 
monopolies 
50. [Expert1]Gene patents are quite strong 
blocking rights, much stronger than tradi-
tional patents. [The BRCA patent] inhibits 
not just applications for diagnosis, but a lot 
of other applications using this gene as 
well. (M7/347-57)  
51. In any well-functioning patent system, 
by conferring monopolies in discoveries, 
patents necessarily increase prices and 
restrict use—a cost society pays to moti-
vate invention and disclosure. 
(Heller/Eisenberg 1998:699) 
 52. [Merck] Patents have slowed the 
progress of PCR products from the 
research laboratory to the marketplace. … 
Highly sensitive diagnostic tests for HIV 
RNA are too expensive for wide-spread 
use, largely because of the licensing fees 
charged by Roche. (NIH 1997-1:4) 
53. Once a product is patented, that patent 
extends to any use, even those that have 
not been disclosed in the patent. [How-
ever] a future non-obvious method of using 
that product may be patentable … [the 
inventor] is not prevented from obtaining 
the second patent. (Doll 1998: 690) 
 54. [Merck] A rational approach to discov-
ery of improved schizophrenia drugs would 
be to target specific dopamine receptors. 
But if different companies hold patents on 
different receptors, the first path to an 
important and much needed therapeutic 
advance can be blocked. (NIH-1:7) 
 
 55. If gene sequences are treated as 
separate “inventions”, any useful product 
is highly likely to cross the boundaries of 
several patents. (Bobrow/Thomas 
2001:763) 
56. [Industry2] Agree that even for a [big] 
company freedom to operate questions 
are very complex today. … [However] 
rights in genes are fair and reasonable and 
the techniques that exist including the 
patentability of second indications … have 
been shown to provide enough basis for 
[resolving the issues around] the uses of 
genes, because of the leverage for cross-
licensing situations, so we haven‘t had a 
problem yet. (M9/158; 348) 
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Issues Pro Contra 
Royalty stack-
ing 
58. When research on a complex system, 
for example receptor biology …, requires 
obtaining multiple licenses on individual 
components of the system, [the need] to 
pay substantial royalty fees on any useful 
application derived from that product … 
can swamp the development costs of 
some therapies to the point where devel-
opment is not economically feasible. (NIH 
1997-1:7) 
57. Just as the issuing of broad claims at 
the early stages of [polymer] technology 
did not deter development of [new] poly-
mers, the issuing of broad claims on 
genomic technology should not deter 
invention in genomics. (Doll 1998:689)  
Reach through 
license 
agreements 
59. The license for the use of its patented 
onco-mouse gives DuPont the right to 
participate in future negotiations to 
develop commercial products that fall 
outside the scope of their patent claims. 
The license terms permit DuPont to lever-
age its proprietary position in upstream 
research tools into a broad veto right over 
downstream research and product devel-
opment. (Heller/Eisenberg 1998:699) 
 
 60. Reach-through license agreements 
appear to become more prevalent. In 
practice, they may lead to [a blocking 
situation] as upstream owners stack 
overlapping and inconsistent claims on 
potential downstream products. 
(Heller/Eisenberg 1998: 699) 
61. Reach-through licensing creates a 
license the value of which can be meas-
ured. The value of basic research is 
usually not known. Thus, reach-through 
licensing may be necessary to compen-
sate for the use of a [patented] basic 
research invention. (Kowalski/Smolizza 
2000) 
  62. For-profit companies have offered 
minuscule lump sum execution fees that 
would barely cover the prosecution costs 
for patent protection for basic research, 
only to agree eventually to proper annual 
payments and royalties based on a per-
centage. (Kowalski/Smolizza 2000) 
Reach trough in 
benefit sharing 
for genetic 
resources 
 63. To demand reach-through royalties 
cannot be per se considered as inequita-
ble. Reach-through royalties may be a 
proper way of compensating the contrib-
uting of enabling technologies or genetic 
resources without which the end product 
would not have been viable. (Cf. also 
Circular 2 on Benefit Sharing)] 
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Questions posed to the participants 
• Is there a difference regarding the dependence of possible downstream inventions 
between patenting (and using) a gene/receptor and patenting (and using) building 
blocks of basic polymers?  
• Is there any empirical test to determine whether patents on genes do on balance 
operate as a barrier to the development of useful products from discoveries in 
genetics? 
• Is a tightening (strict observation) of the patentability standards sufficient to avert 
problems of too many dependency licenses in the development of new products? 
• Should the scope of product patent protection on DNA sequences be limited to 
certain specific functions which would have to be precisely stated and disclosed?  
• Would specific use and process claims (without granting any product patent 
protection) suffice to protect legitimate interests—given the mandatory TRIPS 
stipulation that process claims automatically extend to the product directly 
obtained? 
• Should guidelines be developed to distinguish and provide transparency of best 
practices deployed by companies whenever they make use of their legally granted 
patents on genes? 
(5) Patents on genes and developing countries 
Question: Are patents on genes undermining the access of Developing Countries 
(DC) to new technology? 
Main positions 
Pro Contra 
• To cope successfully with the intricacies and 
ramifications of the international patent system, 
especially to litigate dubious patents, is beyond 
the legal and economic capacities of most devel-
oping countries. (Arguments 67, 77, 79, 80) 
• To enforce patents through litigation is difficult 
and costly. Therefore, companies prefer to coop-
erate whenever possible, e.g. by licensing their 
research results out on reasonable and favorable 
terms. So there is ample room for the design of 
case-specific agreements that serve both the 
partners from DCs and the holders of the patents. 
(Arguments 73, 76, 88, 89) 
• Patents on genes in combination with restrictive 
licensing practices will undermine the technology 
transfer objectives of relevant international 
agreements such as the CBD and bar access to 
new and competitive technology. (Arguments 64, 
82, 83, 86) 
• There are explicit commitments (e.g. in the CBD) 
to facilitate access of DCs to relevant technolo-
gies using germplasm. These commitments can 
be expected to have impact. They are not only 
designed to benefit government agencies in DCs 
but private companies in the South as well. 
(Arguments 84, 85, 87, 90) 
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Arguments 
Issues Pro Contra 
Scope of the 
problem 
64. We need to find out whether current IP 
practices present a barrier of access to 
platform and enabling technologies that 
are most useful for developing countries. 
(Barton/Straus 2000) 
65. [Industry3] There are actually very few 
patents granted to companies from the 
North in poor Southern countries. (M9/657-
61)  
 67. [NGO8] We are moving towards a 
globalized economy with global imple-
mentation of patent law. Patent offices in 
Southern countries have not the capacity 
and cannot be expected to evaluate and 
litigate claims. (M9/623-30)  
66. [Industry2] We cannot afford the effort 
to file in countries where we don’t do 
business and where we don’t have an 
interest. (M9/657-61) 
Territoriality of 
patents 
68. [Industry2] Greenpeace claims that the 
issuance of a patent in Europe will prevent 
indigenous farmers from using existing 
materials in Mexico. (M9/282-93)  
69. [Industry2] There is no extraterritorial 
enforcement of patent properties. And if 
indeed the six varieties that were men-
tioned as existing in Mexico have the 
characteristics of the varieties that [com-
pany] is claiming then the patent will not 
be granted. So indigenous farmers in 
Mexico have nothing to worry about. 
(M9/282-93)  
Misperceptions 
of patent law 
70. [Expert2] Even the international agri-
cultural research system is under this 
misperception that they have to comply as 
an international institution with patents 
granted either only by the US or European 
patent office. Many obviously do not know 
that there is no license required. Most of 
the CGIAR centers are based in develop-
ing countries which have not granted those 
patents so far and they serve client coun-
tries which do not usually grant those 
patents. So the actual freedom to operate 
is not that much affected. (M9/729-40)  
71. [Industry2] There is a need to educate 
people as to the legal nature of intellectual 
property: no extra-territorial influence, 
research exemptions, national emergency 
provisions, compulsory licenses. (M9/827)  
 72. Information is also needed on whether 
research institutions, concerned about 
their relations with donors, are avoiding 
technologies that they are legally free to 
use in a limited context. Will international 
agricultural research institutes, for exam-
ple, distribute crop varieties containing a 
Bt gene that is unpatented in developing 
countries, but patented in donor countries? 
(Straus, 2001) 
 
Infringements 
not sued 
against poor 
farmers? 
74. [NGO3] [This is hardly general prac-
tice.] There are hundreds of prosecutions 
of farmers in North America over the 
question of the drifting of pollen from field 
to field. (M9/385-9) 
73. [Industry2] People who will be saving 
seed and planting materials and using it 
themselves are … not examples of 
infringement that cause us any concern; 
we don’t pursue anonymous infringement, 
we can’t afford it, we’re not rich enough 
(M9/309-12) 
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Issues Pro Contra 
Invalid patents 75. [Industry2] [There are examples] The 
Mexican white bean variety that was taken 
from Mexico somewhere and patented; it 
was derived and so most patent laws of 
the world would say that that’s not pat-
entable. (M9/952-5) 
 
Legal remedies 
too expensive? 
77. [NGO8] Sometimes people are actually 
intimidated by the existence of the patent 
and do not spend millions of dollars liti-
gating. (M9/305-6) 
76. [Industry2] Litigation on a patent is 
extremely expensive. It is not reasonable 
to assume that [Company] would assert a 
patent against an entity in Mexico knowing 
it was invalid. We do not operate that way. 
(M9/299-302) 
  78. [Industry3] Since there are so few 
patents granted to companies from the 
North in poor Southern countries the 
problem is not relevant. (M9/657-61)  
Capacity to 
litigate patents 
79. [NGO8] Bristol-Myers got through the 
patent office in Thailand a formulation 
patent that was in fact rejected in the US 
as not being novel. It’s a famous case 
within the access to medicine of a bogus 
patent. … To give people in the south 
recourse to the western size court system 
doesn’t really mean the same right. 
(M9/666-693) 
 
 80. [NGO8] A poor country cannot really 
litigate patents, they do not have the 
capacity to undo a bad claim. (M9/649-54)  
 
Easier 
mechanism to 
revoke patents? 
82. [Expert2] Given that many of the 
developing countries accept patent pre-
sentations on the basis that they have 
been granted in the US or in Europe… 
there could be a simplified procedure to 
revoke patents in developing countries 
which have been revoked in the northern 
country. I think that is at least an idea 
maybe one could agree on. (M9/709-16) 
81. [Industry2] When companies litigate in 
the United States they seek access to the 
file wrapper of the European Patent Office, 
and conversely … to look for arguments to 
determine whether patentability was 
correct. That’s routinely done around the 
world at present. (M9/720-3) 
Barriers to 
Technology 
Transfer? 
83. IPRs have an impact on the objectives 
of the Convention on Biological Diversity, 
this is most likely to occur in the context of 
technology transfer, rather than in the 
context of conservation and sustainable 
use. … Parties will need to take steps 
cooperatively to manage the influence of 
IPR to ensure that it is positive rather than 
negative. (UNEP/CBD/COP/3/22, para-
graph 5) 
84. Rules exist that require the contracting 
parties to the CBD to make technology 
using germplasm available to the provider 
countries on mutually agreed terms. This 
applies explicitly to technology protected 
by patents and other intellectual property 
rights … and includes transfer to private 
companies in the developing countries. 
(Seiler, Dutfield, 2001) 
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Issues Pro Contra 
  85. One of the key arguments made by 
advocates of stronger global IPRs is that 
such a system, as embodied in the TRIPS 
Agreement, would increase Foreign Direct 
Investment (FDI) in, and associated tech-
nology transfers to, developing countries. 
Theoretical analysis suggests that the 
impact of protecting IPRs is likely to be 
positive, although relatively unimportant in 
relation to other determinants of FDI. 
(UNCTAD, 1996) 
 86. The transfer of technology is important 
in enabling sustainable development. Both 
TRIPS (Art. 7) and the CBD seek to foster 
the transfer of technology. Art. 7 of TRIPS 
refers to the “transfer and dissemination of 
technology, to the mutual advantage of 
producers and users of technological 
knowledge”. Importantly Article 40.1 of 
TRIPS recognizes that the licensing or 
other use of intellectual property rights 
“may impede the transfer and dissemina-
tion of technology”. (EU/CEAS, 2000) 
87. The objectives of promoting techno-
logical innovation and the transfer of 
technology are usually mutually consistent 
since right holders are generally more 
willing to transfer technology voluntarily 
where a country’s IPR system provides 
effective protection. In addition, the disclo-
sure requirements of the patent system 
and exceptions to patent rights for experi-
mental use are designed to maximize the 
degree to which knowledge of new tech-
nology becomes publicly available and can 
be the basis for further technological 
development. (WTO-CTE, 1995) 
Cooperation  88. [Industry2] [For us] it’s much more 
profitable and interesting to be cooperative 
and to collaborate with people who are 
looking for research access to key-
enabling technologies. (M9/314-20) 
  89. [Industry1] [In joint ventures with 
developing countries] we are only con-
cerned that the rights we contribute will be 
used in that country and that the product 
that results will be used within that country 
and there is no export that would undercut 
other prior obligations. To that extent it 
really doesn’t matter to us whether intel-
lectual property rights were created. 
(M9/337-45) 
Freedom to 
operate of DC 
partners 
90. [Industry2] [In case the company 
excludes the right to export products 
resulting from the research cooperation] 
this may affect the viability of the product 
developed in the DC for the local entity. 
For example, economies of scale may not 
be achieved. In the worst case [such 
control] can [annul] the creativity and 
inventiveness of the local arena. (M9/542-
5)  
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Questions posed to the participants 
• Patents restrict, by definition, free access to protected technologies. Do DCs face 
specific problems in this respect if (and because) patent protection is extended to 
genes? What is the difference if technologies implying chemical compounds are 
patented? 
• Is there a need for mechanisms that make it easier for DCs to revoke patents that 
have already been challenged (invalidated) in Northern countries? 
• What can be done to make the cooperative strategies of companies (patent hold-
ers) reliable and stable? 
• Should (and could) patent laws be accommodated in the DCs to support and 
assure such cooperation? 
E2 Points to be Considered for Conclusions 
• Patents restrict, by definition, free access to protected technologies. Do DCs face 
specific problems in this respect if (and because) patent protection is extended to 
genes? What is the difference if technologies implying chemical compounds are 
patented?  
• Is there a need for mechanisms that make it easier for DCs to revoke patents that 
have already been challenged (invalidated) in Northern countries? 
• What can be done to make the cooperative strategies of companies (patent hold-
ers) reliable and stable? 
• Should (and could) patent laws be accommodated in the DCs to support and 
assure such cooperation? 
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